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INTRODUCTION
Trademark law is organized around a set of objectives
and assumptions that map badly onto the Internet. Trademark
law- is predominantly ordered around sectoral, geographic, and
national principles. In contrast, the Internet is defiantly
ignorant of national borders.' This tension has spawned a
number of legislative and quasi-public responses designed in
some cases to attempt to harmonize the two regimes, but more
often to bring the Internet into conformity with trademark law.
Of these, probably the most ambitious-and surely one of the
most flawed and unfair-is the Uniform Dispute Resolution
Policy2 ("UDRP") adopted by the Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers' ("ICANN") to provide a
mandatory arbitration-like process to regulate disputes over
domain name registrations by alleged "cybersquatters,"4 that
is, people who register domain names in order to resell them at
a profit to an owner of a corresponding trademark.
The UDRP is worth examining in detail because it is
being touted as a model for e-commerce dispute settlement by
industry spokespersons and policy entrepreneurs and soon
1 See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, The Internet as a Source of Regulatory
Arbitrage, in BORDERS IN CYBERSPACE 129 (Brian Kahin & Charles Nesson eds., 1997),
available at http://www.law.miami.edu/-froomkin/articles/arbitr.htm.
2 Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, Uniform Domain
Name Dispute Resolution Policy, available at http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-
-policy-24oct99.htm (Oct. 24, 1999) [hereinafter UDRP].
3 Arguably, ICANN itself could be said to be a by-product of this collision. For
discussions of ICANN see A- Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using
ICANN to Route around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17 (2000)
(critiquing formation and use of ICANN as a means to avoid public rulemaking),
available at http://www.law.miami.edu/-froomkin/articles/icann.htm; Jonathan
Weinberg, ICANN and the Problem of Legitimacy, 50 DUKE L.J. 187 (2000), available
at http'/www.law.duke.edu/shell/cite.pl?50+Duke+L.+J.+187.
4 Articles discussing related issues include Froomkin, supra note 3; A. Michael
Froomkin, Semi-Private International Rulemaking: Lessons Learned from the WIPO
Domain Name Process, in REGULATING THE GLOBAL INFORMATION SOCIETY 211
(Christopher T. Marsden ed., 2000) (critiquing procedures used by World Intellectual
Property Organization to contribute to private lawmaking), available at
http://www.law.miami.edu/-froomkin/articles/tprc99.pdf.
6 See, e.g., Juliana Guenwald, Intellectual Property Organization Stumped,
INTERACTIVE WEEK, Feb. 1, 2001, at http://www.zdnet.com/mtweek/stories/news/-
0,4164,2681274,00.html (noting speech by WIPO Assistant Director General Francis
Gurry praising UDRP as model); Brian Krebs, Regulators Would Do Well to Mimic
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may be required by treaty. The U.S. Department of Commerce
recently lauded the UDRP as "an efficient, inexpensive
procedure for the resolution of disputes."' Other governments
also have endorsed the UDRP in principle,' and at least
twenty-one apply the UDRP to registrations in their domestic
country-code top-level domains Many academic commentators
also have praised the UDRP,9 although some have been more
ICANN-White House, at http-//www.newsbytes.com/news/00/148011.html (Apr. 25,
2000) (summarizing a speech by Department of Commerce General Counsel Andrew
Pincus arguing that "[t]he federal government could put an end to its numerous
Internet regulatory headaches if it approached industry with the same type of
cooperation shown.., under the aegis of ICANN"); Masanobu Katoh, ICANN-A
Model for International Organizations in the 21st Century, at http'//www.mkatoh.net/-
speechlicannjkatohO72000-e.ppt (July 2000) (archiving PowerPoint slides from a
speech made by ICANN board member-elect arguing that ICANN could be a model for
global rulemakiag in the twenty-first century).
U.S. Dep't of Commerce, National Telecommunications and Information
Administration Annual Report 2000, available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntia-
home/annualrpt/2001/2000annrpt.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2001).
' See WIPO, ccTLD Best Practices for the Prevention and Resolution of
Intellectual Property Disputes, at http//ecommerce.wipo.int/domains/cctlds/best-
practices/bestpractices.html (Version 1: June 20, 2001) (endorsing UDRP as "an
excellent reference model and a valuable starting basis" for design of online dispute
resolution).
" See UDRPlaw.net, ccTLDs and International Domain Name Dispute
Resolution, at http://www.udrplaw.netctldDisputes.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2001).
Most of this work is either frankly results-oriented, focuses on an idealized
version of the UDRP, or limits itself to the substance of the rules rather than
confronting the UDRP's serious procedural failures. Examples include Shamnad
Basheer, Establishing Rights/Legitimate Interests in a Domain Name: Cyber Squatters
Get Creative, 7 COMPUTER AND TELECOMM. L. REV. 1 (2001); Leah Phillips Falzone,
Playing the Hollywood Name Game in Cybercourt: The Battle over Domain Names in
the Age of Celebrity-Squatting, 21 LOYOLA L.A. ENT. L. REV. 289 (2001) (praising
UDRP as tool for celebrities to wrest "their" names from cybersquatters); Patrick L.
Jones, Protecting Your "SportsEvent.com": Athletic Organizations and the Uniform
Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 5 W.VA. J. L. & TECH. 2.1 (2001), available at
http://www.wvu.edut-wvjolttArch/Jones/Jones.htm; Jason M. Osborn, Effective and
Complementary Solutions to Domain Name Disputes: ICANNs Uniform Domain Name
Dispute Resolution Policy and the Federal Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act
of 1999,76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 209 (2000); John G. White, ICANN's Uniform Domain
Name Dispute Resolution Policy In Action, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 229 (2001); Yun
Zhao, A Dispute Resolution Mechanism for Cybersquatting, 3 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP.
849 (2000); Donna L. Howard, Comment, Trademarks and Service Marks and Internet
Domain Names: Giving ICANN Deference, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 637, 664 (2001) ("[Mjost of
ICANN's [sic] decisions so far have been slam-dunks ... ICANN's dispute resolution
policy... is working and the public is satisfied.").
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critical. ° Most worryingly, the latest draft of the intellectual
property section of the draft Free Trade Area of the Americas
("FTAA") agreement includes a proposal that signatory states
mandate the UDRP for the resolution of domain-name
disputes."
'0 See Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Going Private: Technology, Due Process, and
Internet Dispute Resolution, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 151 (2000); Ian L. Stewart, The Best
Laid Plans: How Unrestrained Arbitration Decisions Have Corrupted the Uniform
Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 53 FED. COMM. L.J. 509 (2001). A more mixed
view appears in Laurence R. Helfer & Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Designing Non-National
Systems: The Case of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 43 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 141 (2001), where after noting some of the UDRP's flaws the authors
optimistically suggest that once they are cured, and especially once a more legitimate
process is found to enact it, the UDRP should serve as a model for future adjudicatory
processes.
" See FTAA-Free Trade Area of the Americas, Draft Agreement, at
http'//www.ftaa-alca.org/ftaadraft/eng/ngip-e.doc (July 3, 2001). The relevant text,
bracketed to indicate it is still subject to negotiation, is:
Article XX. [Domain names on the Internet
1. Parties shall participate in the Government Advisory Committee
(GAC) of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN) to promote appropriate country code Top Level Domain
(ccTLD) administration and delegation practices and appropriate
contractual relationships for the administration of the ccTLDs in the
Hemisphere.
2. Parties shall have their domestic Network Information Centers
(NICs) participate in the ICANN Uniform Dispute Resolution
Procedure (UDRP) to address the problem of cyber-piracy of
trademarks.]
Article XX. [Cancellation and transfer of domain name
In the event that a well known distinctive sign has been
inappropriately registered in the country of the Party, as part of a
domain name or electronic mail address of an unauthorized third
party, on request by the owner or legitimate rightholder of that sign,
the competent authority shall consider the matter and, where
appropriate, shall order cancellation or amendment of the registration
of such domain name or electronic mail address, in accordance with
the respective national law, provided that use thereof would be liable
to have one of the following effects:
1. Risk confusion or association with the owner or legitimate right-
holder of the sign, or with his or her establishments, activities,
products or services;
2. Cause unfair economic or commercial injury to the owner or lawful
rightholder of the sign, arising from a dilution of its distinctive force
or commercial or publicity value;
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The UDRP was controversial even before its birth. On
the one hand, trademark owners originally objected that it was
too weak and narrow, and would not serve to adequately
protect their rights; opponents objected that the courts already
adequately protected legitimate trademark interests, and
UDRP gave trademark holders de facto rights in excess of
those provided by law. With about 4,300 decisions rendered
between December 1999 and February 2002, covering more
than 7,500 domain names, plus almost 400 additional cases
pending,2 it is time to apply some hindsight to this debate.
Analysis of the original World Intellectual Property
Organization ("WIPO") proposals and of the UDRP's
procedures is particularly timely now as WIPO is releasing a
second round of potentially sweeping recommendations for
further restrictions on domain name registrations13  and
3. Make unfair use of the prestige of the sign, or of the good name of
its owner or lawful rightholder.
The action of cancellation or amendment shall prescribe, for a period
of five (5) years from the date on which the disputed domain name or
electronic mail address was registered, or from the date on which
electronic media, whichever period expires later, except where the
registration was made in bad faith, in which case the action shall not
be prescribed. This action shall not affect any other action that might
be available with respect to injuries and damages under common law.]
Id.
12 See http'//www.icann.org/udrp/proceedings-stat.htm (last visited Feb. 14,
2002).
,3 WIPO described the objectives of the second round process as seeking to
combat the
I. the bad faith, abusive, misleading or unfair use of personal names,
II. International Nonproprietary Names (INNs) for Pharmaceutical
Substances, recommended by the World Health Organization in
order to protect patient safety worldwide
III.names of international intergovernmental organizations (such as
the United Nations or WIPO itself)
IV. geographical indications, indications of source or geographical
terms
V. tradenames
See generally WIPO, Second WIPO Internet Domain Process, at http//wipo2.wipo.int-
process2l (last visited Mar. 27, 2002). The last category in particular is rather broad.
Subsequent to the submission of this Article for publication, WIPO published
the final report of its second-round process. See WIPO, The Recognition of Rights and
the Use of Names in the Internet Domain Name System, at http://wipo2.wipo.intl-
process2/report/html/report.html (Sept. 3, 2001). WIPO recommended that the UDRP
or a similar mechanism be adopted to protect INNs, names of international
intergovernmental organizations, but not personal names, geographic indications, or
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ICANN's review of the UDRP is under way.14
The UDRP derives its force from ICANN's de facto
control of a critical Internet resource.15 Anyone who wishes to
have a domain name visible to the Internet at large must
acquire it from a registrar who has the right to inscribe names
in an ICANN-approved domain name registry. ICANN
determines which registries are authoritative. This power to
make and break registries allows ICANN to require registries
(and also registrars) to promise to subject all registrants to a
mandatory third-party beneficiary clause in which every
registrant agrees to submit to ICANN's UDRP upon the
request of aggrieved third parties who believe they have a
superior claim to the registrant's domain name. In so doing,
the UDRP has, to some extent, privatized and
internationalized trademark law, although it co-exists with
national law. In the United States, for example, abusive
registration of domain names is regulated by the Anti-
Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act 6 ("ACPA"), enacted
almost simultaneously with ICANN's adoption of the UDRP.
Part I of this Article introduces the political and
technical background that produced the UDRP and discusses
the main precursor to the UDRP, the WIPO Report entitled
The Management of Internet Names and Addresses: Intellectual
Property Issues7 which proposed a new global domain name
regulatory regime optimized for trademark protection. Part II
sets out the main features of the UDRP and ICANN's
accompanying rules of procedure and compares them to
trade names on the grounds that international consensus law on these three subjects
was not insufficiently uniform at present, making a single global rule impracticable
unless the law develops further. Id.
14 ICANN originally announced the review would take place in 2000, see
http://www.icann.org/minutes/minutes-06jun00.htm (June 6, 2000) (referring to review
"later this year") but inexplicably delayed it. Currently, the domain name supporting
organization ("DNSO"), a subsidiary body of ICANN, has established a study "task
force" of which I am a member. See ICANNWatch, Names Council Selects UDRP Task
Force Members, at http://www.icannwatch.orgarticle.php?sid=317 (last visited Mar.
27, 2002). As of mid-February 2002, the Task Force had yet to make or formulate draft
recommendations or even discuss them.
's See generally Froomkin, supra note 3.
I6 Pub. L. No. 106-43 §§ 3(a)(2), 5, 113 Stat. 218, 220 (1999).
17 World Intellectual Property Organization, The Management of Internet
Names and Addresses: Intellectual Property Issues-Final Report of the WIPO Internet
Domain Name Process, at http://wipo2.wipo.int/processl/reporttfinalreport.html (last
visited Mar. 18, 2002) [hereinafter WIPO Final Report].
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WIPO's proposals.18 Part III offers a number of practical
suggestions for reform of the procedural aspects of the UDRP.
I. PRE-HISTORY OF THE UDRP
While trademark law's assumptions about the local and
sectoral use of trademarks work badly on the Internet because
content in one location can be viewed anywhere, those
assumptions work especially badly with the Internet
addressing system known as the Domain Name System
("DNS"). Trademarks and service marks 9 are intended to be a
user-friendly shorthand for an expected level of product
attributes, including quality. Trademark law seeks to protect
consumers from fraud, counterfeiting, and confusion, and to
protect the goodwill that businesses build up in their
trademarks. If someone passes off inferior goods by affixing a
competitor's trademark, or something that looks confusingly
similar to it, both consumer expectations and supplier goodwill
suffer.
Traditionally, however, a trademark does not give a
trademark holder exclusive rights over every possible
commercial use of a trademarked word or term, especially if
the word or term is not coined or famous; even the holders of
the strongest marks must accept that others will use them for
legitimate non-commercial purposes. Indeed, trademark law
allows multiple, concurrent, uses of the same word or name by
different people in the same business in different places, or by
substantially different businesses in the same place, so long as
they are not in competition and there is no danger of
significant consumer confusion. Reflecting its origins in the
domestic law of multiple nations, trademark law has been
organized predominantly on sectoral, geographic, and national
principles. With the exception of a small class of "famous"
names (e.g., "Coca-Cola") where the assumption is that
consumers in the region where the mark is famous would
"' ICANN, Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, at
http://www.icann.org/udrpludrp-rules-24oct99.htm (Oct. 24, 1999) [hereinafter UDRP
Rules].
,9 For the purposes of this Article I will use "trademark" to mean "trade or
service mark" unless otherwise specified. There are some differences, but none that
affect a discussion at this level of generality.
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reasonably associate the name with any type of goods on which
it might appear, the guiding principle behind much of
trademark law is that it best achieves its purposes by limiting
the reservation of rights in a name" to the type of goods and
location where those goods are sold. "Joe's Pizza" can get a
trademark in the town where it sells pizza, but not in the
whole state or the whole country, and different Joe's Pizzas can
dot the landscape so long as they do not serve overlapping
territories. If one Joe's Pizza becomes a national business, it
cannot undermine the pre-existing rights of the Joe's Pizzas
already extant, but it can more or less prevent them from
expanding their markets. Similarly, Apple Computer coexists
internationally with Apple Records because those businesses
offer different classes of goods and services.
With the exception of some treaty-based registration
systems that allow multiple registration in a unified process,
trademarks are issued by national governments, one country at
a time, and for one or only a few categories of goods of services
at a time. Thus, a firm can trademark the word "United" for air
transport, but this will not extend to moving vans unless the
firm is in that business also. Trademark registrations
generally require use to remain effective. While they are in
effect, they give the holder important rights against others who
would unfairly capitalize on the mark's goodwill by confusing
consumers. Equally important, trademarks protect consumers
against sellers who might seek to pass off their goods as
produced by the mark holder. As a general matter, however, in
the United States at least, trademark infringement requires
commercial use by the infringer. Absent commercial use, some
type of unfair competition, or a very small number of other
specialized offenses (e.g., "tarnishment" of a mark by
associating it with obscenity), trademark law does not make
the use of the mark an offense. Thus, for example, in the
United States as in most other countries, there are many
permitted commercial and non-commercial uses of a basic
dictionary word such as "united," including parody, criticism,
names of pets, and references in literature, despite the
existence of a plethora of trademarks including the word.
20 Or symbol or other identifier, but as there is no way to express these directly
in a domain name we can ignore them for present purposes.
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Unless the mark falls into the small category of "famous"
marks, it is generally permissible to make commercial use of a
name trademarked by another so long as it is not likely to
cause customer confusion.21 Even if a mark is famous, some
types of commercial use remain available, including accurate
comparative advertising, news reporting, news commentary,
and other "nominative fair uses" where the trademarked term
is the only way to identify the thing being discussed.'
In contrast to trademark law's ability to tolerate
multiple users of the same mark, the Internet enforces a
greater degree of uniqueness. Every resource attached to the
Internet must have a unique Internet Protocol ("IP') number.
Without an identifying number no one can find the resource,
and without a unique number correspondents would have no
way of controlling which identified resource received a
communication. IP numbers are a thirty-two bit number
consisting of four octets (sets of eight binary digits) that specify
a network address and a host ID on a TCP/IP network.' These
"dotted quads"--four numbers separated by three periods-are
hard to remember and hard to type, so the Internet also relies
on optional but ubiquitous human-friendly names to help
people identify the resources with which they wish to
communicate. 24 These are domain names.25
Domain names are the alphanumeric text strings to the
right of an "@" symbol in an e-mail address, or immediately
following the two slashes in a World Wide Web address.
Thanks to a massively distributed hierarchical system for
2' For a recent reaffirmation of this principle, see Playboy Enters., v. Welles,
279 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2002).
22 See New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir.
1992).
The text describes IPv4 which is the most commonly used standard. IPv6
will expand the IP numbers to a dotted sextet, thus easing the current shortage of IP
numbers. See generally STEVE KING ET AL., THE CASE FOR IPv6 at 4 (1999), available at
http-/www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-iab-case-for-ipv6-05.txt (touting IPv6's
"enhanced features, such as a larger address space and improved packet formats");
IPv6: Networking for the 21" Century, available at http://www.ipv6.org (last visited
Mar. 18, 2002).
24 See P. Mockapetris, Internet Engineering Task Force, Request for Comments
("RFC") 1034, Domain Names-Concepts and Facilities 29, at http://www.ietf.orgrfc/-
rfc1034.txt (Nov. 1987).
25 The next few paragraphs are drawn from previously published articles by
myself.
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resolving domain names to IP numbers, the DNS Internet
software can rapidly and invisibly convert a domain name to
its IP number. Thus, for example, a properly designed
Internet browser presented with a domain name in a uniform
resource locator ("URL") such as http://www.law.miami.edu
will contact a DNS server, request the corresponding IP
number, http://129.171.187.10, and then direct a request to
that resource. Domain naming conventions treat a domain
name as having three parts: in the address www.miami.edu,
for example, "edu," the rightmost part, is the top-level domain
("TLD"), while "miami" is the second-level domain ("SLD"), and
any other parts are lumped together as third or higher-level
domains. Domain names are just conventions, and the names
of the current TLDs are, from a technical point of view, purely
arbitrary.
Users cannot claim a TLD of their own.28 For a fee,
however, a user can acquire exclusive rights29 to a SLD in any
26 See generally ELLEN RONY & PETER RONY, THE DOMAIN NAME HANDBOOK
26, 31-32 (1998).
27 See Neil Randall, How DNS Servers Work, PC MAG., Sept. 24, 1996, at 217;
Neil Randall, What Happens When You Click, PC MAG., Oct. 22, 1996, at 245.
28 At least, not in the legacy root; almost anything is possible in the
independent roots but these are ignored by the large majority of Internet users, and
are inaccessible to the growing number of users who cannot choose their DNS provider
because it is set by an upstream service provider.
29 The precise nature of the right one acquires by entering into a domain
registration contract with a registrar or registry is a subject of both debate and strong-
arm tactics. Registries have an interest in minimizing the rights that accrue to their
customers, and in particular in ensuring that whatever the nature of the right it does
not sound in "property"; their preferred characterization of the relationship is that a
registrant enters into a service contract. For a particularly striking example of this see
Bret Fausett's markup of the changes in Great Domain's terms of service after their
acquisition by Verio, http://www.lextext.com/GDUser.pdf (last visited Mar. 18, 2002).
In Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro Int'l, Inc., 529 S.E.2d 80 (Va. 2000), the
Supreme Court of Virginia held that a registrants interest in a domain name was
merely contractual and hence could not be garnished. See id. at 80. On the other hand,
Congress recently passed the ACPA, §§ 3(a)(2), 5, which authorizes in rem actions
against domain names. Since in rem proceedings are traditionally used to attach
property, this argues that domain names are property. The Umbro court, however, was
completely unpersuaded by this reasoning, see 529 S.E.2d at 86 n.12, as it was by
Network Solutions, Inc.'s concession at trial that domain names are a form of
intangible personal property. See id. at 86. If that is correct, then ACPA creates a
statutory in rem proceeding for non-property, which is novel and might in some cases
have due process/minimum contacts problems. See, e.g., Veronica M. Sanchez, Taking a
Byte out of Minimum Contacts: a Reasonable Exercise of Personal Jurisdiction in
Cyberspace Trademark Disputes, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1671 (1999).
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TLD that will accept her registration. The registrant may then
create as many third or higher-level domains as she wishes
under that SLD. The number and names of TLDs are set by the
maintainer of the authoritative "root" file from which, by
convention (not law), all other participants in the DNS copy
their data.0 Although there is no technical obstacle to creating
new TLDs, there have been numerous political obstacles to new
TLDs, not least the concerns of trademark holders that new
TLDs would dilute their brands, provide new opportunities for
customer confusion, or subject the holders to ransom demands
from cybersquatters.
Internet czar Jon Postel fixed the original list of top-
level domains in 1984."' Although new country codes were and
are added routinely,32 there was a long-standing freeze on the
creation of new generic TLDs ("gTLDs") that ended only in late
2001."s Thus, during the 1990s, registrants focused heavily on
the three gTLDs then open to them, and especially on .com.
Today, the DNS system used by the vast majority of Internet
users4 is made up of 244 two-letter country code TLDs
30 A root file is the data file containing the addresses of the machines that
carry the authoritative registries for each TLD. See Froomkin, supra note 3, at 43-44.
To be more precise, the root file is copied to the "A" root server. The B-L root servers
copy their data from "A"; everyone else copies from one of the root servers or from
someone who has a cached downstream copy of the original data. There can be many
intermediaries in the chain.
3 J. Postel & J. Reynolds, Internet Engineering Task Force, RFC 920, Domain
Requirements, at http'/www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc0920.txt (Oct. 1984).
32 For example, the U.S. Department of Commerce created .ps for Palestine
upon a recommendation from the so-called Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
("IANA7), a subsidiary of ICANN, in 2000. See LANA Report on Request for Delegation
of the .ps Top-Level Domain, at http:J/vww.icann.org/general/ps-report-22mar00.htm
(Mar. 22, 2000).
In a long, expensive, and convoluted process, ICANN chose a list, sometimes
called the not-so-magnificent seven, of new gTLDs it would recommend be added to the
root: .aero, .biz, .coop, .info, .museum, .name, and .pro. For the go-live dates, starting
with .info on Sept. 23, 2001, see Netcraft, Netcraft Web Server Survey, (Feb. 2002),
http'J/www.netcraft.com/survey/. Of these seven new TLDs, ICANN intended .biz, .info,
and .name, "to be relatively large, 'unsponsored' TLDs" and generally open to most or
all registrants, but intended .aero, .coop, and .museum to be smaller, "sponsored,"
TLDs with much more restrictive registration criteria. If and when it goes live, .pro
will be a type of "unsponsored" TLD. See ICANN, New TLD program,
http'/www.icann.org/tlds/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2002).
34 In addition to the "legacy root" TLDs discussed in this Article, there are a
large number of "alternate" TLDs that are not acknowledged by the majority of domain
name servers. See RONY & RONY, supra note 26, at 513-72 (describing the "Alterweb").
There is no technical bar to their existence, and anyone who knows how to tell his
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("ccTLDs"), fourteen three-letter gTLDs, and one four-letter
TLD (.arpa).35 Domains registered in ccTLDs and gTLDs are
equally accessible from any computer on the Internet.
Until last year, there were only three gTLDs open to
anyone who could afford to pay for a registration: .com, .org
and .net. Other gTLDs in existence since 1984 impose
additional criteria for registration: .mil (U.S. military), 6 .gov
(U.S. government),37 .int (international organizations), .edu
(institutions of higher education, mostly U.S.-based), and
.arpa.3 8 In November 2000, following a complex and convoluted
process, ICANN approved in principle the creation of seven
new gTLDs" Before each of these new TLDs could become
active, the ICANN-approved registry had to negotiate a
contract with ICANN and then receive the approval of the U.S.
Department of Commerce, which currently has the final say on
whether a new gTLD is created." As of mid-February 2002, six
of the seven new TLDs had run this year-long gauntlet and
software to use an alternate domain name server can access both the "legacy root" and
whatever alternate TLDs are supported by that name server. Thus, for example,
choosing to get domain name services from 205.189.73.102 and 24.226.37.241 makes it
possible to resolve http/lighting.faq, where a legacy DNS would only return an error
message.
35 A list of the ccTLDs, gTLDs, and their registries (NICs) appears at World
Internetworking Alliance, TLD Registries, at http'/www.wia.org/database/DNS regist-
ries.htm (Aug. 19, 2000).
36 Delegation of the .mil domain is under the authority of the DDN NIC. See D.
Engebretson & R. Plzak, Internet Engineering Task Force, RFC 1956, Registration in
the MIL Domain 1, at http://www.isi.eduin-notes/rfc1956.txt (June 1996).
37 Delegation of the .gov TLD is under the authority of the U.S. Federal
Networking Council ("FNC"). See FNC, Internet Engineering Task Force, RFC 1816,
U.S. Government Internet Domain Names 1, at http'//www.isi.edu/in-notes/rfcl8l6.txt
(Aug. 1995).
38 The .arpa domain is used for all reverse IP lookups and is about to be
expanded to include other infrastructure functions. See, e.g., P. Faltstrom, Internet
Engineering Task Force, E.164 Number and DNS draft-ietf-enum-e164-dns-03, at
http://www.ietf.orglinternet-drafts/draft-ietf-enum-e164-dns-03.txt (Aug. 18, 2000)
(proposing a method of using the DNS for storage of telephone numbers, relying on
domain e164.arpa) (on file with author).
39 For ICANN's description of the process see ICANN, New TLD Program, at
http://www.icann.orgltlds/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2002). For a more realistic view see
JONATHAN WEINBERG, ICANN AS REGULATOR (forthcoming 2002).
40 The Department of Commerce reserved this right in Cooperative Agreement
No. NCR-9218742, Amendment 11, http'//www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname-
proposals/docnsil00698.htm (Oct. 6, 1998).
[Vol. 67: 3
2002] ICAAN's UNIFORM DISPUTE RESOLUTION POLICY 619
were active,4 although they had not registered huge numbers
of names.42
The 244 ccTLDs are almost all derived from the
International Organization for Standardization's ISO Standard
3166.43  The ccTLDs sometimes have rules that make
registration difficult or even next to impossible" or
semantically unattractive; as a result, the gTLDs, especially
.com, have the lion's share of the registrations. However, an
increasing number of ccTLDs, such as .tv or .to, began acting
as gTLDs and accepted registrations from anywhere, albeit at
a price.
Domain names, or at least short ones,45 are easy to use.
But under the current system they must be unique, or DNS
servers as currently designed will not know which IP address
to return when confronted with a domain name.4' As
businesses stampeded onto the Internet in the late 1990s, they
41 See http'J/www.icann.org/tlds/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2002).
42 Both .info and .name claim over 500,000 active names, see .info, 500,000
.INFO Registrations in Less Than 90 Days, at http:I/www.nic.info/news/pressrel-
eases/pr._articles200l-10-23-01 (Oct. 23, 2001); NeuLevel, .Biz Exceeds a Half Million
Registrations in First Month, at httpl/www.nic.bizlpresslpressjreleaselprar-
chive_2000_200112001.12.13.html (Dec. 13, 2001), but these numbers pale in
comparison to the millions of registrations in .com.
43 See ISO 3166-1:1997, Codes for the Representation of Names of Countries
and Their Subdivisions-Part I: Country Codes, Deutsches Institut fir Normung, at
http://www.din.delgremien/nas/nabdfiso3l66malcodlstpl/enjistpl.html (last modified
June 12, 2001). The ISO, a private standards body, has created these codes for
computer information systems processing purposes. It is not a treaty organization. See
International Organization for Standardization, Frequently Asked Questions, at
http'//www.iso.ch/infoe/faq.htm (last modified Nov. 29, 1999).
Not every ccTLD is necessarily controlled by the government that has
sovereignty over the territory associated with that country code, however. This is likely
to be an area of increasing controversy, as (some) governments argue that the ccTLD
associated with "their" two-letter ISO 3166 country code is somehow an appurtenance
of sovereignty. See Berkman Center for Internet and Society, Communiqud of the
Government Advisory Committee, at http'J/cyber.law.harvard.edu/icann/santiago/arch-
ive/GAC-Comminuque-mtg3.html (last modified Aug. 24, 1999) (asserting that
"delegation of a ccTLD Registry is subject to the ultimate authority of the relevant
public authority or government").
44 Many ccTLDs have far more restrictive rules, including limits on the
number of registrations per person or firm, the type of domain name available, and on
its relationship to nationally protected intellectual property.
," But see http'//llanfairpwllgwyngyllgogerychwyrndrobwllllantysiliogogogoch.-
corn, the domain name incorporating the name of the Welsh village, which is not easy
to type.
46 See Brian Carpenter, LAB Technical Comment on the Unique DNS Root,
available at http'J/www.iab.orgselected-iab-documents.html (May 2000).
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quickly came to view domain names as an important identifier,
or even as a brand name. Once domain names were thought of
as a brand, it quickly led businesses to the conclusion that
trademarks might or should imply rights to corresponding
domain names. Of course it is possible for multiple different
parties to register the same second-level domain in different
TLDs. Law.com, law.org, law.net, and law.tm all point to very
different web sites. But especially before ccTLDs sensed a
market opportunity and began accepting foreign registrations,
the number of TLDs open to businesses in Europe and North
America was small. And even as the number of options grew
slightly, businesses were convinced that one piece of Internet
real estate-.com-was the prime place to be.
Unfortunately for these businesses, registration of SLDs
in the three existing gTLDs (.com, .org, and .net) and in the
ccTLDs which emulate them, is on a first-come, first-served
basis. No questions are asked about the proposed use, or about
possible trademark conflicts. Registrants are asked only to
identify themselves, give administrative and technical
contacts,47 and list two name servers prepared to resolve the
domain name. Today, both ccTLDs and gTLDs require
payment at the time of registration, but until July, 1999, the
dominant gTLD registrar waited thirty days before sending a
bill and then gave additional time to pay, thus creating a long
float.48 As there was no limit to the number of names a person
could register, name speculators quickly understood that they
could register names and seek buyers for them without risking
any capital.49 While some speculators sought common words
with multiple possible uses, a few others-who became known
as cybersquatters-registered thousands of names that
corresponded to the trademarks of companies that had not yet
found the Internet and then sought to resell (or, some would
say, ransom) the name to those companies.
47 All three can be the same person at the same address.4 8 See Todd Spangler, NSI Adopts Prepayment Model, ZDNET INTER@CTIVE
WEEK ONLINE (July 22, 1999) (noting the change from the thirty-day policy to payment
in advance), at http://www.zdnet.com/intweek/stories/news/0,4164,2298737,00.htm.
49 For a survey of the law and equities of name speculation, see generally
Jessica Litman, The DNS Wars: Trademarks and the Internet Domain Name System, 4
J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 149 (2000).
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Because the Lanham Act requires commercial use
before a court will find trademark infringement,50 it seemed
arguable that mere registration without use was legal, and
that the brokers/cybersquatters had found a costless way to
profit. "1 Even persons who were engaged in organized large-
scale cybersquatting, which became clear trademark
infringement after Panavision Int'l v. Toeppen, 2  could
reasonably expect that the settlement value of their essentially
meritless defenses to a claim of trademark infringement might
run into thousands of dollars, since even a simple federal
trademark action would cost that much or more in lawyers'
fees and management time.
At the other extreme, some trademark holders
suggested that ownership of a trademark in a word should
confer a preemptive right on a corresponding domain name in
.com, or perhaps in all TLDs with open registration. The
absurdity of this position is demonstrated by the fact that
given the sectoral and geographic nature of trademark law, it
is common to find multiple holders of rights in the same word
in the same place, not to mention the same country or planet.
Attempting to shoehorn all the different firms called "acme"
into one TLD, or even three, ensures that conflicts will arise
between multiple owners of a trademark in the same string of
characters. As Mr. Justice Neuberger stated, the owners may
be
sectorally separate (same country, but different use or different
category of goods and services), e.g., United Airlines and United
Parcel Service may both want united.com; or
geographically separate (same business, but different countries or
regions within a country), e.g., Joe's Pizza in the two college towns of
your choice; or
both sectorally and geographically separate, e.g., Prince Tennis
rackets and Prince consultants.
5 3
so 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2001).
61 See Litman, supra note 49, at 154-55.
52 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that pattern of offering domain names
for sale to mark holders was "use in commerce" of the mark sufficient to violate
Lanham Act).
3Prince plc v. Prince Sports Group, Inc. [1998] F.S.R. 21 (Ch. Div.).
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Not every string conflict, however, necessarily involves
a claim of misuse of a domain and not all warehousing is
necessarily a misuse. For example, firms sometimes acquire
domains with the same name as a trademark they have
registered even though they do not intend to use the domain.
This warehousing prevents someone else from using the same
name and potentially causing customer confusion." Similarly,
firms and others sometime acquire domains for future use. A
firm may register a domain name before trademarking a term
as part of the often-secret process of preparing a new product
or campaign. These practices gave rise to the concern that
without new gTLDs, large amounts of the namespape might
become unavailable to new and even established users with
new projects, a concern that later proved justified.
A. The White Paper
Faced with a first-come first-served domain name
registration system in which those who were first wanted
money from the latecomers, trademark owners and others
naturally felt aggrieved, even extorted. Their distress blocked
the addition of new TLDs, which they thought would aggravate
their problems (although in fact it would have solved the
shortage problem at the price of aggravating the potential
confusion and dilution problems), and got the attention of the
White House and the Commerce Department's inter-agency
task force charged with imposing some order on the increasing
controversy over domain name policy.
In the White Paper that emerged from the convoluted
U.S. government policy process-formally known as the U.S.
Department of Commerce's Statement of Policy on Management
It is interesting to note, however, that trademark law has a strong policy
against the warehousing of names. If a name is not in actual use, or about to be used in
a very short period, the trademark law offers no protection. See La Socidt6 Anonym6
des Pafums Le Galion v. Jean Patou, Inc., 495 F.2d 1265, 1274 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding
that token, sporadic, or nominal use of a name intended only for trademark
maintenance is insufficient to establish or maintain trademark rights).
5 It might also have solved the cybersquatting problem, if foreseeable supply
increased to the point where speculation seemed pointless.
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of Internet Names and Addresses5 -- the government took
something of a middle-of-the-road position. It agreed that
trademark owners were being victimized by so-called cyber-
pirates who registered domain names to sell them to the
corresponding trademark holder. But rather than proposing
direct action, the White Paper called on WIPO to conduct a
study and make recommendations for what would become
ICANN. WIPO, it said, should:
[IUnitiate a balanced and transparent process, which includes the
participation of trademark holders and members of the Internet
community who are not trademark holders, to (1) develop
recommendations for a uniform approach to resolving
trademark/domain name disputes involving cyberpiracy (as opposed
to conflicts between trademark holders with legitimate competing
rights), (2) recommend a process for protecting famous trademarks
in the generic top level domains, and (3) evaluate the effects, based
on studies conducted by independent organizations, such as the
National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences, of
adding new gTLDs and related dispute resolution procedures on
trademark and intellectual property holders. These findings and
recommendations could be submitted to the board of the new
corporation 7]1 for its consideration in conjunction with its
development of registry and registrar policy and the creation and
introduction of new gTLDs."
5 8
Thus, while certainly feeling the pain of the trademark
owners, the White Paper also acknowledged the existence of
countervailing legitimate rights. Notably, the White Paper's
recommendations distinguished between, on the one hand,
domain name disputes between two trademark holders which
would not be covered by the proposed recommendations and, on
the other hand, domain name disputes between a trademark
holder and someone without a trademark, which would be the
new system's sole focus.59 This distinction was incorporated
Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 FED. REG. 31,741 (June
10, 1998), available at httpl/www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/6_5_98dns.htm
[hereinafter White Paper].
5 The Department of Commerce later recognized ICANN as this "new
corporation."
es White Paper, supra note 56, at 31,747.
"9 A similar distinction pre-dated the White Paper. NSIs draconian dispute
policy "froze" (rendered inoperative) any domain name that was challenged by the
holder of an identical trademark, regardless of the defenses that the registrant might
offer-unless the registrant could produce a trademark of his own. This caused some
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into WIPO's proposals and the UDRP itself. Perhaps because it
punted the key question for later action, or perhaps because it
was exquisitely ambiguous at key points, the White Paper
came closer to being a consensus document than any other
previous or subsequent policy pronouncement during the
domain name wars.
B. The WIPO Process
The publication of the White Paper created an
opportunity for WIPO to launch its Domain Name Process."
Rather than limit itself to the fairly modest project defined in
the White Paper; however, WIPO chose to conduct its study on
its own, more ambitious, terms. WIPO is an organ of the
United Nations with specific duties defined by a series of
treaties. Signatory nations send delegates to WIPO, and meet
occasionally in plenary to make decisions. Being responsible to
all its member states rather than just the United States, the
WIPO staff felt empowered to define its own terms of reference,
and proposed to make recommendations concerning: (1) dispute
prevention; (2) dispute resolution; (3) a process to protect
famous and well-known marks in the gTLDs; and (4) the
effects on intellectual property rights of new gTLDs."1 Pleading
the need for speed, and noting the wholly advisory nature of a
report which would have to be sent to ICANN for any action,
WIPO did not rely on a plenary to adopt its policy proposals.
Indeed, WIPO limited the direct involvement of member states
to the occasional status report and to opening its public
enterprising registrants to rush off and acquire Tunisian trademarks, which were
apparently the quickest and cheapest in the world. NSI eventually stopped accepting
Tunisian trademarks. See Sally M. Abel, Trademark Issues in Cyberspace: the Brave
New Frontier, at http'//www.fenwick.compub/ip-pubs/Trademark%20in%2OCyber-
space%2098/Trademark%20issues.htm (July 21, 1998).
60 On the flawed mechanics of the WIPO process, see generally Froomkin,
supra note 4.
6 WIPO Request for Comments on Issues Addressed in the WIPO Internet
Domain Name Process, RFC 2, at 12, at http://wipo2.wipo.intprocessl/rfc/2/-
index.html. The staff at WIPO were clearly eager to attack the domain name problem,
indeed some suggested that WIPO had lobbied to be asked to undertake the study. In
part this was, no doubt, because they saw it as an important issue. But there were
other bureaucratic agendas operating at the same time, involving the relationship
between the WIPO Secretariate and its member states, and regarding the status of the
newly-launched but under utilized WIPO arbitration center.
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consultation sessions to government speakers. WIPO's staff
met with intellectual property stakeholders and a few others to
acquire information and advice, and then basically drafted
proposals on their own.
As part of its consultations leading up to the
development of its recommendations,6 2 WIPO sought testimony
about the extent of the domain name/trademark conflicts.
Although this consultation exercise consumed a great deal of
time and money,63 the factual record produced by it was sparse.
This was partly due to the relatively short time allowed.
Nevertheless, it remains the case that neither WIPO nor any of
the persons who testified before it sought to conduct or
commission independent quantitative research on the extent of
domain name "piracy." Although WIPO requested data from
existing registration authorities, the testimony gathered by
WIPO remained basically anecdotal.'
The evidence submitted to WIPO or available from
other sources suggested that domain name disputes involved
only a tiny fraction of the number of domains registered in the
open gTLDs (.com, .org., and .net). One measure of the problem
was the number of times that trademark holders had invoked
the NSI dispute policy.65 Data provided by NSI, the monopoly
The records of WIPO's consultations are archived at http'J/wipo2.wipo.int-
processllconsultations/index.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2002).
See Froomkin, supra note 4.
See WIPO, RFC 3, Interim Report of the WIPO Internet Domain Name
Process, 254-60, at http'//wipo2.wipo.int/processl/rfc3/index.html (Dec. 23, 1998)
(providing a summary of some of the testimony) [hereinafter WIPO RFC 3]. WIPO
relied heavily on a report produced by Marques, a trademark association. See WIPO
Final Report, supra note 17, 1 313. This study suggested that the domain name
problem was substantial, but it had a very small sample size, and there was some
reason to doubt whether the companies surveyed were representative or likely to be
particular targets.
In order- to minimize its exposure to suit, NSI crafted a dispute policy that
strongly favored complaining trademark holders over its clients, the registrants. In
brief, NSI would turn off ("freeze") a registranfs domain name upon request by a
holder of a trademark in the same character string whose registration date preceded
the domain name's registration unless the registrant also had a valid trademark in
that character string. On the NSI dispute policies, see generally Carl Oppedahl,
Remedies in Domain Name Lawsuits: How is a Domain Name Like a Cow?, 15 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 437 (1997) (critiquing the NSI dispute policy). The
policy is obsolete, having been replaced by the UDRP, and is no longer on the NSI web
site. It is, however, reproduced at a web site maintained by the Communications Media
Center at New York Law School, http'//www.cmcnyls.edu/Misc/NSIDNRP3.HTM (last
visited Mar. 27, 2002).
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registry, suggested that there were fewer than 1,000
complaints per year, and that the number of complaints had
decreased by ten percent from 1997 to 1998, although the
number of registrations had doubled to almost two million in
the same period.66 This measure suggested a dispute rate of
under .045%; this number, however, both over- and
understated the problem. It overstated the problem in that not
every invocation of the NSI dispute procedure was necessarily
meritorious. Conversely, it understated the problem in at least
two ways. First, many disputes might never be reported to
NSI, although complainants certainly had full incentive to
avail themselves of it, given that the policy presumed that the
registrant was guilty and froze the name unless the registrant
could produce a trademark. Second, and potentially more
serious, trademark holders argued that because NSIs policy
only applied to domain names that were identical to
trademarks, it failed to account for the large number of
registrations of domain names that were confusingly similar to
trademarks.
Indeed, the suggestion that the number of domain name
disputes might have reached a plateau, or even peaked, was
belied by some of the anecdotal evidence presented to WIPO.
For example, witnesses testified that "typosquatters'---who
were immune from the NSI policy since their registrations
were not identical to a trademarked term-were counting on
common misspellings to attract web traffic. 7 A representative
According to Mr. Chuck Gomes of NSI on the IFWP mailing list,
During the slightly more than 5 months between the end of July 1995 and
the end of the year, we invoked the [NSI Dispute] Policy 166 times. During
1996 we invoked the Policy 745 times. During 1997 we invoked the Policy
905 times. During 1998 we invoked the Policy 838 times.
Chuck Gomes, message dated Feb. 1, 1999 to IFWP Discussion List, list@ifwp.org,
Subject: [ifwp] NSI Domain Name Dispute Stats., reprinted in Comments of Carl
Oppedahl in Response to the WIPO Interim Report dated December 23, 1998 (WIPO
RFC 3), note 4, at http://wipo2.wipo.int/dns-attachments/rfc3/attach9211911-40.html
(Mar. 11, 1999).
Motives for registering these "oops" names and creating web sites appeared
to vary and included:
I. Using the domains to host web sites that parody or criticize the
individual (often a politician) or company;
II. Taking advantage of the accidental traffic for relatively harmless
commercial gain, e.g., to show the user an advertisement before
redirecting the user to the site the user was probably looking for;.
III. Taking advantage of the traffic for commercial gain that would
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of AT&T, which had registered att.com, stated that they were
getting complaints every week from customers offended by
attt.com, a porn site.68 There seemed no obvious way to derive a
ratio that might be used to correct the .045% conflict rate
suggested by the NSI dispute baseline. At one of the hearings,
Sarah Deutsch, the senior intellectual property counsel at Bell
Atlantic, and one of the most forceful and effective advocates
for the case that trademark owners were being systematically
victimized, stated that during a single year her office identified
784 domain names that it considered infringed one of Bell
Atlantic's trademarks, but that only ten of these cases could be
resolved through NSI's dispute resolution policy.69 Using that
approximately 80:1 ratio to inflate the NSI data suggested that
of the 1.9 million new domain name registrations in 1999,
about 67,00070 allegedly infringed a trademark. While not in
any way a trivial number, it was still only about 3.5% of all
registrations. In any case, this estimate almost certainly
overstated the size of the problem, since those who were most
affected by the cybersquatters had the most incentive to
participate in the WIPO process. Indeed, Bell Atlantic took a
very aggressive (even unreasonable) view of what constituted a
similarity to one of its marks.
Whether the actual magnitude of the overall "cyber-
piracy" problem was .045% or 3.5% of new registrations, or
more likely somewhere in between, and whether the problem
was growing or shrinking in absolute terms, it clearly existed.
There seemed to be no reason why people engaged in clear
trademark infringement should enjoy a windfall of the
settlement value of basically worthless defenses (although, of
course, opinions varied as to how broadly this set of worthless
defenses should be defined). It also seemed clear that an
arguably tarnish the reputation of the company, usually
pornography;,
IV. Taking advantage of poor typists who were seeking a competitor's
web site.
68 In this case, however, the problem was solved well before the final WIPO
report: the registration of attt.com was somehow transferred to AT&T, and the
pornography vanished.
WIPO, Second D.C. Consultation Transcript, at http'//wipo2.wipo.intpro-
cess/engldc2-transcript-tocl.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2002).
7o The number is the 838 disputes reported by NSI in the most recent period,
see supra note 66, inflated by the 80:1 ratio and rounded to two significant digits.
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important fraction of the problem could be traced to a
relatively small number of people. These "cyber-pirates"
appeared to be engaged in systematic registration of domain
names identical to trademarked terms. Trademark holders
agreed that these cases represented a considerable percentage,
albeit not all, of the problems they believed that they faced. 1
The remainder was what might be termed amateur domain
name speculation, in which individuals not engaged in the
wholesale registration of domains containing trademarked
character strings registered one or more domains that later
excited the interest of trademark holders. In both cases the
speculation was made easy by registration rules that did not
require pre-payment.
Underlying the "cyber-pirate" question was the legal
issue of whether registration of a domain name that is
identical to a trademarked term was in and of itself a
trademark violation. Generally speaking, in the United States
at least, one does not violate a trademark right without
commercial use (and, absent a finding that the mark is famous,
likelihood of confusion). Therefore, unless registration is itself
a commercial use, mere registration without use of a domain
name cannot violate a trademark right. This is particularly
clear in the case of trademarks of common words and in terms
trademarked by more than one party. However, by the time of
the WIPO process two courts, one in the United States and one
in the United Kingdom, had held that a person who routinely
registered others' trademarks for potential resale was making
commercial use of those trademarks and hence was an
infringer.72 Thus, although there was inevitably little directly
relevant decisional law, what little there was tended to support
the proposition that registering a domain name for the purpose
of resale amounted to trademark infringement.73 Furthermore,
the laws of other countries, although lacking actual decisions
relating to domain names, did not necessarily require
71 WIPO also heard testimony that some firms were warehousing domain
names corresponding to their trademarks in order to prevent their competitors from
registering.
72 Toeppen, 141 F.3d at 1325-26; British Telecomm. plc v. One in a Million Ltd.,
(C.A.) [1999] E.T.M.R. 61. (England).
7Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316; One in a Million Ltd., (C.A.) [1999] E.T.M.R. 61.
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commercial use as a prerequisite to finding a trademark
violation.
The overwhelming majority of the reported cases that
had actually gone to trial in the United States and elsewhere
resulted in victory for a trademark holder over a
non-trademark holder. Indeed, so far as one could tell, every
organized cybersquatter who had been taken to court had lost.74
Trademark owners, however, did not take great comfort from
these facts. Instead, they argued that these victories simply
proved the justice of their cause, and demonstrated why new
means had to be found to prevent cybersquatters from holding
them ransom for the settlement value of meritless defenses.
Trials can be expensive, and trademark holders testified that
they frequently found it cheaper or more expedient to offer
out-of-court settlement to registrants of a domain names that
they believed was theirs by right.75
Notwithstanding the size of the individual settlements,
firms managing large numbers of brands argued that the
cumulative costs imposed an unfair burden and amounted to a
windfall to the undeserving. Worse, aggrieved trademark
holders in countries with dysfunctional court systems stated
that their national court systems were so slow as to make the
wait for meaningful relief against improper domain name
registrations an eternity in Internet time, or even in ordinary
time.76 Other trademark holders complained, of the difficulty of
locating cybersquatters who falsified their contact information
at the time of registration, or who were located in jurisdictions
where the law was uncertain, the courts unreliable, or service
was difficult.77
Conversely, there was also evidence of attempted
"reverse domain name hijacking" ("RDNH"). In these cases,
trademark holders improperly threatened to sue the holders of
domains that used the same string as their trademark even
though the registrant was acting legally. A few of these cases
involved commercial, but most involved non-commercial, uses
74 Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316; One in a Million Ltd., (C.A.) [1999] E.T.M.R.
61; Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Abir, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d 1944 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Green Prods. Co. v.
Independence Corn By-Prods. Co., 992 F. Supp. 1070 (N.D. Iowa 1997).
75 See, e.g., WIPO Final Report, supra note 17, 314.
76 See, e.g., id. 148.
IId. 59, 82, 148.
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of the domain name; the key elements in making the would-be
plaintiff drop the claim seem to have been bad publicity for the
mark holder, combined with limited likelihood of success in the
U.S. courts. Indeed, an appreciable but also unquantifiable
fraction of the cases alleged by trademark holders to be
infringements or amateur speculator cases in fact appeared to
be cases where the registrant had at least a colorable, and
perhaps a very legitimate, claim to the domain name. In some
cases this arose from a competing trademark, and in other
cases it arose from some other legitimate commercial or
non-commercial purpose, use, or competing intellectual
property right or name. The leading example of a non-
trademark right was surely the "pokey" case in which the
Prima Toy Company, owners of the Gumby and Pokey
trademarks, threatened a twelve-year-old boy because of his
personal web site at pokey.org. The web site had nothing to do
with the toys, and had been registered by the boy's father
because "pokey" was his son's nickname." Other notorious
examples included epix.com,5 cds.com,' ° ajax.cor,8' dci.com,"
ty.com,83 roadrunner.com, and veronica.org. 8
The trademark lawyers' excessive zeal in policing their
clients' marks was almost inevitable given the trademark
owners' understandable fear that they must aggressively
assert their rights to their marks in every medium or risk the
diminution of their rights.86 Even making allowances for a
7" On pokey see The Domain Name Handbook, at http://www.domainhandbook-
.com/dd2.html#pokey (last visited Apr. 22, 2002) and the links collected there.
79 Interstellar Starship Servs., Ltd. v. Epix Inc., 184 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1999).
CD Solutions, Inc. v. Tooker, 15 F. Supp. 2d 986 (D. Or. 1998).
See http://www.ajax.org, The Colgate-Palmolive Story, at http://www.ajax-
.org/colpal/ (on file with author).
Data Concepts, Inc. v. Digital Consulting, Inc., 150 F.3d 620 (6th Cir. 1998).
Giacalone v. Network Solutions, Inc., 1996 WL 887734 (N.D. Cal., June 14,
1996).
Roadrunner Computer Sys., Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., Civil Action No.
96-413 (E.D. Va. complaint filed Mar. 26, 1996), available at http:/www.patents.com-
nsicpt.sht, dismissed (June 21, 1996).
See Beth Lipton Krigel, CNET News, Archie Comics Fights Parent for
Domain (Jan. 15, 1999), at http'/news.com/2100-1023-220240.html?tag=mainstry.
86 Without question, distinctiveness can be lost by failing to take action
against infringers. If there are numerous products in the marketplace
bearing the alleged mark, purchasers may learn to ignore the 'mark' as a
source identification. When that occurs, the conduct of the former owner,
by failing to police its mark, can be said to have caused the mark to lose
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hair-trigger approach to the issuance of demand letters, some
of these RDNH cases were remarkably clumsy PR, and,
frankly, lacking in sense. Consumer advocates thus argued
that any process that aimed to make bringing complaints
against large-scale cybersquatters easier and less expensive
also risked unleashing a flood of unmerited attempts to grab
attractive names from unsophisticated and often
unrepresented domain name registrants who held legitimate
registrations.
C. WIPO's Final Report
Against this background, and after a considerable and
involved process of its own,87 WIPO issued its Final Report on
April 30, 1999-a somewhat scaled back document from the
maximalist intellectual property agenda set out in its earlier
Interim Report.8
WIPO stated that its design goal was to preserve "the
right to litigate a domain name dispute. 89 In addition to
amassing and summarizing much of the available data on the
contours of the cybersquatting problem, the Report contained a
number of innovative suggestions which shaped the UDRP,
ACPA (the US anti-cybersquatting legislation)," and indeed
the entire domain name debate to this day. WIPO's most
notable proposals, some of which echoed the White Paper,
were:
0 Leveraging ICANN's control over the DNS to impose
contractual mandatory dispute resolution clauses on all
registrants in the open gTLDs;
its significance as a mark.
Wallpaper Mfrs., Ltd. v. Crown Wallcovering Corp., 680 F.2d 755 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
For a critique of the procedural aspects of WIPO's first domain name
process, see Froomkin, supra note 4.
Compare WIPO, RFC 3, supra note 64. I would like to think that my
publication of a critical and dissenting report, A. Michael Froomkin, A Critique of
WIPO's RFC 3, available at, http'/www.law.miami.edul-amf/critique.pdf (Mar. 14,
1999), may have had something to do with this outcome.
8
'WIPO Final Report, supra note 17, 148.
90 ACPA, 15 U.S.C. §1114(2)(D) (2001).
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" Limiting the scope of the proposed dispute-resolution
process to disputes between a trademark holder and a
non-trademark holder;
* Substantive rules to be followed in the dispute
resolutions;
* A set of somewhat confused procedures to administer
those dispute resolution processes;
" Proposing special pre-emptive protections for famous
and well-known trademarks; and
" Basically ignoring the RDNH problem.
ICANN adopted each of these features of the WIPO
proposal verbatim or with modifications, except for preemptive
protection for famous and well-known marks, which ICANN
rejected.91 Each accepted proposal is discussed below.
1. Leveraging the DNS
Undoubtedly, the most important suggestion in WIPO's
Final Report was that ICANN leverage its control over the
DNS to impose a contract of adhesion that created a world-
wide third-party beneficiary right allowing aggrieved parties to
invoke an arbitration-like procedure.92 ICANN's control over
the DNS allows it to impose contractual terms on all domain
name registrants because so long as the U.S. Department of
Commerce delegates to ICANN the control over the "root file,"
ICANN has the power to determine which domain name
registries are considered authoritative.
91 ICANN subsequently adopted peculiar "sunrise" provisions that gave all
trademark holders preemptive registration rights in the .biz and .info TLDs, although
there is no such cognate right at law. It also created a new, utterly undefined, parallel
arbitration system called the CEDRP for some of the smaller, limited-registration, new
gTLDs. See A. Michael Froomkin, Another View of the .museum Contract,
ICANNWatch, at http://www.icannwatch.org/article.phpsid=355. (last visited Mar. 18,
2002).
92 See WIPO Final Report, supra note 17, 1 120-23, 158-62.
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People who register Internet domain names do so in
hopes that anyone in the worldwide network will be able to
reach them. They may wish their websites to be visible around
the world, or they may want to get e-mail or engage in two-way
chats. Whatever the application, a domain name that cannot be
resolved into an IP number by the vast majority of users is of
very limited value on the Internet. Similarly, registrars selling
domain name registrations understand that only domain
names that "work" in the sense of being part of the global
network carry much value. The ability to list a registration in a
registry that is part of the "legacy" root is thus of paramount
importance to a registrar. Furthermore, every registry knows
that its database of domain-name-to-IP-mappings is of limited
value if no one can find it. Registries thus need to be listed in
the legacy root or they (and all the domains they list) become
effectively invisible.
Only a listing in the legacy root currently provides
visibility for a TLD and the domains listed in it. Control of the
root creates powerful leverage, and WIPO's proposal,
subsequently adopted by ICANN, took advantage of this
technical reality to impose contractual conditions on
registrants. What WIPO did not remark on was that the same
technical features which ensured compliance with this contract
of adhesion also undercut the legal justification for it: The
standard policy argument in favor of enforcing adhesive
contracts is that consumers have a choice in the marketplace
and can always switch suppliers; if it happens that all the
suppliers use the same term, this is considered to be evidence
that the term is efficient or, at least, that there is insufficient
consumer demand for an alternate term. 3 These justifications
for enforcement do not fit well when the party offering the
adhesive contract, the registrar, is doing so because of an
adhesive contract it signed with the registry. If the justification
for enforcing adhesive contracts turns on the fundamentally
competitive nature of the market and the idea of sovereign
consumers choosing among alternatives, then it makes little
sense to apply it to a system in which ICANN requires that all
suppliers (gTLD registries/registrars) force the identical terms
93 Some courts in the United States consider online contracts of adhesion to be
as enforceable as printed ones. See, e.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th
Cir. 1997).
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on all their customers. In this circumstance, unlike the
ordinary contract of adhesion, one simply cannot sustain the
legal fiction that the terms are or will be bargained-for (since
the registrar cannot bargain on this issue, being contractually
required to use the arbitration clause), nor can one argue that
suppliers are even potentially subject to competition.
2. Scope
WIPO suggested limiting the proposed dispute-
resolution process to disputes between a trademark holder and
a registrant. WIPO had at one point explored a more
encompassing proposal that would have included both non-
trademark claims and even disputes between competing
trademarks, but representatives of domain name holders
objected as did many of the rights holders involved in the
process.' Non-trademark holders were suspicious of the entire
process and sought to make it as narrow as possible.
Interestingly, many trademark holders also lacked sufficient
faith in it to risk being on the defending end of the
"administrative procedure," preferring to ensure that they
would only be complainants.
Similarly, both groups found common cause in their
desire to make the dispute-resolution procedure non-binding. A
substantial fraction of the trademark owners who testified,
including representatives of some of the larger firms, stated
that they were unwilling to waive their right to go to court in
order to take advantage of the dispute resolution procedure,
since they were certain they would win in court, even if at a
price. Representatives of domain registrants participating in
the WIPO process were both fewer in number and
heterogeneous but they tended to have doubts about the
fundamental fairness of the rules, the ability of WIPO to act as
an honest broker, and the potential for selection bias by
dispute resolution service providers who might tend to stack
their arbitral panels with corporate and trademark lawyers
untrained in and perhaps unsympathetic to the niceties of civil
liberties law. As we will see, however, even though the dispute
resolution was formally equally non-binding on both
9' See WIPO Final Report, supra note 17, 7 159-60, 165.
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complainants and defendants, as a practical matter plaintiff
trademark owners were far more likely than a domain name
registrant to benefit from a second bite at the apple.
Because they doubted the fundamental fairness of the
process and the panels, registrants and their partisans were
particularly anxious to limit the remedies available under the
proposed procedure to transfer the domain name from
registrant to complainant. Some trademark holders suggested
that the arbitrators should have the power to award money
damages, or at least attorneys' fees, but WIPO ultimately did
not adopt this suggestion for two reasons. The primary reason
was that WIPO concluded that the sums likely to be awarded
in most cases would be small, and that it would be difficult to
collect them especially if the registrant had provided false
contact details.95 A secondary reason may have been that if
arbitrators were empowered to seek money damages then
equity would require that they be entitled to levy charges
against abusive filers, and the trademark bar would resist
that. WIPO did, however, propose that while the complainant
should have to pay the arbitrator's fees at the commencement
of the process, the arbitrator could award fees and costs (other
than attorneys' fees) to the victor." This represented a
substantial change from the more ambitious fee-shifting
proposal in WIPO's interim report, which would have used the
English Rule on attorney's fees,9" but still presented a potential
source of intimidation to registrants. Even if the arbitration
costs were relatively modest, the prospect of having to pay
$1,000 or more might make some unwilling to take the risk
required to protect a $70 to $100 investment.
An important consequence of limiting the scope of the
proceeding to trade and service marks was that it excluded
several types of cases. In the face of opposition to the trial
balloon in the Interim Report, WIPO consciously, if reluctantly,
excluded claims based on personal names, place names,
95 Id. 226.
96 Id.
"7See WIPO RFC 3, supra note 64, at % 157 (referring to costs without
specifying whether lawyer's fees are included among them).
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International Nonproprietary Names ("INNs") for
Pharmaceutical Substances,98 and names of international
intergovernmental organizations. Personal names were
excluded because national laws differed substantially as to the
extent names and other rights of personality99 are protected.
WIPO was unable to craft a proposal consistent with its
promise to remain consistent with national law."° A similar
problem blocked protection of INNs and place names, to the
great disgust of French wine makers whose appellations were
protected under French law, and who sought similar protection
for the corresponding domain names."' In a subsequent report,
however, WIPO did recommend the protection of INNs and
country names."'
3. "Administrative" Process
WIPO proposed an entirely online dispute resolution
procedure. °3 The process aimed for high speed and low costs,
and was to be the first business to consumer ("B2C") online
trans-national arbitration-or rather, near-arbitration. Briefing
and decisions would take place online, without any face-to-face
meetings of the parties or even the arbitrators.
The desire for speed and for minimum cost similarly
militated against building an appeals process into the dispute
resolution process. Here again, although opinions in both
98 INNs are a naming system by which generic names for pharmaceutical
substances are agreed and protected at an international level. While an inventor or
patent-holder can acquire rights to a trade name for a substance, no one is allowed to
establish intellectual property rights over the generic name. See generally WIPO, supra
note 13, at 1 87-93.
The "right of personality" is a controversial doctrine-not accepted by all
states in the United States-by which some systems give persons, including politicians,
actors, and other famous people, special rights over the use of their names. In some
other countries the right includes elements of privacy, reputation, protection against
defamation, and even "a right of informational self-determination," i.e., a right
exclusively to determine whether and to what extent others might be permitted to
portray one's life story in general, or certain events from one's life. See, e.g., Edward J.
Eberle, Human Dignity, Privacy, And Personality In German And American
Constitutional Law, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 963 (describing broad reach of these concepts
in German law).
100 See WIPO Final Report, supra note 17, 1 166.
101 Id. 91 167, n.134.
' See WIPO, supra note 13.
103 See WIPO Final Report, supra note 17, 11 215-20.
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camps differed, the two sides generally found common cause.
Trademark interests feared that adding an appeals process
would provide opportunities for unscrupulous cybersquatters to
create additional expense and delay. Some of the more
suspicious registrants imagined that any appeals body could be
stacked against them; many argued that the interests of
individual registrants, who would tend to be less wealthy than
trademark owners, were best served by minimal and least
expensive procedures, especially if there was any danger that
they might be assessed for costs.
One perhaps unintended-or perhaps intended' % -
consequence of WIPO's proposal, was that although it was
formally non-binding, some dispute resolution decisions might
escape judicial review-especially those where the registrant
lost. The process was formally "administrative" rather than a
true arbitration. As a result it was unlikely to be subject to
laws regarding the public duties of arbitrators, or to appeals
under arbitration statutes such as the U.K. Arbitration Act.
05
Indeed, it was unclear whether in the United States, and
perhaps in most other legal systems, a losing registrant would
have a cause of action that a court could be persuaded to hear.
4. Substantive Rules
Many observers had criticized WIPO's Interim Report
for failing to define cybersquatting, and for proposing to give
WIPO the ongoing power to make new substantive rules that
the dispute resolution service providers would be required to
apply. In contrast, the Final Report sought to provide a
definition of cybersquatting, and gave more than lip service to
the overriding principle that the dispute resolution procedure
should, as much as possible, seek to apply the appropriate
national law.
WIPO offered three clauses which together defined a
domain name registration as "abusive":
'4 I say perhaps intended because I personally warned of this problem
on numerous occasions, but WIPO staff shrugged it off.
'0 See UK Arbitration Act 1996 at § 6(1) (limiting application to "an agreement
to submit to arbitration present or future disputes").
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(i) the domain name is identical or misleadingly similar to a trade or
service mark in which the complainant has rights; and
(ii) the holder of the domain name has no rights or legitimate
interests in respect of the domain name; and
(iii) the domain name has been registered and is used in bad faith.0 6
Each of these three clauses raised interesting issues.
a. Similarity
The first clause ensured that only trade and service
mark holders could bring complaints. It did not explicitly state
that owners of common law marks should be able to bring
actions under the proposed policy, but this was understood by
participants in the drafting to be the intention. 7 This
remained unchanged in the UDRP.
The first clause also broadened coverage from the NSI
dispute policy's requirement that a domain name be "identical"
to a mark, replacing it with a looser standard that included
"misleadingly similar." This was not a bright line test. More
fundamentally, the use of the "misleadingly similar" standard
seemed likely to create rights for mark holders that they would
not have had under U.S. trademark law. Indeed, the entire
idea of trying to figure out whether a domain name registration
was a per se violation of a trademark right seemed founded on
a misconception. A domain name is not a trademark nor is it a
good or a source identifier of a good. It is an address. Therefore,
what determines whether the registrant of a domain name is
infringing the rights of any mark holder, whether or not the
mark is famous, is how the domain name is being used. °8 The
issue therefore should not be whether the domain is the same
as, close to, or even very close to a trademarked term, but
106 WIPO Final Report, supra note 17, 1 171(1) (emphasis added).
'07 The WIPO proposal used the phrase "trade or service mark in which the
complainant has rights"; since one of the ways in which a person acquires rights to a
trademark in the United States and in other common law countries is by use without
registration, it followed naturally that so-called common law marks were covered. As
an international body, WIPO was in any case sensitive to claims that it might be
favoring rights acquired in one legal system as opposed to another.
108 See, e.g., Toeppen, 141 F.3d at 1325-26 (noting requirement of commercial
use for ordinary infringement claim); Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868,
877-78 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting relevance of use to dilution claim).
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rather whether the name plus the uses for that name cause
confusion or even dilute the mark."9 The word "shall" is not
misleadingly similar to "shell," but it might be infringing if
used on a gas station. But that argument did not prevail before
WIPO, or indeed before ICANN.
As those of us on WIPO's advisory Panel of Experts
understood it at the time, the "misleadingly similar" test would
have included many if not all "typosquatters" as well as sites
that used a zero instead of an "o." Thus, for example, the then-
notorious Microsoft parody site, microsOft.com, would have
been "misleadingly similar" to the software company's
trademark, but nevertheless would have been permitted under
the UDRP unless the software company could have shown that
"the domain name has been registered and is used in bad
faith." And, as we understood, Microsoft could not have made
that showing because non-commercial parody is not a "bad
faith" use but is in fact quite legal (at least in the United
States).110
Some submissions to WIPO had proposed that every
domain name which included a sub-string identical to a
'0 Infringement can be based upon confusion that creates initial customer
interest, even though no actual sale is finally completed as a result of the confusion. 3
THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23:6
(1996). In regards to domain names, so-called "initial interest confusion" is said to
happen when a user who was in search of one site is drawn to another site, because the
domain name is either the same or substantially similar to a trademark. The user
quickly, perhaps immediately, discovers that the site accessed is not the one intended,
but may decide to use the site accessed anyway. See generally Bryce J. Maynard, Note,
The Initial Interest Confusion Doctrine and Trademark Infringement on the Internet,
57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1303 (2000). For a court that accepts the theory to find that
"initial interest confusion" caused a dilution of a trademark, however, would require
more than a domain name that resembled a trademark. Courts typically require that
the site be put to a commercial use, offering the same or similar products or services as
the trademark owner, or that the site will likely confuse the user into the belief that it
is affiliated with the trademark holder. See TCPIP Holding Co., Inc. v. Haar
Communications, Inc., 244 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2001) (enjoining use of some allegedly
infringing domain names but allowing defendant to continue to use others); Trans
Union LLC v. Credit Research, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (motion for
preliminary injunction between companies that offer similar services court granted for
"transunioncredite domain name and denied for credit "creditbureautransunion).
"o See, e.g., Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ'g Group, Inc., 886
F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1989); Mattel v. MCA, 28 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (C.D. Cal. 1998); cf
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (stating that First Amendment
considerations should generally outweigh consideration of tort of intentional infliction
of emotional distress); but see People for Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney,
263 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2001).
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trademark should be subject to challenge for cause. However, it
was clear to all participants that this was a non-starter, since
short names appeared in vastly different longer names. It also
seemed to be the clear understanding at the time that criticism
websites, such as companysucks.com, could not possibly be
"misleadingly similar" to a mark in "company" and that such
sites would be outside the policy,' although a criticism
website's use of intellectual property on a web page would
remain subject to the ordinary constraints of trademark,
copyright, unfair competition, and trade dress protections.
b. "Rights or Legitimate Interests"
The second clause in WIPO's definition of an "abusive
registration" was superficially simple. In stating that a
complainant could prevail only if a registrant had "no rights or
legitimate interests in respect of the domain name" it seemed
to me that the policy was importing a large number of
traditional concepts in a way that outside observers sometimes
seemed to miss. I believe that these few words imported
traditional choice of law principles to the dispute resolution
procedure. In so doing, they also imported laws protecting fair
use and free expression when these were part of the applicable
law. The consequence of this would be that people in countries
with strong protection for freedom of expression would have
greater protection in the WIPO alternative dispute resolution
("ADR") than would people from, for example, North Korea.
Although the same case might have different outcomes
depending on the residence of the parties, this would be
consistent with WIPO's expressed goal of reflecting rather than
overriding existing law.
III This seemingly obvious point is lost a surprising number of arbitrators
today. See infra notes 172-76 and accompanying text. Contrary to the understanding of
participants in the WIPO process, who assumed that non-commercial "sucks" sites
would be protected, some arbitrators have come up with creative grounds under which
all sucks sites are presumptively in violation of the UDRP. The Vivendi Universal case
is a leading example of this twist: there the majority opined that because not all
'members of the public in general and 'Internauts' in particular" speak English, a non-
native speaker might mistakenly believe that vivendiuniversalsucks.com was
connected to Vivendi Universal. Vivendi Universal v. Sallen and G0247.COM,INC.,
Case No. D2001-1121, (WIPO Dec. 7, 2001), http://arbiter.wipo.inttdomainsdecisions-
/html2001/d2001-1121.html.
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The choice of law issue had been very controversial in
the wake of WIPO's Interim Report. The Interim Report's
guiding principles had, in my view at least, sought to allow
dispute resolution panels far too much leeway to make up
whatever law they thought should apply to a given situation.1
2
There was no sign of the "guiding principles" in WIPO's
Final Report. The Final Report sounded something of a
welcome retreat on this issue:
In applying the definition of abusive registration . . . in the
administrative procedure, the panel of decision-makers appointed in
the procedure shall, to the extent necessary, make reference to the
law or rules of law that it determines to be applicable in view of the
circumstances of the case. Thus, for example, if the parties to the
procedure were resident in one country, the domain name was
registered through a registrar in that country and the evidence of
the bad faith registration and use of the domain name related to
activity in the same country, it would be appropriate for the
decision-maker to refer to the law of the country concerned in
applying, the definition."
Although not as transparent as it might have been, this was a
fairly clear invitation to the arbitrators to use traditional
choice of law principles-without which, I thought, the policy
would invite massive forum shopping.
Unfortunately, and in what was something of a
pattern,"4 WIPO's Final Report was clearer in its main text
than in the operative part, Annex IV, which contained the
actual text of WIPO's proposed policy. It may not have been a
coincidence that the members of the WIPO staff who drafted
the Final Report and Annexes chose to share the draft report
text with the advisory Panel of Experts of which I was a
member, but never showed us the Annexes before finalizing
them. Thus, Annex IV, the proposed policy document, phrased
112 The Interim Report set out fairly arbitrary "guiding principles," drafted by
WIPO, which would have applied to all cases regardless of the nationality of the
parties, and would have trumped national law. See WIPO RFC 3, supra note 64, 11I
199-200.
WIPO also proposed that these "principles" should be "subject to regular
review and appropriate adjustment over time, on the basis of experience gained in the
administrative dispute-resolution system," with the clear implication that WIPO itself
would do the "adjustment." Id. at 1 200.
12 WIPO Final Report, supra note 17, 176.
1' See Froomkin, supra note 4.
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the choice of law term much less clearly by stating: "To the
extent that the Panel makes reference to any applicable law to
reach a determination, it shall apply the law or rules of law
that it determines to be appropriate in light of all the relevant
circumstances.""' This language risked inviting the arbitrators
to make their own determination as to what law would be best,
rather than attempting to replicate what a court of competent
jurisdiction would do. And, indeed, some arbitrators have held
that the exercise of First Amendment rights cannot be asserted
to show an absence of bad faith.16
The choice of law issue is especially important because
choice of law in effect determines what constitutes "rights and
legitimate interests""7 -the defenses to a claim of "abusive
registration." Rights and legitimate interests are creatures of
law and custom. Solicitude for the rights of free expression of
citizens differs considerably around the globe, and choice of law
thus was likely to be significant in a multi-jurisdictional case.
The legal interests one may have in a name differ from country
to country.' Which law and which customs apply may be a
complex question if a party from South Korea registers a
domain with a registrar in Japan that deposits the data in a
registry located in the United States, only to have a Brazilian
claim that the registration infringes a trademark. Many had
argued, with some justification, that the WIPO's Interim
Report failed to protect fundamental free-speech interests
including parody and criticism of famous persons and
corporations. So long as it was understood that these
expressive activities were "rights and legitimate interests" in a
registration-and the choice of law provision of the Final
Report text, if not necessarily the Annex, seemed to make that
" WIPO Final Report, supra note 17, at Annex IV, 4.
"6 See, e.g., Kelson Physician Partners, Inc. v. Mason, No. CPR003, httpll/-
www.cpradr.org/ICANNDecisionCPR003-000905.htm (July 24, 2000) ("deciding a First
Amendment Constitutional issue is outside the scope of this arbitration"); Home Props.
v. SMS Online, FA0009000095639 (NAF Nov. 2, 2000), http/www.arbforum-
.com/domains/decisionsl95639.htm ("Deciding a First Amendment Constitutional issue
is outside the scope of this proceeding"). The Regents of the Univ. of New Mexico vs.
Am. Info. Servs., FA0002000094306 (NAF Apr. 26, 2000), http://www.arbforum-
.com/domains/decisions/94306.htm ("First and Eleventh Amendment Constitutional
issues are not within the scope of this arbitration.").
117 The test set out in WIPO Final Report, supra note 17, 1 171(1)(ii).
1'8 Countries differ, for example, in the latitude given to startup companies and
the nature of interests one can have in ones' own name.
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clear-then the Final Report appeared to me to be a
substantial improvement over its predecessor. However,
although the UDRP uses similar language, the subtlety of the
choice of law issue has either been lost on some arbitrators, or
they have chosen to avert their eyes from it. Perhaps the
arbitrators have concluded that "UDRP law" should, after all,
be some free-standing body of rules deracinated from any
legislature and made up largely by trademark lawyers.
Indeed, a number of arbitrators clearly believe that the
"rights and legitimate interests" language invokes some free-
standing sui generis UDRP-specific set of considerations. The
arguments that tend to be deployed in support of this view are,
I believe, misguided.
First, some argue that the point of the UDRP is to differ
from local law. As noted above, this was indeed WIPO's goal in
its Interim Report, but was abandoned by the Final Report.
The UDRP does differ from local law in that it covers only a
subset of the matters that would constitute trademark
infringement, but this underscores the importance of fully
representing the local ideas of a defendant's rights and
privileges in the process.
A more persuasive argument rests on administrative
necessity. It is claimed with some justification that panelists
cannot be experts on the laws of all the jurisdictions relevant to
cases they may hear. Short submissions, some of which will be
pro se, cannot possibly hope to tell panelists all they would
need to know. As a result, panelists-whether they want to or
not-must rely on a fairly uniform understanding of free
speech and other rights. While it has the force of practicality, I
do not agree with this argument. There is a substantial
difference of opinion around the world as to where to strike the
balance between trademark rights on the one hand, and fair
use and free speech on the other. Nations vary enormously, for
example, as to whether they allow a competitor's marks to be
used in comparative advertising. If German law forbids this
use, there seems no reason why the UDRP should necessarily
be closed to a German mark-holder proceeding against a
German defendant just because the United States allows the
use of such marks in comparative advertising.
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Even if the argument for administrative necessity is
fundamentally practical, it can also be defeated by the practical
observation that, were arbitrators left to create their own idea
of a common default set of defendant "rights and legitimate
interests," current practice suggests that they would end up
with something considerably more constrained than what
current United States law allows. Nor could this problem be
solved by inviting UDRP re-drafters to produce an
authoritative list of defendants' rights. The drafters have no
authority to do this. Plus, as the drafting project will be
international, it will at best result in a compromise that gives
some parties more defenses than their legislators chose, and
gives other parties less. Neither result could be justified, given
the summary nature of the UDRP, especially not the failure to
recognize legitimate rights.
c. Bad Faith
Probably the most critical issue was the definition of
"bad faith" in the third clause of the definition constituting an
abusive domain name registration. WIPO stated that "the
following, in particular, shall be evidence of the registration
and use of a domain name in bad faith":
(a) an offer to sell, rent or otherwise transfer the domain name to
the owner of the trade or service mark, or to a competitor of the
owner of the trade or service mark, for valuable consideration; or
(b) an attempt to attract, for financial gain, Internet users to the
domain name holder's website or other on-line location, by creating
confusion with the trade or service mark of the complainant; or
(c) the registration of the domain name in order to prevent the
owner of the trade or service mark from reflecting the mark in a
corresponding domain name, provided that a pattern of such conduct
has been established on the part of the domain name holder; or
(d) the registration of the domain name in order to disrupt the
business of a competitor.
119
19 WIPO Final Report, supra note 17, 171(2) (emphasis added).
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However, the Final Report also cautioned that,
ET]he behavior of innocent or good faith domain name registrants is
not to be considered abusive. For example, a small business that had
registered a domain name could show, through business plans,
correspondence, reports, or other forms of evidence, that it had a
bona fide intention to use the name in good faith. Domain name
registrations that are justified by legitimate free speech rights or by
legitimate non-commercial considerations would likewise not be
considered to be abusive.
120
Following the pattern in which the operative part of the Final
Report was more pro-mark-owning complainant than the
Report itself, this caution-which appeared in 172 of the
Final Report immediately following the definition of
cybersquatting-was omitted from Annex IV, leaving some
doubt as to how seriously WIPO intended to encourage
arbitrators to find for defendants.
WIPO's four categories of bad faith registration were
non-exclusive, which invited arbitrators to expand the list.
Each of the four responded to a category of grievance expressed
by mark holders, yet each also raised questions of its own.
(i) Offers to Sell
The first category, "an offer to sell, rent or otherwise
transfer the domain name to the owner of the trade or service
mark,* or to a competitor of the owner of the trade or service
mark, for valuable consideration," appeared to be the most
straightforward, as it simply reflected the Toeppen 2' and One
In A Million" facts. In both cases, the offer to sell the domain
name to the trademark holder constituted commercial use.
Even here, however, there were ambiguities. The greatest
ambiguity was that not all offers to sell domain names for
which the intellectual property rights are legitimately disputed
are evidence of bad faith on the part of the registrant. For
example, it is hard to see how it could be bad faith to respond
"' Id. 172.
' Toeppen, 141 F.3d at 1325.
'22 British Telecomm. plc v. One in a Million Ltd [19991 F.S.R. 1, (Court of
Appeal, England) (July 23, 1998), available at http'J/www.nic.uk/news/legal/oiam-app-
eal-judgement.html.
2002]
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to a solicitation of a bid unless one was in the business of
registering masses of domain names and waiting for bids. Or, if
the parties are enmeshed in a dispute, an offer to sell may be a
legitimate part of a search for settlement. Indeed, in some legal
systems "without prejudice" offers in the context of a dispute
are protected from disclosure to a tribunal by rule of court.1"
The ambiguity regarding offers to sell persisted into the UDRP
and caused problems: Some arbitrators appear to believe that
"without prejudice" letters-which are inadmissible evidence in
England-"should" be admitted in UDRP proceedings." If the
parties are strangers, it would be perverse to have a rule that
would allow a wily mark holder to entrap a naive registrant by
asking whether the domain was for sale. The seemingly
absolute wording of WIPO's first category, echoed in the
UDRP, nonetheless appears to create just such a trap for the
unwary.
(ii) Commercial Confusion
WIPO's second category targeted "an attempt to attract,
for financial gain, Internet users to the domain name holder's
website or other online location, by creating confusion with the
trade or service mark of the complainant" as an indicia of bad
faith. Since this closely tracked the test in the Lanham Act and
other similar statutes in Paris Convention states,"= and it
required commercial activity, in one sense it was the least
controversial category.
1
2 E.g., FED. R. EVID. 408; UK, Civil Procedure (White Book), c.36.19 (1999).
124 See, e.g., Spirit Airlines Inc v. Spirit Airlines Pty Ltd, Case No. D2001-0748,
(WIPO July 25, 2001), http'//arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisionshtmY2001/d2001-0748-
.html.
12 Lanham Act § 32, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (providing remedies for
use of registered mark in commerce, without consent of the registrant, when "the use is
likely to cause confusion"); see also Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property Article 6bis, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 823 U.N.T.S. 305 (requiring
signatory states "to refuse or to cancel the registration, and to prohibit the use, of a
trademark which constitutes a reproduction, an imitation, or a translation, liable to
create confusion" of a well-known mark).
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(iii) Repeat Players
WIPO's third category took aim at "the registration of
the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the trade or
service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding
domain name, provided that a pattern of such conduct has been
established on the part of the domain name holder." Here
again, WIPO was reacting to the Toeppen facts, and the
worries of mark holders. Mark holders had argued that the
wiliest cybersquatters would react to WIPO's first category,
offers to sell, by adopting a studied passivity and simply
waiting for the mark holders to make an offer. This third
category was primarily aimed at heading off that eventuality.
(iv) Unfair Competition
WIPO's fourth category was not strictly concerned with
a trademark violation, but was instead directed at a rarified
form of unfair competition. Any firm that registered a
competitor's name as a domain and set up a website that
sought to capture the competitor's customers would fall under
the second and perhaps the third of WIPO's categories. Why,
then, should there be an additional clause to prevent "[t]he
registration of the domain name in order to disrupt the
business of a competitor"? Some mark holders feared that a
firm which was first in its industry to understand the
Internet's importance might warehouse its competitors' names
to deny them the use of their mark as a domain. Since the
name was being warehoused, rather than used, there would be
no use, much less commercial confusion. And since there was
no chance that the name would be offered for sale, the first
WIPO category would not apply either. This fourth category
closed that loophole. One might have questioned the inclusion
of a non-trademark issue in a process ostensibly designed to
protect trademark rights. Since, however, this sort of sly, even
malicious, warehousing appeared to be a form of unfair
competition that was likely to be prohibited worldwide, I
though there was no harm in including this category-and the
people who thought it necessary wanted it badly. 6
12c At the time we referred to this as the kaplan.com problem, being under the
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5. Meta questions
The WIPO proposal left several major issues either
unanswered or answered implicitly. One such issue was who
carried the burden of proof. Although complainants usually
have the burden of proof, and in the absence of anything to the
contrary, it seems plausible to assume that WIPO intended
this to be the case,127 one might nevertheless have wished that
WIPO had spelled it out.
A related and more difficult question was whether the
complainant would be required to affirmatively allege each of
the three elements of an abusive registration, and in particular
whether the complainant would have to affirmatively allege
and prove that the registrant had no legitimate rights or
interests in the name at issue. It is easy to allege a negative,
but hard to prove it. In the U.S. system one might deal with
this situation by having the allegation shift the burden of
production to the respondent while leaving the ultimate burden
of persuasion on the complainant. This type of procedural
differentiation is, however, not universally practiced, and
seemed ill-suited for a transnational procedure. The
uncertainty as to this issue persists into the UDRP, and has
resulted in inconsistent practice between cases.
An even more difficult question was whether the-
complainant would meet his burden of proof of bad faith by
simply making allegations in a complaint or, if not, what sort
of supporting evidence would or should be required. It was
unclear how little would suffice to meet the complainant's
burden in a default judgment, and how much would be enough
to overcome the registrant's bare denial in a contested matter.
Similarly, it was unclear what type of evidence might suffice to
rebut an allegation. Again, the UDRP suffers from similar
impression that the Princeton Review had warehoused the kaplan.com domain. In fact,
it appears that Princeton Review actually made use of it to advertise itself and to
disparage Kaplan Education Centers. See RONY & RONY, supra note 26, § 8.1
(discussing dispute between Kaplan Educational Center, Ltd. and Princeton Review
Management Corp).
127 Indeed, given that WIPO's proposal for a special right for famous marks
suggested that the owner of a mark that WIPO certified as globally famous would be
entitled to an "evidentiary presumption" that places a "burden of justifying the
registration" on the registrant, WIPO Final Report, supra note 17, 291, no other
conclusion seemed possible regarding the ordinary case.
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uncertainties and this has led to inconsistent results in
practice. WIPO also made no attempt to address how an
arbitrator assesses credibility in an entirely online proceeding
where each side only gets to submit one short pleading; the
UDRP is equally agnostic.
6. The RDNH Problem
WIPO's Interim Report had set out proposals that would
have invited a flood of reverse domain name hijacking. Chief
among these was a cost-shifting proposal that could potentially
subject a registrant to fees many times the value of the original
registration. The Final Report retained a considerably limited
version of the cost-shifting, thus reducing but not eliminating
the danger that parties with legitimate registrations, especially
unsophisticated and unrepresented parties, could be
intimidated into surrendering them for fear of losing. As
WIPO's prime concern was the protection of trademarks, not
protection against trademark abuse, it made no
recommendations to address this problem.
7. Deeply Flawed Procedures
Many of the ideas and proposals in the Final Report
grew out of the Interim Report. One set of wholly new
proposals, however, which had never been submitted for public
comment or even discussed with WIPO's own advisory panel,
surfaced at the last moment in what became Annex V.128 This
document set out proposed procedures for the dispute
resolution process. These procedures were, quite simply,
unjust. Regrettably, as we shall see, some of these unjust
features were included in the UDRP.
WIPO's proposed procedures imposed several unfair
time limits on registrants and invited various forms of abuse.
Under WIPO's proposal, the date of commencement of a
proceeding would be the date that complaint is received by the
Dispute Resolution Service Provider, not the date that the
registrant has actual (or even constructive) notice of the
12 8WIPO Final Report, supra note 17, at Annex V.
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complaint. The respondent's ten days to reply would thus begin
to run before he was even notified of the action.9 This method
of computing time violated established notions of due process,
and was contrary to civil practice throughout the civilized
world.
Admittedly, there were genuine and difficult issues
regarding what constitutes sufficient notice in an online
proceeding. Given the different ways in which e-mail could be
used, WIPO nonetheless proposed the most unfair and easily-
abused rule available: e-mailed notice by the Dispute
Resolution Service Provider to the registrant. Time starts to
run when this notice is e-mailed, not when it is read: "a notice
or other communication shall be deemed to have been received
on the day it is delivered or, in the case of telecommunications
or Internet modalities, transmitted."130 Nothing in the rules
required that the complainant make any effort to contact the
registrant prior to filing the request for arbitration.
Registrants might have no reason at all to expect to be subject
to an arbitration, and would not be on notice that they should
check their e-mail.
Thus, under WIPO's procedures, anyone who failed to
check his e-mail for ten days could lose by default. The ten-day
period to reply was in any event ridiculously short. A
complainant would have as much time as he wishes to prepare
a complaint, but in the ten days allotted to the registrant, the
registrant would not only have to receive the notice, but
prepare his entire defense. For a person who may be an
unrepresented consumer, with no familiarity with the relevant
arbitral or legal rules, this is not a very long time. And yet, in
that period WIPO expected him to:
(1) Decide whether to seek representation;
(2) Write and submit his sole statement in his defense;131
(3) Collect and submit any relevant documents and a
schedule of such documents; 32 and
'2 Id. at Annex V, § 8.
"0 Id. at Annex V, art. 3(c).
' Id. at Annex V, art. 8.
112 Id. at Annex V, art. 8.
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(4) Have the defense, and possibly the documents
translated into the language of the ADR procedure,
which will ordinarily be the language of the registration
agreement.
133
Ten days (minus the time it takes to get actual notice!) is
simply inadequate, especially in the absence of any warning
that the ADR is imminent. Unfortunately, ICANN's version of
the procedures adopted to accompany the UDRP did a little to
ameliorate this serious problem.
II. ICANN's UDRP
After WIPO forwarded its Final Report to ICANN, that
body began its own complex process to consider whether to
adopt it."3 ICANN did not incorporate WIPO's proposals
regarding preferential WIPO-administered treatment of a new
special class of globally famous names into the UDRP, 135 but
ICANN adopted the bulk of WIPO's other proposals, albeit
with some amendments. 3 ' ICANN adopted in principle its
UDRP and the accompanying UDRP Rules, in August 26, 1999,
but wrangles over details of the implementing language
delayed the final documents until October 24, 1999.
ICANN had already relied on its de facto control over
which registries are in the root to demand that the monopoly
registry, and all registrars, sign contracts with it. ICANN's
agreement with NSI requires that registry to only accept
registrations from registrars who have accepted ICANN's
1' WIPO Final Report, supra note 17, at Annex V, Art 22.
34 As the White Paper instructed ICANN to do something about cyber-
squatting, see supra text accompanying note 58, it seemed a somewhat forgone
conclusion that ICANN would in fact "do something" about the issue. And so it proved.
"5 ICANN later did incorporate a broadened "sunrise" protection for trademark
owners in the roll-out of new gTLDs. See supra note 91.
"a6 In fact, at the instigation of its Vice President and General Counsel, Louis
Touton, ICANN threw out the work product of its internal deliberative committee,
Working Group A, and substituted a draft written in secret by a lawyer hired by a
group of registrars. See A. Michael Froomkin & Mark Lemley, ICANN and Anti-Trust,
available at http'J/personal.law.miami.edu/-froomkin/articles/-icann-antitrust.pdf
(forthcoming 2002).
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standard form Registrar Agreement.' This ensures that any
registrar who hopes to sell registrations in the legacy root will
comply with ICANN's requirement that registrars impose the
UDRP on their customers."38
An analysis of the key substantive parts of the UDRP
follows in Part II.A. There were reasons to doubt whether
ICANN had complied with its own rules in enacting the
UDRP,"' but on the whole the substantive product seemed to
be an improvement over WIPO's proposals-if only because of
the rejection of WIPO's proposals regarding globally famous
trademarks. Unfortunately, as discussed in Part II.B, the
procedures accompanying the UDRP were seriously flawed in
design. Some of these flaws, notably the lack of parity as to the
parties' ability to get a court to hear their dispute if the UDRP
goes against them, had originated in WIPO's last-minute
proposals, "' while others were introduced in the UDRP itself.
137 See ICANN, ICANN-NSI Registry Agreement, available at http'//www.icann-
.org/nsi/nsi-registry-agreement-04nov99.htm (Nov. 4, 1999). ICANN has also imposed
similar requirements on the registries for the seven new TLDs it recently approved.
138 ICANN, Registrar Accreditation Agreement, available at http://www.icann-
.org/nsilicann-raa-04nov99.htm § ILK (last visited Dec. 5, 2001).
139 See A. Michael Froomkin, A Catalog of Critical Process Failures; Progress on
Substance; More Work Needed, available at http://www.law.miami.edu/-amf/-
icann-udp.htm (Oct. 13, 1999). In order to be validly adopted, the UDRP would have
had to be discussed by a working group composed of representatives of each of
ICANN's seven domain name supporting organization ("DNSO") constituencies. In fact,
the working group lacked this representation and, contrary to a policy that anyone
could join a working group, the chair-a Canadian trademark lawyer-excluded
certain opponents of WIPO's policies (including me) from voting membership. In order
to further dilute opposition in a group dominated by trademark lawyers, he divided the
group into subcommittees, and prohibited people from serving on more than one. By
excluding and marginalizing opponents, and doing most of the drafting himself at the
last moment, the chair was able to claim a rough consensus for his work.
The next step in the ICANN process required the DNSO Names Council to
assess whether. there was a consensus in favor of the Working Group's proposal. It did
no such thing, perhaps because this risked finding an answer it would not like.
Instead, the Names Council forwarded the Working Group report to the ICANN Board
for action, appending its own substantive comments.
Faced with screams of outrage by non-trademark groups, the ICANN Board
accepted the UDRP in principle, but instructed its staff to consider drafting changes to
key elements. The staff, in the person of counsel Louis Touton, convened a "small
drafting committee" of U.S.-trained lawyers to advise it, composed of representatives of
the warring factions. I was eventually added to this group. When the group was unable
to agree, rather than reporting a lack of community consensus, Mr. Touton simply
decided matters on his own.
140 See supra text following note 128 (discussing last-minute addition of
Annexes containing procedural provisions of WIPO's proposals).
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One important additional source of difficulty for the
UDRP stems from ICANN's decision to allow the complainant
to choose among ADR service providers accredited by ICANN.
While this policy potentially has the healthy effect of
promoting price competition, there is suggestive if not
conclusive evidence that it may have promoted pernicious non-
price competition also. Dispute providers have an incentive to
encourage complainants to vote with their checkbooks, by
competing to appear the most "plaintiff friendly" provider."
A. Criteria for Transfer
The critical substantive part of the UDRP is the
definition of grounds for the transfer of a domain name from a
registrant to a complainant. Although based on WIPO's
proposals, the UDRP contained a substantial number of
substantive changes. Changes to the grounds for a transfer
generally benefited mark holders, the potential complainants.
The specification of affirmative defenses had mixed results.
Conversely, the removal of WIPO's fee-shifting proposal, and
especially the attempt to address the problem of asymmetrical
access to judicial review, worked to help registrants.
1. Definition of Offense
According to the UDRP, to secure a name transfer a
complainant must prove each of these three elements:
(i) your domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a
trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; and
(ii) you have no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the
domain name; and
(iii) your domain name has been registered and is being used in badfaith 43
141 See Michael Geist, Fair.com?: An Examination of the Allegations of Systemic
Unfairness in the ICANN UDRP, http'//aixl.uottawa.ca/-geist/geistudrp.pdf (Aug.
2001); Milton Mueller, Rough Justice: A statistical assessment of ICANNs Uniform
Dispute Resolution Policy, http'//dcc.syr.edu/roughjustice.htm (last visited Mar. 18,
2002).
1 UDRP, supra note 2, § 4(a).
143 Id.
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So far, this language precisely tracked WIPO's proposal, except
that ICANN spelled out the burden of proof which had only
been implied in WIPO's proposal. ICANN also substituted the
slightly broader, but more Lanham-Act-like word "confusingly"
for "misleadingly" in sub-section (i).'"
Thus, like WIPO, ICANN limited the class of potential
UDRP complainants to trademark and service mark holders.
Despite this explicit limitation, however, a number of UDRP
decisions have found that the policy protects famous people's
personal names, on the theory that they are common law
trademarks or some sort of source identifiers.145 Other UDRP
decisions have found that the policy protects geographic
identifiers, 46 a category excluded under the WIPO proposal. 147
Following WIPO, ICANN limited its definition of
cybersquatting to a small subset of trademark infringement.
Rather than attempt to craft ADR for all domain name-based
trademark infringement actions, ICANN limited the new
remedy to the clearest cases where the registrant obviously
had no "rights or legitimate interests" in the term at issue. In
so doing, like WIPO before it, ICANN imported traditional
choice of law principles, and thus whatever rights of free
expression might apply under that selected law. Unfortunately,
this point proved somewhat subtle for certain arbitrators, who
144 The Lanham Act includes the word "confusion" rather than "mislead"
although it certainly prohibits deception. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1994) prohibits "use in
commerce [of] any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered
mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any
goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion,
or to cause mistake, or to deceive." Id.
145 See, e.g., Roberts v. Boyd, No. D2000-0210 (WIPO May 29, 2000), httpi/-
arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/htmld2000-0210.html; Sade v. Quantum Computer
Servs. Inc., No. D2000-0794 (WIPO Sept. 26, 2000) http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/-
decisions/html/2000/d2000-0794.html; Madonna v. Parisi and "Madonna.com," No.
D2000-0847 (WIPO Oct. 12, 2000), http://arbiter.wipo.intdomains/decisions/htmll-
2000/d2000-0847.html; but see Sting v. Urvan, No. D2000-0596 (WIPO July 20, 2000),
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisionshtml/d2000-0596.html (finding that "Sting" is
a common word and that entertainer was not entitled to name transfer).
146 See Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de Barcelona v. Barcelona.com Inc, No.
D2000-0505 (WIPO Aug. 4, 2000), http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html2000/-
d2000-0505.html. But see Kur- und Verkehrsverein St. Moritz v. StMoritz.com, No.
D2000-0617 (WIPO Aug. 17, 2000), http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/htmY-
2000/d2000-0617.html (finding that stmoritz.com should not be transferred).
147 WIPO returned to the issue of geographic identifiers in its second domain
name process precisely because the issue was excluded from the first round. See supra
note 13.
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either did not consider the choice of law issue, or felt more
comfortable applying sub-sets of the law148 or just making it
149
u1p.
In leaving WIPO's language in this section basically
unchanged, ICANN resisted a forceful call by the International
Trademark Association ("INTA"), among others, to change the
"and" in sub-section (iii) ("your domain name has been
registered and is being used in bad faith") to an "or." Both sides
of this debate had some valid points. Trademark partisans
argued that it would be difficult to prove the motive for a
registration after the fact. Furthermore, since trademark
violations turn on use, it should suffice to show bad-faith use to
establish a violation; a hypothetical pure-hearted registrant
gone bad should not escape the policy. In addition, trademark
partisans worried that wily cybersquatters would register
domains in bad faith, fully intending to ransom to mark
holders, but would not actually use them to forestall any
finding of bad-faith use or might hatch complex schemes in
which one person registers a name but leases or transfers to
another who actually uses it.
Registrant partisans countered that current trademark
law, at least in the United States, was quite clear that mere
registration of a domain, without some kind of commercial use,
did not constitute trademark infringement. Although courts
had held that offering a domain for sale was commercial use, it
could not follow that a plaintiffs psychic conclusion that
warehousing was in bad faith could substitute for actual
conduct. They also argued that, large-scale cybersquatters
excepted, the only way to tell that a registration was in bad
faith was to look at subsequent conduct, i.e., use, and that the
two therefore should not be separated. Furthermore, as noted
below, ICANN has greatly broadened the evidence that would
suffice to find an intent to profit by selling to the complainant.
The small drafting committee empanelled by ICANN
deadlocked on this issue, and ICANN Counsel Louis Touton
148 See supra note 111 (citing arbitral decisions).
1 The barcelona.corn decision, No. D2000-0505, is particularly outrageous, as
the Spanish arbitrator ordered the transfer not because the registrant lacked rights to
the name-he was operating a travel business that offered tours to Barcelona-but
because the arbitrator found that the city had "better rights or more legitimate
interests as in this case." One can only wonder what dispute policy the arbitrator was
reading, if any.
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single-handedly decided it in favor of "and." In practice,
however, this distinction appears to have been completely lost
on numerous arbitrators, who have read "and" as if it meant
or."
150
Like WIPO before it, ICANN also spelled out a non-
exclusive list of "circumstances, in particular but without
limitation, [which] if found by the Panel to be present, shall be
evidence of the registration and use of a domain name in bad
faith."5' Three of the four clauses of ICANN's policy diverged
materially from WIPO's text, and more often than not in ways
that benefited potential complainants.
Only ICANN's second category of bad faith, § 4(b)(ii),
relating to Toeppen-style mass cybersquatters hewed precisely
to WIPO's recommendations.52
'5 See, e.g., Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Burgar, No. FA 0002000093564 (NAF April
10, 2000), http://www.arbforum.com/domains/decisions/93564.htm.
'5' UDRP, supra note 2, § 4(b).
152 Compare UDRP, supra note 2, § 4(b)(ii) with WIP0 Final Report, supra note
17, § 171(2)(c).
Evidence of bad faith
ICANN UDRP § 4(b)(ii)
[Y]ou have registered the
domain name in order to
prevent the owner of the
trademark or service mark
from reflecting the mark in
a corresponding domain
name, provided that you
have engaged in a pattern
of such conduct;
Evidence of bad faith
WIPO 171(2)(c)
[Tihe registration of the
domain name in order to
prevent the owner of the
trade or service mark from
reflecting the mark in a
corresponding domain
name, provided that a
pattern of such conduct has
been established on the
part of the domain name
holder;
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Compared to WIPO's earlier proposal, ICANN's classic
cybersquatting definition, § 4(b)(i), had one big change that
favored mark holders, and a small change that favored
registrants. The big change greatly expanded the arbitrators'
ability to rely on circumstantial evidence to find intent to resell
a domain name to a trademark holder. Where WIPO had
required an actual concrete offer to "sell, rent or otherwise
transfer" a domain name, ICANN required only a finding of
"circumstances indicating" acquisition of the domain name
"primarily for the purpose" of such a transaction. 5 '
16 Compare UDRP, supra note 2, § 4(b)(i) with WIPO Final Report, supra note
17, § 171(2)(a).
Evidence of bad faith
WIPO 171(2)(a)
[A]n offer to sell, rent or
otherwise transfer the
domain name to the owner
of the trade or service
mark, or to a competitor of
the owner of the trade or
service mark, for valuable
consideration;
Evidence of bad faith
ICANN UDRP § 4(b)(i)
[C]ircumstances indicating
that you have registered or
you have acquired the
domain name primarily for
the purpose of selling,
renting, or otherwise
transferring the domain
name registration to the
complainant who is the
owner of the trademark or
service mark or to a
competitor of that
complainant, for valuable
consideration in excess of
your documented out-of
pocket costs directly related
to the domain name;
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On the other hand, albeit of lesser import, where WIPO
considered the registrant's request for any "valuable
consideration" to be the mark of a cybersquatter, in § 4(b)(i)
ICANN accepted the argument that requests for actual
expenses, such as the cost of the registration, cost of stationary
incorporating the domain name, and other costs associated
with changing a name, did not make a registrant a
cybersquatter so long as the costs were reasonable and
documented.1" Trademark partisans complained that this
could easily be abused, but experience suggests that this sort of
abuse is rare.
Like it had done with the basic cybersquatting clause,
ICANN's version of the unfair competition clause, § 4(b)(iii),
also loosened the evidentiary requirement. Where WIPO
required a finding that the domain had been registered "in
order" to disrupt a competitor, ICANN accepted the argument
that mixed motives should not save an otherwise unfairly
competitive domain name registration. It relaxed the "in order"
language to require only a finding that the domain name was
registered "primarily for the purpose of disrupting a
competitor."
155
Evidence of bad faith
ICANN UDRP § 4(b)(iii)
Mou have registered the
domain name primarily for
the purpose of disrupting
the business of a
competitor; or
Evidence of bad faith
WIPO 171(2)(d)
the registration of the
domain name in order to
disrupt the business of a
competitor.
1 4 Id.
'6 Compare UDRP, supra note 2, § 4(b)(iii) with WIPO Final Report, supra
note 17, § 171(2)(d).
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As its tortured syntax suggests, bearing all the
earmarks of a committee wrangle, § 4(b)(iv) was very
controversial. WIPO's cognate text sounded like a fairly
standard trademark prohibition against using a mark in
domain name in a way that caused commercial confusion. In
their arguments to ICANN, however, trademark
representatives protested vehemently that the proposed
standard was underinclusive and too difficult to meet. ICANN
accepted their arguments.'56
26 Compare UDRP, supra note 2, § 4(b)(iv) with WIPO Final Report, supra
note 17, § 171(2)(b).
Evidence of bad faith
ICANN UDRP § 4(b)(iv)
[Bly using the domain
name, you have
intentionally attempted to
attract, for commercial
gain, Internet users to your
web site or other on-line
location, by creating a
likelihood of confusion with
the complainant's mark as
to the source, sponsorship,
affiliation, or endorsement
of your web site or location
or of a product or service on
your web site or location.
Evidence of bad faith
WIPO 171(2)(b)
[Ain attempt to attract, for
financial gain, Internet
users to the domain name
holder's website or other on-
line location, by creating
confusion with the trade or
service mark of the
complainant;
20021
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Among the most significant changes were the loosening
of the standard from "creating confusion" to the more Lanham-
Act-like "creating a likelihood of confusion," and the change
from a requirement of attempted "financial gain" by the
registrant to attempted "commercial gain"-the idea being that
some "financial" gains might be non-commercial (e.g., a church
asking for donations). Most confusingly, ICANN substituted
WIPO's straightforward statement that it prohibited confusion
with a trade or service mark, with a prohibition on a likelihood
of confusion with marks "as to the source, sponsorship,
affiliation, or endorsement of your web site or location or of a
product or service on your web site or location.""7 As one might
expect given its convoluted nature, this paragraph has
spawned inconsistent and idiosyncratic decisions.'58
2. Affirmative Defenses
Unlike WIPO, ICANN specified three non-exclusive
affirmative defenses which would demonstrate the registrant's
rights or legitimate interests to the domain name.5 9 Some
objected to specifying defenses in the policy on the grounds
that it would just give cybersquatters an instructional guide,
but this objection was not pressed hard, and it did not carry
the day. UDRP § 4(c) stated that:
Any of the following circumstances, in particular but without
limitation, if found by the Panel to be proved based on its evaluation
of all evidence presented, shall demonstrate your rights or legitimate
interests to the domain name for purposes of Paragraph 4(a)(ii):
(i) before any notice to you of the dispute, your use of, or
demonstrable preparations to use, the domain name or a name
corresponding to the domain name in connection with a bona fide
offering of goods or services; or
(ii) you (as an individual, business, or other organization) have been
commonly known by the domain name, even if you have acquired no
trademark or service mark rights; or
1UDRP, supra note 2, § 4(b)(iv).
158 For a survey see Amy Bender, Bad Faith, ch. 3.2.4., at http'J/lweb.law.harv-
ard.edu/udrp/opinion/btext.html#3.2.4 (last modified Jan. 2002).
159 UDRP, supra note 2, § 4(c).
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(iii) you are making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the
domain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly
divert consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at
issue.160
The first affirmative defense protects persons who could
demonstrate their "use of, or demonstrable preparations to use,
the domain name or a name corresponding to the domain name
in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services" at a
time prior to any notice to them of the dispute. 6' Trademark
partisans objected to including "demonstrable preparations to
use" on the grounds that this would be too easy to fake. The
counterargument was that such fakery was fraud and
punishable as such. The second counterargument was that the
rule was needed to reflect the reality of e-commerce in which
the domain name was often a critical and early part of a
startup's business plan. As such, the name might be registered
legitimately some months before the firm started active
trading, during a period in which everything about the firm
was intentionally secret.
The second affirmative defense was sometimes called
the "pokey" clause after the notorious attempted hijack of the
pokey.org website.'6' This defense protects those who "(as an
individual, business, or other organization) have been
commonly known by the domain name, even if you have
acquired no trademark or service mark rights."6 ' While having
a personal name or nickname does not entitle one to trade
under it if that would create confusion with another's pre-
existing trademark in that name, it seemed likely that such
cases would be rare, and would be more correctly characterized
as garden variety trademark infringement rather than
cybersquatting. In any event, any policy that could have been
characterized as a threat to children's websites would have
been a public relations disaster.
160 Id.
'"Id. § 4(c)(i).
'62 See RONY & RONY, supra note 26.
16 UDRP, supra note 2, § 4(c)(ii).
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The final affirmative defense category is a weird mix of
incompatible concepts. It states that a domain name is being
used legitimately if the registrant is "making a legitimate
noncommercial or fair use of the domain name, without intent
for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to
tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue."64 Under U.S.
trademark law at the time the UDRP was being debated,
commercial use was a clear prerequisite to a claim of federal
trademark infringement. Both the Lanham Act and the Anti-
Dilution Act require commercial use by the defendant for a
court to find for the plaintiff.'65 Thus, in the United States,
absent very strange facts alleging actionable non-commercial
tarnishment not protected by the First Amendment, a category
that may well be limited to linking a mark to obscenity, 66 a
purely non-commercial use was pretty much an iron-clad
defense against a claim of trademark infringement. 67 ICANN's
164 Id.
165 Lanham Act § 32, codified at 15 U.S.C. §1114(a)(1) (protecting registered
mark against "use in commerce" of "any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable
imitation ... in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising
of any goods or services or in connection with which such use is likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"); see also id. § 1114(1)(b) (prohibiting
application of copies of registered mark to advertisements and packaging "intended to
be used in commerce"); Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, codified at 15 U.S.C. §
1125(c)(4) (stating that "noncommercial use" of a famous mark "shall not be actionable
under this section"); cf Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 11 (1979) (stating that
Lanham Act protections extend to "strictly business" matters and involve "a form of
commercial speech and nothing more").
16 Hasbro, Inc. v. Internet Entm't Group, Ltd. 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1479, 1479 (W.D.
Wash. 1996) is suggestive, although the case involved commercial use. More on point is
Archdiocese of St. Louis v. Internet Entm't Group, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1145 (E.D. Mo. 1999)
(granting preliminary injunction against the use of papalvisitl999.com and
papalvisit.com), although the decision seems plainly erroneous on First Amendment
grounds.
16 Arguably the passage of ACPA, which echoes some of the language of the
UDRP, may have created another avenue by which non-commercial tarnishment could
be actionable. For an argument that ACPA, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(IV), might
have this effect, see Jason M. Osborn, Effective and Complementary Solutions to
Domain Name Disputes: Icann's Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy and
the Federal Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of 1999, 76 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 209, 251 (2000).
I think this argument is wrong for First Amendment reasons. Cf 4 J. THOMAS
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24:105 (4th ed.
2000) (noting that "tarnishment caused merely by editorial or artistic parody which
satirizes plaintiffs product or its image is not actionable under an anti-dilution statute
because of the free speech protections of the First Amendment" and that otherwise "a
corporation could shield itself from criticism by forbidding the use of its name in
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third defense, however, fails to reflect this. Having noted the
non-commercial use defense as applying to any "legitimate
noncommercial or fair use of the domain name, without intent
for commercial gain," at the eleventh hour-well after most of
the public comment period had passed-ICANN added the
limiting clause, "to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish
the trademark or service mark at issue."
As a drafting matter, it seems odd to have a potentially
major ground for transferring non-commercial domain name
registration appear as a purported affirmative defense.
Substantively, this importation of the tarnishment concept as a
limit on non-commercial uses of domain names seems wholly
inappropriate, because it undermines a substantial part of the
free-speech value of the non-commercial and fair use defenses.
In particular, this language easily could be used to deny
protection to legitimate criticism sites. A site designed to
attack a company's labor practices or its environmental record
("MegaCo kills the earth") might be considered to have the
requisite intent to tarnish a mark. This would go far beyond
U.S. law in protecting trademark holders. The picture is even
more disturbing if one considers the various meanings of
tarnishment in other legal systems. At various times and
places, even gentle criticism of corporations such as
comparative price and quality advertisement have been held to
be tarnishment.6
As many observers noted at the time, the natural effect
of this language blunts the protection of free speech that
noncommercial users are entitled to. ICANN was sufficiently
concerned about the appearance of restricting free speech that
its Second Staff Report included a footnote stating:
In view of the comments, one detail of the policy's language should
be emphasized. Several commentators indicated that the concept of
"tarnishment" in paragraph 4(c)(iii) might be misunderstood by
those not familiar with United States law or might otherwise be
commentaries critical of its conduct."); Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 28 F. Supp.
2d 1120, 1156 (C.D. Cal. 1998); Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber, 29 F. Supp.
2d 1161, 1165 (C.D. Cal. 1998); Oscar S. Cisneros, Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v.
Faber, 15 BERKELEYTECH. L.J. 229 (2000).
'6 See Mathias Strasser, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection
Revisited: Putting the Dilution Doctrine Into Context, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENr. L.J. 375 (2000).
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applied inappropriately to noncommercial uses of parody names and
the like. Staff is not convinced this is the case, but in any event
wishes to point out that "tarnishment" in paragraph 4(c)(iii) is
limited to acts done with intent to commercially gain. Staff intends
to take steps to publicize this point.
16 9
In the two years since that statement was penned,
however, the only visible publicity has been the posting of the
Second Staff Report on ICANN's web site. And indeed-
although this clause is not inevitably cited as the reason-a
surprisingly large number of UDRP decisions have found that
non-commercial so-called "sucks" sites violate the UDRP and
have ordered domain name transfers. 7 ° Arbitrators under the
UDRP have been willing to find names such as directlinesucks,
dixonssucks, freeservesucks, guinness-beer-really-really-sucks,
guinness-really-really-sucks.com, 7' natwestsucks, standard-
charteredsucks 7 ' and walmartcanadasucks are "identical or
confusingly similar" to a trademarked term without the
"sucks." For example, the arbitrator in the
standardcharteredsucks.com case concluded that it "is by no
means necessarily" the case that the name "would be
recognized as an address plainly dissociated from 'Standard
Chartered.' "17' Although the arbitrator allowed that "[slome
will treat the additional 'sucks' as a pejorative exclamation and
therefore dissociate it after all from the Complainant" he
seemed to think that some people were not clever enough to
make this distinction and would be "confused."74 However,
under standard trademark principles it is very unlikely that a
court would find that consumers would believe the company
169 ICANN, Second Staff Report on Implementation Documents for the Uniform
Dispute Resolution Policy, n.2, at http'//www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-second-staff-re-
port-24oct99.htm (Oct. 25, 1999).
170 Not all, however. See, e.g., Lockheed Martin Corp. v. .Parisi, No. D2000-1015
(WIPO Jan. 26, 2000), http://www.arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisionshtml/2OOO/d2OOO-
1015.htm. ("Both common sense and a reading of the plain language of the Policy
support the view that a domain name combining a trademark with the word 'sucks' or
other language clearly indicating that the domain name is not affiliated with the
trademark owner cannot be considered confusingly similar to the trademark.").
17' Diageo plc v. Zuccarini, No. D2000-0996, (WIPO Oct. 22, 2000), http://-
www.arbiter.wipo.int/domains/-decisions/html/d2000-0996.html.
172 Standard Chartered PLC v. Purge I.T., No. D2000-0681 (WIPO Aug. 13,
2000), http'//www.arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-O6-81.html.
173 Id. § 5.
174 Id.
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being mocked would sponsor a site describing it in these
pejorative terms. Such a finding would require extensive
survey evidence, and even then First Amendment principles
would likely allow the use for criticism by a non-competing
party.
3. Costs
ICANN made a very significant decision about the
assessment of costs that benefited registrants, and reduced
somewhat the danger of reverse domain name hijacking. The
WIPO proposal had contemplated having the complainant pay
fees to the dispute resolution provider to initiate the process,
but would have allowed the arbitrator to require a losing
registrant to pay arbitral fees and costs. To the trademark bar
this was a just strategy aimed at lowering settlement values
and creating incentives for cybersquatters to throw in the
towel, but to advocates of registrants' rights it was a recipe for
intimidating individual registrants. At the time, the
administrative costs of the proceedings were estimated to be
between $1000 and $3000.'7 While this is not a large number
for a big corporation, and is manageable for many small
businesses in the developed world, it could be prohibitive for
others and for individuals-especially those located in less
wealthy countries. Add in the cost of a lawyer, and the
difficulty of finding competent counsel on very short notice, and
the prospect becomes daunting for small and even medium-
1' This was not in fact a bad guess as things turned out, although it ignores
the issue of attorney's fees. Actual costs vary among the providers and also depend on
whether the ADR uses a one-person or three-person panel. Costs run between $750
and $4500 for one disputed domain name. See CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution
("CPR"), CPR Supplemental Rules to ICANN's Rules for Uniform Domain Name
Dispute Resolution Policy, § 12, at http:J/www.cpradr.org/ICANN_RulesAndFees.htm
(last modified Sept. 15, 2000) (noting that the fee for one panelist is $2000 and the fee
for three panelists is $4500); eResolution Consortium, Schedule of Fees, § 1, at
http'/www.eresolution.calservices/dnd/schedule.htm (Oct. 2, 2000) (noting that the fee
for one panelist is $750 and the fee for three panelists is $2200); National Arbitration
Forum Dispute Resolution for Domain Names, Schedule of Fees, at
http//www.arbforum.condomains/domaln-fees.html (Dec. 23, 1999) (noting that the
fee for one panelist is $750 and the fee for three panelists is $2250); World Intellectual
Property Organization, Schedule of Fees Under the ICANN Policy, at
http://arbiter.wipo.intdomains/fees/'mdex.html (Aug. 15, 2000) (noting that the fee for
one panelist is $1500 and that the fee for three panelists is $3000).
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sized enterprises. Given that a domain name could be
registered for under $100, the prospect of having to risk thirty
or more times the value of one's investment to protect it was
likely to have an intimidating effect in many cases. While
trademark representatives grumbled about the loss of fee-
shifting, some admitted that collecting those fees would be
nearly impossible in most cases, given that the cost of
enforcement would have exceeded the amount that could be
recovered-even if one could find the defendant.
4. Reverse Domain Name Hijacking ("RDNH")
The UDRP continues WIPO's tradition of providing no
meaningful punishment for RDNH. UDRP § 15(e) does,
however, provide for the potential slap on the wrist in an
adverse decision:
If after considering the submissions the Panel finds that the
complaint was brought in bad faith, for example in an attempt at
Reverse Domain Name Hijacking or was brought primarily to harass
the domain-name holder, the Panel shall declare in its decision that
the complaint was brought in bad faith and constitutes an abuse of
the administrative proceeding.
17 6
Although the failure to find a more forceful solution to
RDNH is not a small problem, most of the direct remedies
might be worse than the disease. The UDRP does not give the
arbitrators authority to levy fines against registrants or
complainants. If the policy were amended to allow fines for
RDNH, it is likely that fines against losing registrants would
be the next step. Other than fines, there appears to be no
sanction which could be applied against reverse domain name
hijackers except perhaps excluding them from any further
access to the UDRP. ICANN did not consider the exclusion
option because implementing it contractually might be
difficult. By far the best solution would be to ensure that
arbitrators do not make zany decisions ignoring the plain
words of the UDRP. The more zany decisions there are, the
more mark holders will be tempted to "have a go" at the quick
and inexpensive UDRP.
176 UDRP Rules, supra note 18, § 15(e).
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Section 15(e) of the UDRP has no deterrence value. Its
irrelevance is best demonstrated by noting that despite the
many odd complaints filed under the UDRP, the first case
actually to find RDNH was not decided until June 19, 2000,177
about six months into the life of the UDRP. By the time the
UDRP was a year old, there were only two UDRP cases finding
RDNH.'78 By February 2002, there were at most a handful of
RDNH decisions. 9  Of course the absence of RDNH findings is
not itself proof that there is a problem with policy, as this fact
is also consistent with the hypothesis that the overwhelming
majority of claims filed are either meritorious or at least
arguable. However, when one combines the many debatable or
17 See Qtrade Canada, Inc. v. ank of Hydro, No. AF-0169 (eResolution June 19,
2000), available at http'//www.eresolution.ca/services/dnd/decisions/0169.htm.
'78 In addition to the Qtrade case, there was K2r Produkte AG v. Trigano, No.
D2000-0622 (WIPO Aug. 23, 2000), http://arbiter.wipo.inttdomains/decisionshtmnl-
2000/d2000-0622.html, in which only two of the three panelists were willing to find
RDNH despite fairly clear facts.
'7 There is no authoritative list of UDRP decisions finding RDNH. A fairly
complete list is as follows:
Torres, S.A. v. The Torres Group, No. D2001-1200 (WIPO Dec. 19, 2001),
http'//arbiter.wipo.int/domainstdecisions/html/200l/d200l-1200.html; Soci~t6 des
Produits Nestl6 S.A. v. Pro Fiducia Treuhand AG, No. D2001-0916 (WIPO Oct. 12,
2001), http'/arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2001/d2001-0916.html; Aspen
Grove, Inc. v. Aspen Grove, No. D2001-0798 (WIPO Oct. 5, 2001), http:j/arbiter.wipo-
.int/domainsdecisions/htmY2001/d2001-0798.html; Maine Bait Co. v. Brooks a/k/a
Maine Bait, No. FA0107000098246 (NAF Aug. 28, 2001), http'J/www.arbforum.comI-
domains/decisions98246.htm; G. A. Modefine, S.A. v. A.R. Mani, No. D2001-0537
(WIPO July 20, 2001), http'J/arbiter.wipo.int/domainstdecisions/htmil/2001/d2001-0537-
.html; Koninklijke KPN N.V. v. Telepathy Inc., No. D2001-0217 (WIPO May 7, 2001),
http://arbiter.wipo.intdomainsldecisions/html/2001/d200l-0217.html; ODE and ODE-
Optimum Digital Enter. v. Internship Ltd., No. D2001-0074 (WIPO May 1, 2001),
http'//arbiter.wipo.intdomains/decisions/htmY2001/d200l-0074.html; ONU s.r.l. v.
Online Sales, LLC, No. AF-0672 (eResolution Feb. 16, 2001), http://www.disputes.org/-
eresolution/decisions/0672.htm; Goldline Int'l, Inc. v. Gold Line, No. D2000-1151
(WIPO Jan. 4, 2001), http'//arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-1151-
.html; Deutsche Welle v. DiamondWare Ltd., No. D2000-1202 (WIPO Jan. 2, 2001),
http'J/arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/htnl/2000/d2000-1202.html; Foresight Corp.
v. Servos, No. AF-0473 (eResolution Dec. 15, 2000), http://www.disputes.org-
eresolution/decisions0473.htm; Foresight Corp. v. Servos, No. AF-0473 (eResolution
Dec. 15, 2000), http:/www.disputes.org/eresolution/decisions.0473.htm; Safari Casino
A.G. v. Global Interactive Ltd., No. AF-0288 (eResolution Oct. 4, 2000), http'//-
www.disputes.orgeresolution/decisions/0288.htm; Smart Design LLC v. Hughes, No.
D2000-0993 (WIPO Oct. 18, 2000), http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html-
2000/d2000-0993.html; K2r Produkte AG v. Trigano, No. D2000-0622 (WIPO Aug. 23, .
2000), http://arbiter.wipo.intdomains/decisionshtml/2000/d2000-0622.html; Qtrade
Canada Inc. v. Bank of-Hydro, No. AF-0169 (eResolution June 19, 2000), http://www-
.disputes.org/eresolution/decisions/0169.htm.
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frankly abusive decisions against respondents, indeed the
cases where one would expect a RDNH finding yet there is
none, and the absence of any RDNH decisions that are even
arguably wrong, one begins to see a tilt in a particular
direction.
Deutsche Welle v. DiamondWare,180 one of the first cases
to find RDNH, exemplifies the lengths to which complainants
have to go before a panel will find them guilty of abusing the
process. Indeed, in the DiamondWare matter, despite the
obviously abusive nature of the complaint based on trademarks
more recent than the domain name registration, only two of the
three arbitrators were willing to say the complaint was
brought . in bad faith.181 The complainant was a German
television and radio network, the respondent a software
development company based in the United States which had
traded under the acronym "DW" since as early as 1994. The
respondent registered dw.com in 1994. Deutsche Welle had
German .trademarks dating to the 1980s, but none in the
United States with priority before 1995. When Deutsche Welle
sent a demand letter182 to DiamondWare in July 2000, it
responded (on dw.com letterhead), as follows:
Thank you for your interest in our domain name, dw.com. We are
not currently offering this property for sale on the open market,
however it has recently been attracting enquiries. Therefore, we
would consider an offer above $3,750,000 (three million, seven
hundred fifty thousand US Dollars) from an accredited buyer.18
Deutsche Welle responded by bringing a proceeding
under the UDRP. According to the judgment, this was the
entire argument it presented:
" No. D 2000-1202, (WIPO Jan. 2, 2001), http//arbiter.wipo.intdomains/-
decisions/html/2000/d2000-1202.html.
181 Id.
12 The letter said:
It has come to our attention that you are in possession of the domain
www.dw.com. As shown in the enclosed certification Deutsche Welle
has a registered trade mark concerning "dw."
Therefore you shall transfer this domain name over to us.
Nevertheless we would be very grateful for your co-operation in
resolving this matter and find an amicable solution.
I look forward to hearing from you soon.
Id.
183 Id.
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The complainant is operating a public television and radio
program worldwide under the denomination "DW." The trade marks
of the complainant cover goods and services directly related to
media, data transfer, and internet services. Furthermore, it has
become very common that broadcasting channels offer internet
services under their program (which is "DW" in this case).
The respondent has been approached by fax of July 13, 2000 by
the complainant. The respondent has answered by fax of August 10,
2000 and was offering the domain 'DW" for the offer of U.S. $
3,750,000. The fact that the respondent is offering the domain for
sale shows that the respondent has no personal or other legitimate
interest in holding the domain, .which is obvious taking into
consideration the amount of money they are asking. Furthermore,
from the letter of the respondent one can see that the respondent
acquired the domain and holds the domain primarily for the purpose
of selling it.18
The two arbitrators in the majority held that the
complaint was abusive because the complainant knew that the
dw.com registration pre-dated its U.S. trademarks (which
were, in any case not for the letters "dw," an acronym of the
complainant, but rather for the letters plus a graphic design
element), and since it also knew or should have known (from
even a cursory examination of the dw.com website) that the
respondents were and had been operating a bona-fide business
from it."" Indeed, the complainant had completely failed to
allege, much less offer any evidence, that the domain was
registered "primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or
otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the
complainant" or to explain why, if this was the case,
DiamondWare waited six years to make its request for
payment, and then only in response to a demand letter.
18 6
For the two arbitrators in the majority, this conduct
demonstrated an abuse of the UDRP. Even the dissenter on the
RDNH finding agreed that "the Complaint was misconceived
and should not have been filed" because the complainant had
failed to make even "a minimal effort to establish plausible
grounds for bringing the Complaint under the Policy."
194 id.
'85 Deutsche Welle v. DiamondWare, Ltd., No. D2000-1202, (WIPO Jan. 2,
2001), http//arbiter.wipo.intdomains/decisionshtml/2000/d2000-1202.html.
186 Id
2002]
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Nevertheless, the dissenter was unwilling to join the RDNH187
finding because, upon receipt of Deutsche Welle's demand
letter, DiamondWare had failed to explain it was a bona fide
user of the domain name and failed to explain "the basis for the
price it was quoting for the Domain Name."188 Despite Deutsche
Welle's apparent failure to do minimal investigation of
DiamondWare's web site or history, this dissenter stated that
the respondent's failures to educate the party threatening it
would make it "unduly harsh to characterize the Complaint as
reverse domain name hijacking.""9 Where the UDRP imposes a
duty to educate people who negligently send you threatening
letters was never explained.
Perhaps DiamondWare was lucky. In NetLearning, Inc.
v. Parisi.9° a different panel faced a complaint bought by a
trademark holder whose first use of its trademark was more
than a year after the respondent first registered the contested
domain name. The majority of the NetLearning panel rejected
the suggestion that because there was no way that a
registration made before the trademark right existed could
ever be in bad faith under UDRP § 4(a)(iii), the complaint must
therefore be abusive. In fact, it went one better and transferred
the domain name to the complaint. 91
B. Procedural Problems
Except for the small matter of attorneys' fees, the
UDRP is certainly quick and relatively cheap when compared
to litigation in a U.S. court.'92 The proceeding can cost under
$1,500 for one panelist, depending on the complainant's choice
187 Id.
i' Id. (referring to the views of arbitrator Torsten Bettinger).
189 Id.
" No. FA0008000095471 (NAF Oct. 16, 2000), http'/www.arbforum.com/dom-
ains/decisions/95471.htm.
19' Id. The panel majority's decision seemed to turn on two facts: that Parisi
used the domain to display pornography, and that the parties had discussed selling the
domain name for several thousand dollars. The respondent then took the matter to
court, producing a reported decision holding that the court would hear the case de novo
and that Federal Arbitration Act does not apply to UDRP matters, Parisi v.
Netlearning, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 745 (E.D. Va. 2001), but, so far at least, no decision
on the merits.
192 For a summary of the costs see supra note 175.
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of dispute resolution provider. The arbitration runs on a very
fast track, with each side entering only exhibits and one short
pleading. Save in the most exceptional case (which has yet to
occur 93), there is neither a live hearing nor online argument.
Proceedings normally take forty-five days or less from
complaint to conclusion. If the respondent loses, he has ten
more days to file a challenge in a competent court, or the
domain name is transferred to the complainant." It is no
surprise, therefore, that so many cases have been filed under
the policy since it began. Of the cases that have proceeded to a
decision, more than seventy-five percent have been decided for
the complainant. 9
The UDRP's advantages to complainants come,
however, at the price of a substantial reduction in registrants'
legal rights. Many of the worst effects on registrants' rights are
artifacts of the UDRP rules rather than the policy itself. Four
of the most unfair aspects of the UDRP rules are: (1) the
selection and composition of the arbitral panel; (2) the failure
to provide a registrant with adequate time to reply to a
complaint-or even to ensure that the respondent has actual
notice; (3) a very crabbed and limited opportunity for
complainants who lose a UDRP action to get their cases into
court; and (4) the absence of any meaningful check on the
providers' creation of supplemental rules that effectively tilt
the playing field.
1. Selection and Composition of the Tribunal
Rather than both sides having equal input into who will
decide the case, the complainant chooses the arbitral tribunal
from a small list of approved providers maintained by ICANN.
Unlike standard arbitration clauses where the provider is
"
3 In Columbine JDS Systems, Inc. v. Jin Lu (adserve.com), No. AF-0137
(eResolution Apr. 28, 2000), http'/www.disputes.org/eresolution/decisions/0137.htm,
the arbitrator said that he would have "preferred" more evidence from the respondent.
In Ebuilder, Inc. v. Building Online (ebuilder.com), No. CPR008, http'J/www.cpr-
adr.org/ICANNDecisionCPRO08-001205.htm (Dec. 5; 2000), the Panel said that the
relationship between the Complainant and the TM owner was not clear. Neither panel
apparently thought to invoke this procedure.
19 UDRP, supra note 2, § 4(k).
1 Mueller, supra note 141.
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specified in the presumably bargained-for contract or
negotiated by the parties at the time of the dispute, the
respondent has no say in which provider will manage her case,
and no peremptory challenges to arbitrators she may fear are
biased. The respondent can, however, pick one member of a
three-person panel at her own expense if the complainant
opted for a single panelist an& the respondent decides three are
needed.9  Overall, the system gives dispute resolution
providers an economic incentive to compete by being
complainant-friendly. 
19 7
Different strategies were proposed for deciding how a
given case would be assigned to a dispute services provider.
The discussions took place at a time when it was unclear how
many providers there might be, how they would be accredited
and by whom, and how, if at all, they would be monitored.
WIPO would have been happy to be the sole dispute-services
provider,'98 but not everyone was comfortable with this idea.
WIPO's defined mission of encouraging the protection of
intellectual property, and the views put forward in its Interim
Report and Final Report, created some doubts about its neutral
status. Having multiple providers might also encourage price
competition, while a monopoly provider could either charge
what it liked, or would require some form of price control by an
ICANN dedicated to promoting competition.
Proposals for assigning cases included the suggestion
that the registrant would pick the dispute-services provider
either at the time of registration or at the time of dispute, or
that plaintiff would pick one at the time of complaint, or that
39 UDRP Rules, supra note 18, §§ 6(c), 6(e).
197 See Mueller, supra note 141.
198 By February 2002, WIPO had captured the lion's share of the market, with
National Arbitration Forum ("NAF") in a distant second place, and the other providers
having only negligible shares. Cumulative data up through mid-February 2002 showed
this breakdown for a total of 4388 cases:
WIPO: 2565 cases (58.46 % of total caseload)
NAF: 1548 cases (35.28 % of total caseload)
ERES: 244 cases ( 5.56 % of total caseload)
CPR: 31 cases ( 0.70 % of total caseload)
E-mail from Michael Geist to Michael Froomkin, (Feb. 19, 2002) (on file with
author). This cumulative data, liowever, does not show how WIPO's share grew over
time. Ethan Katsh has assembled data showing that on February 2000, WIPO's share
of the total caseload was about 43%; by February 2001 it was almost 60%, with NAF
having almost all the remaining cases. E-mail from Ethan Katsh to Michael Froomkin,
(Sept. 12, 2001) (on file with author).
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registrars would pick, or that the service-provider would be
randomly selected. Once the trademark bar had conceded on
the issue of who would pay for the process (plaintiff, unless
plaintiff wanted one arbitrator and respondent wanted three,
in which case the cost was split), it insisted that allowing the
defendant to pick, even at the time of registration, was unfair.
The trademark bar also argued that if anyone other than the
complainant were allowed to select the provider, it might
encourage the existence of an arbitration service provider
biased toward registrants. If that happened, all registrants
would select it, and even registrars might be forced for
competitive reasons to elect this service to arbitrate domains
they administered. ICANN therefore allowed the complainant
to select the provider, but made no effort to put in place any
mechanism to monitor the system for pro-complainant bias, a
prospect that seemed at least as likely as pro-registrant bias.
In exchange for paying the piper a pittance, the trademark bar
got to call the tune. It turned out to be a good bargain for their
clients.
This was a serious error, and urgently needs repair.
There were other options available, but they were discarded.
The registrar could choose the provider, or a provider could be
selected at random. Random choice was in some ways fairest,
but it had the real disadvantage of introducing no incentive for
dispute services providers to keep down their prices, which
seemed risky.199
Whatever procedure replaces the current one, ICANN
should have no role in the selection of arbitration providers.
The selection and vetting of arbitrators is in no conceivable
form a technical issue relating to either names, numbers, or
the functioning of the Internet and is thus outside ICANN's
proper jurisdiction. There is nothing in the structural
composition of ICANN, nor in the composition of the current or
any imaginable future ICANN Board, which suggests any
special competence in this area. If, despite this, ICANN takes
on as it has the function of accrediting dispute services
providers, it must put in place mechanisms to ensure that the
providers are competent, and must monitor them for partiality.
As a later participant in the creation of a dispute services provider, I still
stand by that conclusion. We would have been happy to charge more-and would still
be in business.
20021
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Without some monitoring, one gets the system we have today-
which is a recipe for forum shopping.
Second, any system that replaces the current one must
allow arbitrators to be selected from lists that do not only
include trademark lawyers, but people with other backgrounds,
including civil liberties lawyers. As registrations and
trademarks are both global, the system must also take account
of national and linguistic differences of the participants.2"
2. Issues of Notice and Computation of Time
Adopting one of the worst features of WIPO's proposal,
the UDRP does not require actual notice to respondents, only
attempted notice for a relatively short period of time. The mere
sending of the complaint to postal-mail, fax, and e-mail
addresses found via whois, 0 ' and by e-mail to postmaster@ plus
any e-mail address shown or e-mail links on www.domn name
suffices to start the twenty day clock for the respondent's only
chance to reply."2 The decision to forgo requiring actual notice
in absolutely all cases is understandable, given the efforts that
the sleaziest registrants go to hide their contact details in
shady registrations. The short deadlines, on the other hand,
Issues of composition of panels from the lists maintained by individual
arbitration service providers are discussed infra at Part III.F.
201 Whois is a program that queries one or more registry or registrar databases
to see if a second-level domain name has been registered. If the name has been
registered the program returns information about the registrant, typically including
name, address, e-mail and telephone number. See RONY & RONY, supra note 26, §
6.3.2.
202 We begin with UDRP Rules § 4(c) which states, "The date of commencement
of the administrative proceeding shall be the date on which the complaint is forwarded
by the Provider to the Respondent," UDRP Rules, supra note 18, § 4(c), and Rule 2(f)
which states that "All time periods calculated under these Rules shall begin to run on
the earliest date that the communication is -deemed to have been made in accordance
with Paragraph 2(e)." Id. § 2(e). The key parts of Rule 2(e) state that "Except as
otherwise provided in these Rules ... all communications provided for under these
Rules shall be deemed to have been made.., if via the Internet, on the date that the
communication was transmitted, provided that the date of transmission is verifiable."
Id. Note that this refers only to transmittal, not receipt. Rule 2(a) does not appear to be
a rule "otherwise" providing in terms of rule 2(e) because it does not speak of
computation of time (this may be a drafting error?). It speaks only of a duty to achieve
actual notice-.., eventually. Thus, if e-mail to a defendant bounces, time starts to run
anyway while the Provider continues to attempt to achieve actual notice by some other
means. Similarly if an e-mail is sent but not read (e.g., if the recipient is on vacation or
in the hospital), time starts to run anyway.
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are completely unfair, even if ICANN's twenty days is up from
the ten days in the WIPO proposal."' Respondents who happen
to take a three-week vacation, or find themselves in intensive
care without e-mail, can lose their chance to explain why they
should keep their domain name without ever knowing it was
endangered.
Merely initiating communications via e-mail is not
adequate notice.2" Running a procedure of this sort without
actual notice or a method reasonably calculated to achieve
notice prior to the commencement of the proceedings must be
contrary to the public policy of all civilized nations. It risks
producing results that are, or at least should be, unenforceable
in the courts of all civilized nations.
The time problem is especially acute for consumers and
small or medium enterprises ("SMEs") that do not have an
Internet-savvy intellectual property lawyer on retainer, or
indeed any lawyer at all. Although not as rare as they once
were, lawyers who understand the issues in a domain name
case are still something of an exception, and are not found in
every community. The response period needs to be long enough
for parties to find a lawyer they are comfortable with, and for
that person to get up to speed on the issues and to organize
and write the response. While twenty days (minus time to
actually get the notice) is plenty of time for a large corporation
with lawyers on call to do all this, it is not very long for smaller
organizations and ordinary individuals who have the
misfortune to register a name that someone else covets.
The current rules for computing time also suffer from
two technical defects, both of which contribute to the overall
atmosphere of unfairness. Contrary to expectations, it has
become routine for complainants to attach a large number of
paper exhibits to their complaints. Although the actual
complaint itself is an electronic document, the exhibits
frequently are not digitized (and in the case of products
exhibiting a trademark exhibit are often not igitizable!). Since
the twenty-day clock for the registrants' time to respond begins
when the first e-mail is sent, but the paper exhibits sometimes
'
3 See supra text accompanying note 129-33.
204 For a discussion of the issues, see generally Rachel Cantor, Comment,
Internet Service of Process: A Constitutionally Adequate Alternative?, 66 U. CHI. L.
REV. 943 (1999).
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contain crucial parts of the case, the registrant is not informed
of the case which he must answer until some time later. In the
developed world, parties are rarely more than two days away
from the dispute services provider by express mail, but there is
no requirement that the documents be sent by express mail,
and some providers choose not to express mail documents to
respondents as a matter of policy. In the less developed world,
even express packages can take much longer to arrive, and
ordinary mail is unreliable.0 5 Even what constitutes "receipt"
is problematic as some courier services may use file signatures
for unattended deliveries.
A second problem is more egregious. Until shortly after
the web publication of an early draft of this paper,2 6 one of the
competing providers-the National Arbitration Forum
("NAF")-used its supplemental rules to offer parties a chance
to file an extra brief five days after the ordinary close of
pleadings for $150.27 Since the ordinary close of pleadings is
the registrant's response, this opportunity was primarily of
value to complainants. Furthermore, the right is not
cumulative: filing such a paper did not trigger another five day
window for the other side. Not only did this rule tend to favor
one side, but it invites sandbagging-leaving a key point for
the unanswerable supplemental filing.28 The opportunity for
abuse is especially large since the supplemental pleading,
205 John Berryhill informs me that the African registrant in the lycralovers.com
case, E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co. v. ITC, FA0012000096219 (NAF Feb. 20, 2001),
http//www.arbforum.com/domains/decisions/96219.htm, received the complaint on the
day his response was due. I have also heard from a source I trust of a NAF case in
which the complaint and exhibits were stopped by customs for the entire twenty-day
response period.
20' The NAF changed the rule on October 15, 2001. Compare http'J/www.arb-
forum.com/domainsludrp/rules02OlOl.asp (last visited Mar. 13, 2002) with http'J/-
www.arbforum.comfdomainsludrp/ruleslO150l.asp (last visited Mar. 13, 2002).
207 See National Arbitration Forum Dispute Resolution for Domain Names,
Supplemental Rules, Rule 7, available at http//www.arbforum.com/domainsdo-
main-rules.html (Oct. 24, 1999) ("A party may submit additional written statements
and documents to The Forum and the opposing party(s) not later than five (5) calendar
days after the date the Response is submitted or the last date the Response was due to
be submitted to the Forum, whichever occurs first."). Although couched in neutral
terms allowing either party to avail itself of the supplemental brief, it is obvious that a
provision allowing either party to file a supplemental brief five days after the
defendant's response is designed to favor plaintiffs.
20 1 am indebted to John Berryhill for this suggestion, which he tells me is not
hypothetical.
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unlike the complaint and the response, has no length limit.
This sandbagging opportunity looks suspiciously like a dispute
services provider's attempt to be as plaintiff-friendly as
possible. Indeed, one commentator described the "sandbag"
rule, and a number of other NAF supplemental rules, as
"extremely biased toward Complainants."20 9
NAF's decision to revise the sandbag rule removes one
problem but creates another. The new rule allows the
non-filing party five more days from the date on which a
supplemental filing was made to make its own responsive
supplemental filing. As Jonathan Weinberg noted:
[F]ive days isn't much time to receive and respond to anything in a
UDRP proceeding. The new rule also opens the door to an endless
stream of replies and sur-replies, since each new filing opens
another five-day window. At the same time, NAF has eliminated the
blatant "last shot" for complainants, potentially side-stepping the
question of whether supplemental filings are permitted under the
UDRP in the first place.
As some complainants are using their "supplemental" filing to
make their case in chief, the net effect of this rule undercuts
the respondent's right of reply. Faced with a supplemental
complaint, the complainant must not only rush to reply, but
she must pay $250 for the privilege. 21
1
The sandbag rule saga reveals a more general problem:
in the absence of supervision, providers are able to use their
supplemental rules to seek a competitive advantage in ways
that undermine the UDRP. ICANN, which purportedly
supervises the dispute services providers, allowed the sandbag
rule to take effect, and took no action to repeal it or to remove
NAF's accreditation. Since both the original sandbag rule and
2
09 Stacey H. King, The "Law That it Deems Applicable"." ICANN, Dispute
Resolution, and the Problem of Cybersquatting, 22 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 453,
498 (2000). In addition to the rule noted in the text, Ms. King identified the NAFs
draconian policy on extensions of time, its requirement that a respondent's requests for
an extension be accompanied by a $100 fee, and its rule allowing complainants to
convert a three-member panel to a (cheaper) one-member panel if the respondent does
not file a reply. Id. at 498-500.
210 Jonathan Weinberg, NAF to End the Last Shot Rule, at http//www.icann-
watch.orgfarticle.php?sid=409 (Oct. 11, 2001).
211 See NAF Supplemental Rules § 7, at http://www.arb-forum.com/domains/-
UDRP/rules.asp (last visited Mar. 13, 2002).
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its revision are fairly clear violations of the UDRP,212 ICANN's
failure to react suggests that ICANN is not willing or able to
police the dispute services providers.
3. Asymmetric Access to Courts to "Review" UDRP
The UDRP attempted to ameliorate a fundamental
imbalance in WIPO's proposal regarding the parties' access to
courts after the dispute resolution provider rendered a
decision. Like WIPO's plan, the UDRP is meant to be non-
binding in that either party can seek a judicial determination
of their rights at any time before, during, or after the ADR.
Under the WIPO proposal, the consequences of the ADR
procedure were very severe, and completely asymmetrical:
losing a WIPO ADR would not affect the rights of a
complainant mark holder in any significant way and there was
no reason to believe that the losing registrant would be able to
find a court willing to hear his claim that he should keep the
domain. ICANN ameliorated this by creating a small-very
small-window for losing registrants to get to court. Despite
this, the fundamental asymmetry remains.
An example will make this clear. Imagine that Alice, a
complainant, has a trademark in "companyname," but Bob has
registered "companyname.com" which Alice believes is
rightfully hers. If Alice wished to avoid the WIPO ADR, she
can bring the action in any court that has jurisdiction over the
registrant. Suppose that Alice, the complainant, lives in New
York, and Bob, the registrant, lives in Prague. If Alice can
persuade a New York court to assert jurisdiction over Bob
because he is using the domain in an infringing manner with
effects in New York, then she can bring suit where she lives.
On the other hand, if Bob has merely registered the domain
but made no internationally infringing use of it, Alice probably
must go to Prague to bring the action.21 The WIPO ADR
212 The UDRP defines the allowed pleadings as a "complaint" and a "response."
The UDRP leaves it to the arbitral panel's discretion whether to allow additional
filings in exceptional cases. Indeed, one NAF panel refused to accept a supplemental
paid filing for this reason.
213 For the first part of this example, we ignore ACPA, which includes the
possibility of an in rem remedy in the U.S. courts, as it did not exist when WIPO made
its proposal.
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offered Alice a potentially attractive means of avoiding the
expense and uncertainty of hiring foreign counsel and risking
the vagaries of a foreign legal system.
Suppose, however, that Alice lost before WIPO's
proposed tribunal, and she wishes to bring suit anyway. At this
point, since the ADR is non-binding, she has the same options
she had before the WIPO ADR, minus whatever damage
caused by the persuasive power of the arbitral decision. She
has as long as she wants to file her complaint, subject only to
considerations of laches and statutes of limitations, and the
fear that Bob might establish some secondary trademark rights
of his own over time.
Now suppose, on the other hand, that the WIPO ADR
rules that Bob, the registrant, should surrender his domain
name. Bob wishes to challenge this outcome, perhaps because
he believes that under Czech law he has a valid right to the
name that the arbitrators failed to recognize. Under the WIPO
policy the decision goes into effect within seven days,14 so Bob
has a week to find a court with jurisdiction over Alice to hear
his request for an injunction.
Without the WIPO ADR Bob probably would have
defended the action in a court in Prague, giving him the
benefits traditionally accorded defendants, particularly
defendants who are ordinary individuals and small businesses:
a convenient venue, familiar law, local language, local counsel,
and local choice of law principles. Instead, unless Alice has
sufficient contacts with Prague for the court there to assert
jurisdiction over her, Bob must now shoulder the burden of
being the plaintiff in a New York court, with potentially
unfamiliar and more expensive procedures, a different local
language, and foreign counsel. The New York court may use
different choice of law and different substantive principles than
the Czech court. And, Bob will now be the plaintiff instead of
the defendant and must shoulder the burden of proof. Indeed, if
Bob seeks injunctive relief to prevent the WIPO ADR decision
from going into effect immediately, Bob will have to shoulder a
heavy burden of proof indeed. Without an injunction, however,
Bob was probably doomed.
214 WIPO Final Report, supra note 17, 1216.
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Recall that WIPO stated that its design goal was that
"the right to litigate a domain name dispute should be
preserved."215 It also stated that
the availability of the administrative procedure should not preclude
resort to court litigation by a party. In particular, a party should be
free to initiate litigation by filing a claim in a competent national
court instead of initiating the administrative procedure, if this is the
preferred course of action, and should be able to seek a de novo
review of a dispute that has been the subject of the administrative
procedure."'
The question remains: What exactly was Bob supposed to tell
the court if he loses the WIPO ADR? If Bob failed to secure an
injunction, the "administrative" decision goes into effect in
seven days; the domain name is transferred and remains in
effect until countermanded by a competent court. That order
would never come however, because at the moment the domain
name is transferred, Bob loses his cause of action.217 One might
think that Bob could seek a declaration that the ADR was
mistaken, on the grounds that he would then get his domain
name back. Unfortunately for Bob, this comes too close to a
wager on a court decision. While one can get a court to
adjudicate a bet that turns on some question external to the
court, especially if a debt is disputed, one cannot manufacture
subject matter jurisdiction for a court to adjudicate a legal
question by placing a bet on what it will decide.
U.S. law does not provide for general review of alternate
dispute resolution procedures. Certainly, the Federal
Arbitration Act does not provide a means of review, since that
act limits the court's review to arbitrations, and only those
arbitrations:
(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
means.
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators, or either of them.
215 Id. 148.
211 Id. I 150(iii).
2I believe this to be true in most legal systems, but I have illustrated the
point with U.S. law, which is the only system I know at all well. As a very large
fraction of all domain name registrations are by U.S. persons and firms, U.S. law
obviously matters in this context.
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(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to
hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any
other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been
prejudiced.
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the
subject matter submitted was not made.
2 18
Even if the WIPO ADR were an "arbitration" under U.S.
law, one hopes that none of these four factors, which are aimed
at cases where the arbitration is tainted by fraud,
incompetence, or the like, would ordinarily apply. (Other
nations provide procedures for more searching review of
"arbitration,"2 9 but this "administrative" procedure would be
unlikely to qualify-in part because it is not binding, in part
because of the limited nature of the right being adjudicated.)
Indeed, if the proceeding is not an "arbitration" then
Bob has a problem. U.S. courts do not ordinarily review
"administrative" decisions of private parties (as opposed to
government agencies), unless there is some claim of tort,
breach of contract, or violation of some other legal right.
Having lost the domain name, Bob must now frame a cause of
action that will get a court's attention, and in a context where
he no longer has the domain name because he agreed to a
contractual "administrative" procedure in which he promised
not to sue the arbitrator, the registrar, or the registry. If he can
do so, the courts will consider his claim de novo, without
deferring to the UDRP decision.20
Suppose Bob thinks the arbitrators improperly ignored
a legal basis for his claim of right to the name, or incorrectly
decided that Bob was a liar. Several potential claims are
probably hopeless. For instance, Bob might wish to frame some
218 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1990).
219 See, e.g., Arbitration Act, 1996, c.23 (Eng.).
22 See, e.g., Strick Corp. v. Strickland, 162 F. Supp. 2d 372, 374 n.5 (E.D. Pa.
2001), available at http://www.strick.com/aug27.pdf; Parisi, 139 F. Supp. 2d at 752; see
also Weber-Stephen Products Co. v. Armitage Hardware and Bldg. Supply, Inc., 54
U.S.P.Q.2d 1766 (N.D. Ill. May 03, 2000) (denying stay of UDRP proceeding; holding
court not bound by UDRP decision but declining to decide "what weight should be
given to a panel's decision"); Broadbridge Media, L.L.C. v. HperCd.com, 106 F. Supp.
2d 505 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). See generally http'//www.udrplaw.netfUDRPappeals.htm (last
modified Mar. 27, 2001) (listing UDRP cases challenged in court).
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sort of claim of "tortious interference with contractual
relations" against Alice, based on his contract with his
registrar, but that seems a poor bet when he specifically agreed
to the ADR procedure in his contract. Indeed, there is no
contract between Bob and Alice for the court to adjudicate, and
Bob has no claim against Alice under his contract with the
registry. If Bob is a non-commercial user and there is no claim
of bad faith or fraud on the part of the arbitrator, then Bob will
not be able to claim a violation of his right of free expression
because the damage was caused by a private party, not the
government."' While Bob might try that argument, it is
untested waters-and likely therefore to be a high-cost, high-
risk strategy. He has little actual damages, and it is in any
case unclear who has been negligent or behaved tortiously. In
addition, there is no statutory right at issue.
Without a trademark of his own, Bob is unlikely to have
a claim against Alice under Alice's subsequent contract with
her registry. Of course, if Bob has a trademark identical to his
domain name, and the arbitrators just ignored it for some
strange reason, he can claim that Alice is violating his
trademark. But the strength of that claim will turn in
substantial part on how Alice is using the mark, not on what
Bob was doing, which would have been the subject of the case
but for the WIPO ADR. It is easy to imagine a case where the
two parties are not in fact infringing each other, and a court
applying national law would have found for Bob if he were the
defendant. But as Alice is no more guilty of trademark
infringement under the relevant national law than is Bob, she
will win the court case and keep the domain Bob would have
had but for the WIPO ADR.
A slightly less hopeless argument for Bob would be
"tortious interference with a prospective business advantage"
against Alice. The Restatement Second of Torts instructs that,
221 Bob might try to argue that ICANN and/or the arbitrators are state actors.
See generally Froomkin, supra note 3. He would find comfort in Sullivan v. Barnett,
526 U.S. 40 (1999), where the Chief Justice suggested that the decision of a heavily
regulated arbitration procedure, "like that of any judicial official, may properly be
considered state action." Id. at 54. As ICANN, acting in conformity with the policy set
out in the White Paper, has written both the substantive rules applied in the UDRP,
and the bulk of the procedural rules that arbitration providers must observe, see UDRP
Rules, supra note 18, it follows that if ICANN is a state actor then arguably dispute
providers are state actors also.
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One who intentionally and improperly interferes with another's
prospective contractual relation (except a contract to marry) is
subject to liability to the other for the pecuniary harm resulting from
loss of the benefits of the relation, whether the interference consists
of (a) inducing or otherwise causing a third person not to enter into
or continue the prospective relation or (b) preventing the other from
acquiring or continuing the prospective relation.
However, U.S. courts have frequently imposed more
stringent limiting conditions on this tort than the Restatement
formulation might suggest. For example, in order to prevail on
a claim of tortious interference with prospective economic
advantage, a plaintiff must show "the defendant's interference
with business relations existing between the plaintiff and a
third party, either with the sole purpose of harming the
plaintiff or by means that are dishonest, unfair, or in any other
way inproper."' Similarly,
In order to state a claim for tortious interference with prospective
economic advantage, a plaintiff must show (1) business relations
with a third party; (2) defendants' interference with those business
relations; (3) defendants acted with the sole purpose of harming the
plaintiff or used dishonest, unfair, or improper means; and (4) injury
to the relationship.22
Tins will usually be difficult to prove, or even to allege in good
faith: most people in Alice's position will be able to argue
convincingly that harm to Bob was not the sole purpose of the
ADR in that Alice sincerely wanted the domain name for
herself. Furthermore, assunng that it was the arbitrators who
erred, and there was no fraud by Alice, Bob cannot in good
faith claim that she used "dishonest, unfair, or improper
means" to win the proceeding.
If the above analysis is correct, then under WIPO's plan
for many-perhaps most or all-registrants who lost an ADR,
their dispossession would have been the whole of the law On
the other hand, challengers who lost an ADR would have lost
nothing more than their costs and some bragging rights, as
they would have retained their previous right to litigate.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 766B (1979).
PPX Enter. v. Audiofidelity Enters., 818 F.2d 266, 269 (2d Cir. 1987).
24 Purgess v. Sharrock, 33 F.3d 134, 141 (2d Cir. 1994).
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ICANN attempted to ameliorate this by introducing two
new ideas in the UDRP. First, ICANN required that the
complainant, Alice in our example, waive a defense of lack of
personal jurisdiction in a "mutual jurisdiction"-Alice's choice
of either the location of the registrar, or the place where the
registrant, Bob, said he was located when he filled out his
application for the domain name.' If Bob loses, the domain
name transfer is stayed for ten business days. In that two-week
period if Bob files a complaint in the "mutual jurisdiction," or
any other court of competent jurisdiction, then the transfer is
halted 6 without any need for Bob to seek an injunction.
By allowing Bob to halt the transfer in this manner,
ICANN attempted to ensure that Bob would retain a sufficient
connection to the domain name to motivate a declaratory
judgment action, thus making it possible for Bob to challenge
an adverse decision so long as he could mobilize his lawyer to
file a complaint within ten business days of the decision. The
ten working-day filing period may be longer than WIPO's
seven-day proposal, but it is not long at all. Exactly how
onerous it is depends where the parties are located. The United
States and many European jurisdictions have relatively liberal
rules of pleading. In the United States, for example, an initial
complaint (in federal court at least) can be very skimpy, even
mildly inaccurate in places, and can be amended once as of
right with no or minimal consequences to the plaintiff. A rule
that says, rush to the courthouse, file in a hurry, and amend at
leisure is not unjust in such a regime. Pleading rules were not
always so liberal, however; the filing of an inaccurate
complaint (and any complaint that needed amendment
potentially was "inaccurate"!) was once considered fraud on the
court. Similar pleading rules persist in some legal systems, and
the ICANN rule will be particularly onerous for parties
residing in, or registered with a non-U.S. registrar, in those
jurisdictions. In systems where pleadings cannot be amended,
but must instead be withdrawn and re-filed, the UDRP policy
will treat the withdrawal of the original complaint as grounds
225 See UDRP Rules, supra note 18, § 1 (defining "mutual jurisdiction"). Given
that NSI was the monopoly registrar for most of the Internet's recent history, this
meant that in practice a complainant could choose the Eastern District of Virginia.
However, NSI's market share is now down consideiably, which adds some variety.
22 UDRP, supra note 2, § 4k.
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for enforcement of the arbitrator's decision, even if the
complaint were re-filed the same day. Worse, from the losing
registrant's viewpoint, some legal systems do not even allow
the withdrawal of a complaint without prejudice.27
Even in the United States the ability of a losing
registrant to mount a meaningful court challenge has been
subject to doubt. A recent ruling by a Massachusetts district
court, subsequently reversed by the First Circuit, well
illustrates the problem. Jay D. Sallen, a U.S. citizen, registered
corinthians.com; the Brazilian soccer team Corinthiao
(Portugese for "Corinthians") subsequently initiated and won a
claim for the domain name under the UDRP.25 Within the ten-
day period after losing the UDRP decision, Sallen sought a
declaratory judgment that his registration of the domain name
did not violate the ACPA 9 Sallen relied on an ACPA provision
contemplating just such an action:
A domain name registrant whose domain name has been suspended,
disabled, or transferred under [the UDRPI may, upon notice to the
mark owner, file a civil action to establish that the registration or
use of the domain name by such registrant is not unlawful under
this chapter. The court may grant injunctive relief to the domain
name registrant, including the reactivation of the domain name or
transfer of the domain name to the domain name registrant. 0
At this point, Corinthiao applied procedural jujitsu by
appearing before the court and disclaiming any intention of
bringing an ACPA claim against Sallen. This promise not to
bring a future trademark claim was made secure in the
Not every jurisdiction has liberal pleading rules. See, e.g., JORGE A. VARGAS,
MEXICAN LAW: A TREATISE FOR LEGAL PRACTITIONERS AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTORS
§ 20.2 (1998) (stating that in Mexico, "Once drafted, a complaint cannot be refiled").
The UDRP puts all nationals of such countries to an unreasonable choice: they must
either give up their home forum by registering with a foreign registrar, or do a great
deal of advance legal work before they even know the result of the arbitration if they
want to have a meaningful chance of appeal. (Note that the same does not apply to a
losing challenger, who can wait as long as he likes before trying for a second bite at the
legal apple, subject only to laches or the statute of limitations.) This matter requires a
degree of study it simply has not received.
Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA v. Sallen, Sallen Enters., and J. D.
Sallen Enters., No. D2000-0461, (WIPO July 17, 2000) http'//arbiter.wipo.int/domains/-
decisions/html/2000/-d2000-0461.html.
22 J.D.S. Enters. v. Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA, No. 00-CV-11555, 2000
U.S. Dist. Lexis 19976 (D. Mass. Dec. 19, 2000).
230 ACPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2)(D)(v) (West 2001).
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knowledge that if the federal case were dismissed the domain
name transfer would take effect and Sallen, the original
registrant, would therefore no longer have a cause of action."
As a result of the transfer, there would be no possible ACPA
claim. Judge Young agreed that this concession disposed of the
case:
Based on the representations made by Defendant, Corinthians
Licenciamentos ("CL) that it "has no intent to sue Plaintiff under
the ACPA for his past activities in connection with corinthians.com"
the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.... Jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 2201 is proper only if there exists an actual controversy
between the parties. . . . Absent the threat of suit there is no
controversy and jurisdiction is lacking. CL's representation is
bolstered by the fact that a suit under the ACPA provides no
additional relief. Because the disputed domain name was registered
prior to the enactment of the ACPA, damages are unavailable. 
2
In one sense, Judge Young's conclusion was quite
understandable. By making this tactical concession, the
victorious mark holder transformed the post-UDRP judicial
proceedings into something with a procedural posture akin to
the one that seemed to make judicial review of a WIPO ADR a
nullity in cases where the registrant lost. The court's
conclusion follows all too naturally, although one wonders if
the court could not, for example, have denied the motion to
dismiss and instead treated the concession as reason to grant
the declaration on summary judgment since there was no fact
in dispute.
Fortunately for the UDRP, the First Circuit took a
broader view of the matter, holding that the ACPA language
quoted above"3 creates a cause of action for a party who loses
an action under the UDRP.234 In this view, the ACPA supplies
the claim, and thus both the subject matter jurisdiction and
the standing that Judge Young had found to be absent. This
result is surely correct, as simply dismissing the complaint
would undermine the fundamentally equitable object of the
2"1 See supra text accompanying notes 213-20.
22 J.D.S. Enters. v. Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA, No. 00-CV-11555 (D.
Mass. filed Aug. 3, 2000) (internal citations omitted), reversed sub nom, Sallen v.
Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA, 273 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2001).
15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2)(D)(v).
Sallen, 273 F.3d at 24-29.
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declaratory judgment statute, 5 the purpose of the ACPA right
of action, and would require the court to turn a needlessly
blind eye to the realities of the relationship between the
parties. Indeed, until an ACPA suit seeking to prevent a LJDRP
decision from going into effect is dismissed and the mark
holder gains possession of the domain name, there remains a
genuine contractual dispute between the parties as to who has
the right to have the registry list them as the holder of the
domain name.26
. Even if other circuits follow the First Circuit's lead, the
United States is not the only jurisdiction whose laws need to be
taken into account. Since the UDRP is not an "arbitration" but
merely an "administrative proceeding," losing parties whose
right to sue inures in non-U.S. legal systems will not, in
general, be able to bring cases under laws providing for the
appeal of an arbitration award. The problem of framing an
appropriate cause of action may thus be replicated world wide.
It may be that there are simple answers to this problem in the
major legal systems of the world, but as far as I know no one
has yet come forward to say what they are.
As if that were not enough, the Corinthians.com case
exposed yet another weakness in the UDRP framework.
Although the registrant took a timely appeal of the district
court's decision, the registrar transferred the domain name
upon receipt of Judge Young's decision. Arguably, that act
destroyed the registrant's standing to pursue the appeal; had a
business relied on the domain name it would undoubtedly have
damaged it. The First Circuit dealt with this issue in a cursory
footnote, stating:
2' The Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) states, "[i]n a case of
actual controversy within its jurisdiction,... any court of the United States, upon the
filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of
any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could
be sought...."
2S A further issue, perhaps, is whether even if the court conducts de novo legal
review, findings of fact by the UDRP panel should be given preclusive effect. Given the
absence of any serious testing of the factual submissions, I think there is no reason
why facts found by the arbitration could have preclusive effect consistent with due
process.
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After the district court dismissed Sallen's suit, however, the domain
name was transferred to CL, possibly wrongfully in light of the
pendency of this appeal. If the complaint were reinstated, the logic of
Sallen's position is that Sallen would seek leave to amend his
complaint to request an injunction returning the domain name.2
7
While this does not amount to a reasoned decision that
leave should be granted, or even that standing exists so long as
there is a claim for the injunction, it is a pretty strong hint.
Even so, this aspect of the Corinthians.com experience
suggests that making provisions for timely appeals is one of
the many things that could usefully be fixed in the UDRP.
III. FIXING THE UDRP's PROCEDURAL SHORTCOMINGS
The UJDRP's procedural shortcomings can be
summarized under five headings: (1) issues of fairness; (2)
issues of proof and evidence; (3) issues relating to the
timetable; (4) ensuring the availability of equal access to court
for subsequent proceedings; and (5) improving the auditability
and transparency of the process. Notably absent from this list
is the substance of the UDRP, including its definition of
cybersquatting, the affirmative defenses, the murky choice of
law clause, and the strange ways in which those definitions
have been interpreted by some arbitrators. A comprehensive
repair of the UDRP would address not only its procedural
shortcomings, but also the problem of existing arbitral
decisions that clearly flout the rules yet are continually cited as
"precedent." No amount of substantive repair, however, is
likely to be effective unless the UDRP's procedural problems
are rectified.
A. Basic Fairness
Fairness requires fundamental reforms. First, the
UDRP's built-in tendency to reward arbitration service
providers for being "complainant friendly" must be redressed.
The system must be, and must be seen to be, even-handed
between both complainants and respondents. Second, would-be
27 Sallen, 273 F.3d at 16 n.1.
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abusers of the system need a greater disincentive to bring
frivolous claims. Otherwise there is almost no reason not to
bring "try-on" cases, especially if arbitrators are perceived to be
rendering unpredictable, even random, decisions.
1. Removing Potentially Biased Arbitrators
The UDRP lacks an effective mechanism to allow
parties to challenge the appointment of an arbitrator whom
they believe to be biased or to have a conflict of interest.
Peremptory challenges might be one way to address this, but
they might also become another occasion for delay and
strategic behavior on both sides. Current procedures rely on
arbitrators to disclose potential conflicts, but this is clearly
insufficient since the truly biased person will tend to downplay
the extent of conflicts. Therefore, there is a need to develop
some means by which parties can raise for-cause challenges
with the provider and some agreed criteria for what constitutes
an impermissible conflict of interest. For example, if an
arbitrator is a member of a firm, and the firm has taken a
position on a disputed question of law in a pending arbitration
or lawsuit for a client, should the arbitrator be allowed to
decide a case raising a similar question? Or, if a partner
previously has represented or sued one of the parties, should
that count as a conflict of interest? What if the matter is
current? Since there is no common practice on these issues,
and national standards of what constitutes a potential conflict
of interest vary, it is essential to craft written standards or,
better yet, import them from an external, experienced body.
2. Removing Cases from Potentially Biased Providers
In a recent case in which I sat as a respondent-
appointed arbitrator, the respondent alleged that the provider
itself was biased in favor of the complainant because the
complainant was a member of the body sponsoring the
arbitration service provider and had a long-standing
relationship with it. The arbitration service provider refused to
recuse itself, and the respondent again raised the issue before
the panel. The arbitrators agreed unanimously that whatever
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the merits of this claim might be, and despite the theoretical
possibility that a service provider might use its power to
control the appointment of one or more of the arbitrators, the
UDRP "does not give panels the authority to order recusal of a
provider."=8 I believe this decision was correct in that the
current UDRP -clearly does not give a panel that authority. But
that does not mean that the possibility of provider bias, or even
of the reasonable appearance of bias, is an issue that should be
ignored.
The risk of a reasonable appearance of provider bias due
to a preexisting relationship with a party is probably greatest
with WIPO because it has a unique relationship with its
members, and especially with member states. They are, quite
simply, its masters. Under the circumstances, there is at least
an appearance of impropriety, one fed by the obscurity of the
WIPO arbitrator assignment policy and the existence of certain
odd decisions. 9 Rules should be in place to avoid even the
appearance of this sort of impropriety, and WIPO itself should
not be asked to be the final judge in its own case. °
3. Leveling the Playing Field
No one can be expected to trust an arbitration provider
whose long-term income depends on satisfying one side in
disputes but not the other. The problem is not that
complainants choose the forum, for that after all is no worse
than ordinary forum shopping. Rather the problem is that the
income of the arbitral institutions, and through them the
arbitrators, is affected by plaintiffs' lawyers' views of the
extent to which the dispute services provider tilts towards
complainants. A judge's pay remains the same however long
the line at the courthouse; the same is in no way true of
arbitrators and especially the arbitration service providers.
238 AFMA, Inc. v. Globemedia, No. D2001-0558 (WIPO Aug. 23, 2001),
http'//arbiter.wipo.intdomains/decisions/html/2001.d2001-0558.html.
2 The leading example is the barcelona.corn decision, see supra note 149, in
which WIPO appointed a former high-ranking WIPO official to hear a matter involving
his hometown.
210 The issues with NAF are more systemic, and probably more serious. See
supra text accompanying notes 207-12 (discussing NA's use of supplemental rules to
become more complainant-friendly).
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Fortunately, there are many simple and fair ways to
reduce or even eliminate this source of real or apparent bias,
although it is not as easy to find one that also creates some
incentive for the arbitration service providers to compete on
price. One easily implemented solution, which I nonetheless do
not advocate, would be to assign all cases by lot. While simple
to implement, this solution carries great disadvantages. For
example, if one or more accredited providers is doing sub-
standard work or charging unreasonably high prices, that
provider would continue to get the same share of the randomly
assigned cases. This seems unfair to everyone, albeit equally
unfair to everyone.
Perhaps the best solution would be to ask the parties to
agree to a provider, with the decision to be taken by lot if they
cannot agree. Each party would be asked to list the providers it
would be willing to accept, in order of priority. Since both
parties would have equal say in the matter, the providers'
incentive to please only one side would be greatly reduced. But
even this solution has three problems. First, in order to prevent
competition for the substantial number of default judgements,
the choice of provider would be made by lot when the
respondent failed to reply to the complaint. As noted above,
lottery selection is far from ideal. Second, a priority list system
would work better if there were more providers, but it works
fairly badly in a system with only four providers. Suppose, for
example, that it were the case that informed participants
believed Providers A and B to be very biased for complainants
and Providers C and D to be very biased for respondents.
Informed complainants propose A, B, C, D; informed
respondents propose D, C, B, A. The result is a stalemate,
leading to random selection. Alternately, if parties are required
to rank only the providers they approve of A, B vs. C, D is also
a stalemate. In such a world, in the short run at least, the
system collapses to a pure lottery. A third problem is that since
the providers currently handle the service of the complaint on
the respondent, the respondent is not available to express an
opinion as to who the provider should be until after the dispute
service provider has already been chosen.
Alternately, the choice of a dispute services provider
could be lodged in some third party. The ideal third party
would be one that has a desire to respect the interests of both
20021
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parties, and the incentive and ability to stay informed about
the relative capabilities, fees, and possible biases of the
competing dispute providers. Such a paragon may not exist,
but the registrars may be the closest thing to it. The registrar
is well placed to promote price and service competition since it
is the registrar's customers who will have to deal with the
provider and who may be paying half the provider's fees.
Registrars could either select a single provider who would be
chosen for any disputes regarding domains they register, or
they could present complainants with a list to select from.
Lodging the choice in the registry seems the best
solution. It is not, however, without its critics. It might
reasonably be objected that the registrars have an obvious
interest in serving their customers, the registrants, but no
particular incentive to consider the interests of potential
complainants. Indeed, at the time the UDRP was being
drafted, representatives of mark holders hypothesized that a
rogue registry in some hypothetical unfriendly jurisdiction
might join with a hypothetical rogue dispute provider and
advertise itself as the pirate-friendly registry in order to
attract business. In principle, this objection seems weak: given
that ICANN has to accredit dispute providers, all it has to do is
refuse to accredit a rogue provider, or remove its accreditation
if it proves itself unworthy. Given current practice, however,
the objection seems to have more force. ICANN has so far
demonstrated a complete failure to monitor the activities of the
dispute providers, and has taken no action when they write
rules that are biased for plaintiffs. The most likely reason for
that disinterest is that ICANN, which heavily represents
trademark and other business interests, is not troubled by
those rules, just as it was not troubled by the UDRP. The
lobbies that dominate ICANN would be much quicker to
demand action if the bias ran the other way, and were a rogue
provider to materialize, one can reasonably expect that ICANN
would be quick to take action against it.
4. Finding a RDNH Prohibition with Teeth
The UDRP drafters were well aware that the document
dismally failed to address the problem of frivolous claims
brought to intimidate a legally untutored or resource-poor
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registrant into surrendering a domain name, a tactic dubbed
reverse domain name hijacking ("RDNH"). Representatives of
mark holders considered the UDRP's failure to do anything
meaningful about RDNH to be a selling point; representatives
of registrants were divided. Some said such a one-sided policy
was too unfair, and that something should be done for victims
of frivolous complaints. At the time, I argued that a slap on the
wrist was preferable to awarding damages or costs for frivolous
complaints because I wanted to preserve the principle that
panels would only have the power to award a domain name.
Since I suspected that the system would favor mark holders, if
only because the bulk of arbitrators would be drawn from the
trademark bar and would thus have a natural empathy for
parties resembling their clients (which proved to be an
accurate prognosis), I feared that any power to award costs
would tend to fall most heavily on registrants. Furthermore,
complainants almost always would be represented by counsel,
while registrants might represent themselves because the
short time limits would make it very difficult for them to locate
Internet-competent attorneys. Moreover, since costs are always
higher when you pay someone else, a fee-shifting rule would
tend to favor the represented parties, i.e. the complainants.
Most of all, however, I was worried that while the fees of $1000
or so were trivial to large corporate complainants, even the
threat of costs of this magnitude would intimidate many
legitimate respondents who were unable or unwilling to risk
thousands to defend a domain registered for under $100.
The UDRP's capriciousness has made RDNH even more
attractive than I expected, and I now believe that something
more must be done to reduce the incentive to bring frivolous
claims. I still believe, however, that arbitrators should not
have jurisdiction to award costs because the threat of costs
would intimidate legitimate registrants. Furthermore, as the
UDRP supposedly seeks to mirror existing rights for
registrants rather than create new ones for complainants,
imposing the "English rule" for costs on registrants from
jurisdictions that use the "American rule" would violate that
principle, at least as applied in the United States. The best
solution I can envisage is to require some sort of surety bond
from complainants, say $5,000, to be awarded to the registrant
only if the panel makes a finding of RDNH. Admittedly, a
2002]
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disadvantage of this proposal is that it would impose a
temporary capital cost on complainants and thus might make
them less willing to file meritorious cases. The cost might fall
particularly hard on complainants from less developed
countries for whom $5,000 might be a very large sum even for
a small business. However, given that so many of the
complainants are major corporations from Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") member
nations who can part with $5,000 during the pendency of the
UDRP action, I do not think that this is currently a major
concern.241 Another alternative is to forgo having the money
paid into a fund, and instead have the complainant agree to
pay if the arbitrators require it. The difficulty here, of course,
is that an unscrupulous complainant will not pay, and the sum
may be too small for an effective transnational collection
action.
An additional, but more easily solved, problem with
§ 15(e) as currently administered is that it allows complainants
to bring abusive claims and yet escape the mild consequences
of being branded with a finding of RDNH. Suppose Alice files
an abusive complaint against Bob, in the hopes that he may
surrender or default. Bob responds by paying for a three-
member tribunal and making a RDNH claim under § 15(e).
Upon receipt of the counter claim, Alice drops her case. If the
withdrawal is without prejudice, Alice can do it again and
subject Bob to more non-refundable arbitration fees. (NAF
provides refunds to complainants who request three-member
panels if the respondent defaults. However, if the respondent
requests a three-member panel and the complainant drops the
case there is no refund to the respondent.242 The net effect of
211 Conceivably, at the cost of substantial administrative complexity, some sort
of sliding scale could be worked out that took account of the assets of the complainant.
212 NAF Supplemental Rule 16(c) provides that "Fees to be paid to the Forum
as provided in these Supplemental Rules must be paid in U.S. Dollars and are
non-refundable." However, Supplemental Rule 9 states:
(c) In cases where the Complainant requested a three-member Panel
and no Response was submitted as required by Rule 5(a), the
Complainant may be given the option of converting the three-member
Panel to a single-member Panel:
[... I
(iv) If a single-member Panel conducts the administrative hearing, the
Complainant will be reimbursed $1,000 of its hearing fee.
http://www.arb-forum.com/domains/udrp/rules.asp (last visited Mar. 27, 2002).
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these two rules is to provide refunds to complainants for excess
three-member panel fees but never to respondents.) Even
assuming the withdrawal is with prejudice,2" it still denies Bob
his chance to -make the RDNH claim, or indeed to get some
vindication for the sums billed by his lawyer.
A recent NAF arbitration panel, faced with this exact
scenario in Glimcher University Mall v. GNO, held that it
lacked jurisdiction to act on the RDNH claim after the
complaint was withdrawn, because "[a] decision on reverse
domain name hijacking is to be made in conjunction with a
decision on the merits of a complaint."' As the panel very
forthrightly put it, "[tihe only remedies available under the
Policy are for the benefit of a complainant." 5 Proceeding on
the basis of this rather one-sided, if perhaps accurate,
assumption, the panel rejected the idea that a respondent's
request for a finding of RDNH is in the nature of a
counterclaim since "the Rules place these issues before the
panels in all cases."2" Oddly, the panel treated the RDNH
finding as something a panel might do sua sponte, although the
decision does not cite any examples of a panel doing so, and I
know of none. Indeed, if the UDRP is "for the benefit of a
complainant" sua sponte findings of RDNH are very unlikely.
One could be forgiven for thinking that UDRP Rule
§ 17(b) gives the panel all the authority it needs to make a
RDNH finding even after a complainant attempts to withdraw
a complaint. That rule states: "If, before the Panel's decision is
made, it becomes unnecessary or impossible to continue the
administrative proceeding for any reason, the Panel shall
terminate the administrative proceeding, unless a Party raises
justifiable grounds for objection within a period of time to be
determined by the Panel." 7 Surely the respondent's assertion
that the claim was brought in bad faith "raises justifiable
grounds for objection"? Indeed, it is hard to imagine what other
"justifiable grounds for objection" a respondent might have.
24 But see infra text accompanying note 253.
244 Glimcher Univ. Mall v. GNO, Inc., No. FA0107000098010, (NAF Aug. 23,
2001), http://www.arb-forum.com/domains/decisionsI98010.htm.
245 Id.
246 Id.
247 UDRP Rules, supra note 18, § 17(b).
20021
BROOKLYN LAWREVIEW
Unless the Glimcher University Mall decision can be
dismissed as a fluke, the UDRP rules should be amended to
close this loophole.
B. Proof and Decisions
The drafters of the UDRP, myself included, did not
think carefully enough about questions and mechanics of proof.
This deficiency has become increasingly evident from practice
under the UDRP. Furthermore, different views of what it
means to carry a burden of proof in different legal systems
have added an additional level of misunderstanding and
confusion.
1. Allocating the Burden of Proof
The UDRP places on the complainant the entire burden
of proof for the case in chief, 8 that is, the burden of showing
that both the registration and use were in bad faith. Yet the
UDRP fails to explain how a complainant meets this burden,
what quantum of proof suffices to prove malicious intent, and
to what extent respondents must carry the burden of proof,
production, or persuasion to make out affirmative defenses.
a. Meeting the burden
A particularly contentious issue has been how a
complainant meets the burden of showing that the respondent
registered a name in bad faith. 9 In the paradigmatic
cybersquatting case, where the name is offered for sale to the
trademark owner, it is plausible to infer the bad intent from
subsequent conduct. Some arbitrators, however, have
succumbed to the temptation to cut corners and have found bad
intent from mere registration without subsequent conduct,
which unquestionably is not what the drafters of the UDRP
2 8 UDRP, supra note 2, § 4(a).
249 See, e.g., Mitchell J. Matorin & Michael Boudett, Domain Name Disputes:
Cases Illustrate Limitations of ICANN Policy, 45 BOSTON BAR J. 4 (2001) (complaining
that burden is too great).
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agreed upon, and runs counter to U.S. law, which holds clearly
that mere registration, without more, is not cybersquatting.
20
Other arbitrators have found that the registration of some
names is ipso facto proof of bad intent since there are some
names that the arbitrator believed could never be registered in
good faith by anyone other than the trademark holder-a view
that is clearly incorrect as a matter of U.S. law, which frowns
on rights in gross in any word."' It may be that the burden of
proof needs to be clarified to explain that each element of the
complaint must be proved separately, and to explain what
qualifies as proof, although given the underdeveloped state of
mind-reading technology, it would be reasonable to explicitly
allow circumstantial evidence other than the nature of the
name itself to prove intent at time of registration.
2. The Problem of Settlement Negotiations and
Solicited Offers of Sale
Since the paradigmatic case of cybersquatting remains
a domain offered for sale to a trademark holder, wily mark
holders have developed new strategies for tricking domain
name holders into actions that can then be cited as "evidence"
of bad faith. The classic case is the solicited offer. The mark
holder or her agent writes to the registrant, asking whether a
domain is for sale, and how much it would cost. Registrant
replies by saying "I'd sell for $X." This communication is then
introduced as evidence of cybersquatting. A variant on this
strategy is for mark holder to send a demand letter to
20 As the district court found, Toeppen traded on the value of Panavision's
marks. So long "as he held the Internet registrations, he curtailed Panavision's
exploitation of the value of its trademarks on the Internet, a value which Toeppen then
used when he attempted to sell the Panavision.com domain name to Panavision."
Toeppen, 141 F.3d at 1325. And, "Toeppen made a commercial use of Panavision's
trademarks. It does not matter that he did not attach the marks to a product.
Toeppen's commercial use was his attempt to sell the trademarks themselves. Under
the Federal Trademark Dilution Act and the California Anti-dilution statute, this was
sufficient commercial use." Id. at 1325-26: "Thus, while the mere reservation of a
domain name per se does not constitute a commercial use sufficient to trigger the
Lanham Act, the courts in the Toeppen case have stretched the law in order to reach
the cybersquatter." MCCARTHY, supra note 109, § 25:77; see also K.C.P.L., Inc. v. Nash,
49 U.S.P.Q.2d 1584 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
25 See David J. Franklyn, Owning Words In Cyberspace: The Accidental
Trademark Regime, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 1251.
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registrant in a case where there are genuine, perhaps complex,
issues of concurrent use. The demand letter sparks settlement
negotiations. Mark holder, being unwilling to pay the possibly
legitimate or possibly excessive price requested by registrant,
chooses to invoke the UDRP and introduces the settlement
correspondence as evidence.
At a minimum, the UDRP should be modified to include
an evidentiary privilege for settlement negotiations after the
receipt of a lawyer's demand letter. A party who seeks to
introduce evidence of solicited offers that do not involve a
demand letter (e.g., in response to a non-threatening e-mail)
should also be required to disclose any solicitation that
triggered the offer in the same pleading. The rules should
make clear that the full context of the correspondence is
relevant to whether the offer. to sell is a sign of bad faith.
Barring all evidence of solicited offers although preferable, is
probably politically infeasible, because mark holder
representatives maintain they are concerned that the canniest
cybersquatters will register names and then sit tight waiting
for offers.
3. Special Rules Needed for Allegations of Common
Law Marks
As a matter of principle, there is no reason to favor
registered marks over common law marks when allowing mark
holders to avail themselves of the UDRP. Both types of marks
have similar rights and are equally harmed if subjected to
cybersquatting. Experience has proved, however, that the light
and quick procedures used in the UDRP are unsuited to
determining whether a complainant has a common law mark
in a term. 2 Without cross examination, expert testimony, and
a greater inquiry into the facts than the current system allows,
arbitrators have little choice but to shoot from the hip, and this
increases the odds that they will miss. One simple solution
would be to revise the UDRP to apply only to registered marks.
Failing that, new procedures and rules of evidence (and
252 See, e.g., Roberts v. Boyd, No. D2000-0210; Sade v. Quantum Computer
Servs. Inc., No. D2000-0794; Madonna v. Parisi and "Madonna.com," No. D2000-0847;
Sting v. Urvan, Case No. D2000-0596.
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probably a new fee schedule to match them) need to be crafted
to deal with the preliminary issue of whether the plaintiff has
a common law mark at all.
Of course, the right to allege a common law mark
should be limited to complainants trading in jurisdictions
which recognize such marks. To give complainants from civil
law jurisdictions that do not recognize common law marks a
right to bring a UDRP case based on common law concepts
would violate the basic precept that should always inform the
UDRP. Its function is to mimic a subset of existing trademark
law, not to create a new set of global trademark rights
unsanctioned by the relevant legislatures.
4. UDRP Decisions Should Be Final Within the System
At least one panel has invented, apparently out of whole
cloth, the concept of a "dismissal without prejudice" under the
UDRP in response to a respondent's RDNH claim. 3 This idea,
which finds no support in the UDRP itself, invites parties to
keep on filing complaints until they either get it right, strike it
lucky, find a compliant dispute services provider, or wear down
their opponent. The UDRP is intended for truly clear cases of
cybersquatting. If a party cannot make its case clearly enough
or if the facts are complex, the matter belongs in court. It is
bad enough that trademark owners get two bites at the apple-
one in the UDRP and one in court. They do not need a whole
barrel of bites before having to face a real judge. The rules
should be amended to make it clear that complainants get only
one try, before one provider.
5. Avoidance of Joinder; Need for Joinder
The UDPR assumes that all proceedings will be one
plaintiff against one defendant. Nevertheless, some providers
have allowed cases to go forward against multiple defendants,
notably in cases in which it was unclear which of the
defendants had the domain name. Certainly if there is going to
be joinder of this sort, the structure of the UDRP needs to be
See, e.g., Kee Byrd Prods., Inc v. robinbyrd-men-for-men.com, No. AF-0898
(eResolution Aug. 3, 2001), http'J/www.disputes.orgeresolution/decisions/-0898.htm.
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reworked to provide for complex joinder questions. It would
probably be better to avoid the effort, but only if a means could
be found to make arbitration service providers follow the rules
as they currently exist.
Worse, however, are the cases where two different
complainants with arguable claims to a domain name bring
actions before separate arbitration service providers, or even
the same one, claiming the same domain name. 4 The UDRP
needs a mechanism to recognize that such multiple claims
exist, and to avoid giving a domain name to the first to reach
the virtual courthouse either by consolidating the proceedings,
or by aborting them all. Most multiple claimant cases are likely
to be sufficiently complicated to be beyond the ability of as
lightweight a process as the UDRP; those cases belong in court.
This may be somewhat unfair to the claimants, especially if it
results in a cybersquatter holding onto the name longer than
he otherwise would, but the UDRP contains no principles that
would allow an arbitrator to choose among two legitimate
trademark holders, and the attempt to draft any such
principles would be a nightmare.
6. Complainants Should Take Their Two Bites in the
Right Order
Whatever the merits of letting people unhappy with
UDRP outcomes go to court, it is clearly undesirable to have
parties dissatisfied with court decisions attempt to reverse
them by filing a subsequent UDRP action. Astonishingly, this
is what happened in the Cello.com case. 5 The holder of the
"cello" trademark for high-end stereo equipment filed an action
in federal district court against Storey, the holder of the
cello.com domain name. After a published decision denying
cross motions for summary judgment, 6 the parties reached a
settlement and the district court dismissed the matter with
2" This alas is not a hypothetical case. The ipx.com domain name was the
subject of simultaneous challenges from two different complainants, one of whom filed
with WIPO, and the other with CPR. Compare WIPO D2002-0116 (ixp.com
"Compliance Review Pending") with CPR 0205 (ixp.com "Pending").2
- See Storey v. Cello Holdings, L.L.C., 182 F. Supp. 2d 355 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
2 Cello Holdings, L.L.C. v. Lawrence-Dahl Co., 89 F. Supp. 2d 464
(S.D.N.Y.2000).
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prejudice. The trademark holder then invoked the UDRP and
filed a complaint against Storey on the same facts. The
(Canadian) arbitrator refused to recognize the U.S. federal
court's dismissal "with prejudice" as res judicata. 7 He not only
entertained the case, but found for the complainant, thus in
effect reversing the district court.28 Storey was forced to bring
a new' federal action, this time as plaintiff. Ultimately,
however, the court not only found for Storey, but imposed Rule
11 sanctions against the trademark holder, finding that it
"acted to harass Storey and to cause both unnecessary delay
and needless increase in the cost of litigation." The district
court judge stated, "Based on my familiarity with and
supervision of the proceedings in this case as well as the first
action, I have no doubt that Cello, with substantially greater
resources than Storey, sought to wear Storey down." 9
Allowing matters to go to the UDRP after they have
gone to court almost ensures inconsistent outcomes of benefit
to no one. The UDRP needs to be modified to make this
impossible unless both sides explicitly consent.
2 The only possible defense for the arbitrator's conduct is that the trademark
holder appears to have at least negligently and perhaps fraudulently mis-stated the
procedural history of the case in its submissions. In the portion of the complaint form
that asked for a description of "any other legal proceedings that have been commenced
or terminated in connection with or relating to the contested domain name(s)," it
stated:
This issue began with a Complaint filed 16 Oct. 1997 in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York, 97 Civ.
7677. The case has dragged on for almost three years without
resolution and with significant expense. Cello Holdings LLC
voluntarily dismissed the case last month so as to avail itself of this
dispute resolution policy which was not available at the time of the
1997 filing, thereby saving significant time and expense over the
continued litigation.
Storey, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 359 (emphasis omitted). This left out the key fact of the
dismissal with prejudice.
2s Cello Holdings v. Storey, Case No. Af-056, (e Resolution Dec. 21, 2000),
http'J/www.eresolution.comfservices/dnd/decisions/0506.htm.259 Id.
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C. Time and Computation of Time
1. Notice and Attachments
As noted above, the UDRP not only fails to require
actual notice, or even reasonable efforts calculated to achieve
timely notice, but it unfairly starts the ridiculously short clock
for a response when a complaint is sent, not when it is
received.
The solution is simple. The period for responding should
be at least tripled, and the clock should not start to run until
the entire complaint has been received, or proof is made of
efforts reasonably calculated to achieve actual notice of the
entire complaint."' Furthermore, complainants should be
penalized for using attachments to get around the word limits
on complaints and doubly penalized for using paper
attachments. A suitable penalty would be to extend the
registrant's period to reply by five days for the first five pages
of attachments--except for evidence of registration of the
mark-and one day for each additional page, with double
penalties for paper rather than digitized attachments.
Opponents to this solution might argue that, at least
once there is actual notice, the current twenty-day period is
sufficient for a response. After all, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure offer a defendant in a civil case only twenty days to
file a defense.6 1 If this time period is good enough for the
Federal Rules, it should be good enough for the UDRP. This
argument is mistaken. First, as any practitioner knows, a
substantive answer to a federal complaint is almost never
made within the twenty days specified in the Federal Rules. In
some courts, extensions of time are given liberally or agreed
between the parties.262 The UDRP does not allow this; indeed, it
260 Since there is a genuine problem with false contact details provided
for some infringing uses of domain names, itself circumstantial evidence of bad faith, it
would be an over-reaction to require actual notice in all cases.261 See FED. R. CIV. PROC. 12(a).
262 Indeed, there are incentives for the voluntary extension of time, among
them the thought that time is a two-way street, and both sides may need extensions at
one point or another in a long trial, and the desire not to give the judge the idea that
one is deploying "scorched earth" litigation tactics.
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gives complainants every incentive to hope for a default.
Second, as a practical matter, even without an extension of
time, no federal court will grant a default judgment in twenty
days.26 Most importantly, the initial answer to a civil
complaint in federal court ordinarily is more a matter of form
than substance. A typical first reply will admit the most
obvious facts not in dispute, and submit a general denial to
everything else. A first reply is far from the last word, and
ordinarily will be supplemented by various motions, amended
pleadings, and the like. Indeed, the defendant's first reply
frequently comes at a time when the party has yet to marshal
the evidence and work out a theory of the case, much less plead
it. In contrast, a respondent in a UDRP has to find counsel,
gather evidence (some of which may be located in a foreign
country and language if the validity of the complainant's
trademark is uncertain), marshal his arguments, and file. The
UDRP effectively gives a respondent only twenty days to do
what would take several months in an ordinary federal
lawsuit, even though the complainant has had as long to
prepare as he wanted. Given this, even sixty days is quite a
short period for the average respondent to mount a competent
defense, and may be one factor that explains the current very
high rate of respondent defaults. 4
2. Removal of the NAF "Sandbag" Rule and Its Ilk
The NAF "sandbag" rule26" is one of the most pernicious
examples of a provider's attempt to distinguish itself as
plaintiff-friendly. A rule that allows a party to pay to put in a
surprise pleading, perhaps with new factual allegations or even
a new case in chief, is not a rule calculated to achieve justice.
Allowing the other party to respond at additional cost is not
much help. Either ICANN needs to decide that the rule
violates the existing rules of procedure, or the rules of
procedure need to be rewritten to ensure that if a party
26 Also, a default can be set aside for lack of notice. FED. R. CIV. PROC. 55(c),
60(b).
264 On UDRP defaults rates and* their causes, see Michael Geist,
Fundamentally Fair.com? An Update on Bias Allegations and the ICANN UDRP, at
http://www.udrpinfo.com/resc/fairupdt.pdf (last visited Apr. 22, 2002).265 See supra notes 206-09 and accompanying text.
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introduces a supplemental brief of any kind, the other party,
automatically and without extra payment, shall have an equal
right to respond. More generally, ICANN needs to set up some
continuing procedure by which someone can quickly hear
complaints that a provider's supplemental rules violate the
UDRP. Who that someone should be is a vexing question,
however, as there is no reason to believe that ICANN itself has
the energy or competence to do this.
3. Helping Respondents Find an Arbitrator
Respondents who have the opportunity to appoint an
arbitrator need a better means to locate persons whose
schedules permit them to accept the appointment. Otherwise
the chance to appoint a member of the panel will be wasted.
Ideally this appointment would be centralized in some manner
to avoid the danger that litigants would "pollute" the pool of
possible arbitrators by making improper ex parte
communications as part of their inquiries.
4. Special Rules for Default Judgments?
Although the cause behind the high rate of respondent
defaults is unclear, it may be that in some cases the
respondent defaults are truly cybersquatted domains with false
contact details, or hopeless facts. Thus, the default rate is a
sign that the UDRP is working well. On the other hand, the
constrained time limits and UDRP's poor service provisions
may be preventing registrants with meritorious cases from
mounting an effective defense. If fixing the time and notice
problems noted above causes the default rate to fall
substantially, we will have a good indication as to what
originally caused that high default rateY6 In any case, without
more data it may be premature to advocate any special rules
for default judgments other than to amend the rules to
reiterate the complainant's burden of establishing a case
whether or not there is a reply. I thought this burden was
266It will not be absolute proof, since it is always possible that the clearest
cases were litigated first.
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obvious from UDRP 4(a), but in practice, this has not been
clear to all arbitrators.26
The suggestive fact regarding defaults is that the
default rate for cases filed with arbitration service provider
eResolution before its demise was between ten and twenty
percent lower than cases filed with competing providers.
eResolution was also the only provider that delivers all the
complainant's documents, including attachments, online.
Respondents were also allowed to file all responsive pleadings
and documents online.26 s eResolution's online filing system may
have been sufficiently faster or more user-friendly than the
substantially paper-driven systems used by competitors, facts
that may have contributed to the complainants' bar's decision
to shun it. Perhaps the UDRP should be changed to require all
providers to migrate to fully online systems.
D. Court Review
1. Ensuring Even Unequal Access to Courts
Ensuring that registrants would have some sort of
access to a judge after losing an arbitration was a critical
element of the original compromise that produced the UDRP.
As described above, WIPO's draft did a poor job of this; one of
the major advances of the ICANN draft was that because it
required only a filed complaint in a court of competent
jurisdiction rather than an actnal emergency injunction, it
seemed to do better. Better, but not well: The UDRP timetable
allows the mark holder to take as long as he wishes to file a
complaint, then puts the respondent on a short timetable to
respond. If the mark holder loses the arbitration, he again has
as long as he wishes to file in court; if the registrant loses, he
has only ten days to block the name transfer. Meanwhile, the
267 I have had personal correspondence with UDRP arbitrators who expressed
greatly varying views on this issue.
28 See M. Scott Donahey, The UDRP-Fundamentally Fair But Far From
Perfect, (2001), http'//www.brownwelsh.com/Archive/DonaheyUDRP.pdf (last visited
Apr. 22, 2002).
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struggle in the Corinthians.com matter269 illustrates a problem
that may reappear in other circuits and especially in other
nations that do not create a specific right of action similar to
that found in § 1114 (2)(D)(v) of the ACPA. If a national court
in a jurisdiction with an active population of domain name
registrants were to follow the district court in the
Corinthians.com case and hold that registrants have no way to
bring a case after losing, it would break the fundamental
fairness of the UDRP beyond repair.
2. Technical Amendments
As the drafters of the UDRP worked entirely in a
private-law paradigm, we failed to consider what might happen
if a sovereign party brought a claim. In particular, we failed to
consider whether the consent to jurisdiction in the UDRP
suffices to effect a waiver of sovereign immunity. I think it
does, but this issue needs clarification.2 0
Another problem is how to head off the following
procedural double feint by a determined and unscrupulous
complainant.27' Suppose a mark holder files a UDRP complaint,
including the required admission of jurisdiction at, say, the
registrar's location.272 The mark holder then files a Lanham Act
claim in federal court in his favorite jurisdiction. If the
respondent loses the UDRP and chooses to file a declaratory
judgment action within the ten-day period to stop the domain
name transfer, the mark holder can force a dismissal of this
action by informing the court of the previously-filed suit. After
the ten days have lapsed, the mark holder can also dismiss the
original UDRP action. Since both dismissals were without
prejudice, the registrant can refile his action, but doing so will
be too late to prevent the domain name transfer. Indeed, even
if the registrant ultimately secured a declaration that the
name was lawfully registered, the declaration would be
meaningless because it provides no cause for the return of the
26 9 See supra notes 228-37 and accompanying text.
210 Cf. Virtual Countries, Inc. v. South Africa, 148 F. Supp. 2d 256 (S.D.N.Y.
2001).
271 Again, I am indebted to John Berryhill for this hypothetical.
272 See UDRP Rules, supra note 18, §§ 3(b)(xiii), 1 (defining "mutual
jurisdiction").
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domain name now registered by the mark holder. (Since the
original registrant lacks a trademark, there would also be no
grounds for a UDRP action.) Section 18 of the UDRP rules
currently provides that:
In the event of any legal proceedings initiated prior to or during an
administrative proceeding in respect of a domain-name dispute that
is the subject of the complaint, the Panel shall have the discretion to
decide whether to suspend or terminate the administrative
proceeding, or to proceed to a decision.
3
Revising this provision to require that the UDRP be halted if
there are legal proceedings initiated prior to the UDRP should
head off the procedural double feint.
Another amendment must address the problem of
timely appeals from a judgment in a court of first instance. To
allow a registrar to transfer a domain away from a registrant
who loses an initial decision but makes a timely appeal risks
making the appeal moot. If a party is piepared to file an
appeal, perhaps within some deadline of the initial decision,
that too should toll the name transfer for the same reasons as
the filing of the initial complaint.
E. The Language of the Agreement
Holger Paul Hestermeyer has identified a fundamental
problem with the UDRP that had previously escaped
commentators.274 An official text of the UDRP exists only in
English. Many countries, however, have consumer protection
laws that require all consumer contracts concluded within the
jurisdiction to be in the local language in order to be valid and
enforceable. This condition is not satisfied by the UDRP's
requirement that the proceedings be conducted in the language
of the registration agreement.275 While this may not affect
domain name registrations conducted across national
boundaries, there are an increasing number of registrars
around the world, and today consumers registering domain
273 UDRP Rules, supra note 18, § 18.
24 Holger P. Hestermeyer, The Invalidity of ICANN's UDRP Under National
Law, 3 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 1 (2002).
275 UDRP Rules, supra note 18, § 11(a).
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names often have a local option. The absence of authorized and
accepted translations of the UDRP means that registrars must
either refer to the official English text or translate the UDRP
into their native language. If they refer to the English text,
they may make the agreement unenforceable against
consumers in Germany, France, and other countries with
similar language-related consumer protection laws. 276 If, on the
other hand, the registrars do their own translation, they run
the risk of introducing material variations from the English
text. Any material variations open the registrars to accusations
of breach of contract when the arbitrators use the English text,
which arbitrators are required to do, since the contract
specified the materially different text in the local language.
The issue of translation is far from trivial, since there are a lot
of languages, and ICANN presumably lacks both the funds and
the skill to do the translations. Meanwhile, the parties with the
money and the skill, such as WIPO, may lack the trust of
important segments of the affected communities given WIPO's
mandate to further the protection of intellectual property.277
F. Auditing for Quality and Fairness
ICANN has created a "task force" to review the
UDRP.278 This review is likely to prove difficult because key
data are not easily available. One thing the task force should
do therefore is take steps to ensure that the necessary data will
be available in the future. Indeed, basic steps need to be taken
to enhance the ability of outsiders to audit the performance of
the UDRP. Without more data it is hard to monitor either the
dispute providers or the arbitrators.
For example, one would like to be able to say something
systematic rather than anecdotal about the quality (or lack
thereof) of the decisions of the competing arbitration service
providers. The decisions themselves do bear varying indicia of
quality: clear decisions that follow from premises appear better
276 See Hestermeyer, supra note 274.
277 See supra text following note 198.
278 See ICANNWatch.org, Names Council Selects UDRP Task Force Members,
at http://www.icannwatch.orgarticle.phpsid=317 (Aug. 27, 2001). I am the
representative of the non-commercial domain name holders' constituency on this Task
Force.
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than those that ramble, or appear to have been cut and pasted
from earlier irrelevant cases.2 19 But overt indicia of quality are
not sufficient to prove that the decisions are right, especially if
there are reasons to fear bias. Unfortunately, the current
UDRP makes it difficult to attempt to measure bias in any
systematic way because decisions are published without the
parties' submissions; unlike courts, in which briefs are
ordinarily open public records, the parties' UDRP submissions
are private. Indeed, there is not even a requirement that the
dispute service providers keep archive copies, not to mention
any provision for what happens when providers go out of
business. Not only does this make independent judgments
difficult, but it .makes any review by ICANN unlikely to be
meaningful.280  Complaints and replies should be published
online along with decisions, subject to redaction of confidential
business information. Providers should be required to archive
all briefs and exhibits for several years, and to make them
available to researchers and others who want to study them.
279 See Kieren McCarthy, The Register, WIPO Disgraces Itself Over Celin-
eDion.com, (Feb. 23, 2001), http'//www.theregister.co.uk/content/6/17161.html.
280 The recent UDRP study by The Max Planck Institute, http://www.intellec-
prop.mpg.de/Online-Publikationen/2002UDRP-study-final-02.pdf, falls into this trap:
the evaluators looked at the decisions but without seeing the parties contentions it is
impossible to make an informed decision as to whether the outcome is fair or not.
Consider, for example, Out2.com, Inc. v Rustom Corp., No. FA0010000095896 (NAF
Dec. 20, 2000), http://www.arbforum.condomains/decisions/-95896.htm. The entire
discussion of the merits of the respondents case is as follows: "Moreover, even if
Respondents late-filed Response were considered, the Panel finds that Respondent
failed to show in that Response that Complainant would not be entitled to the
requested relief." And the discussion of the reasons for denying a late filing are almost
as conclusory.
Although Respondent contacted the Forum, after the deadline for
filing a response, and asserted lack of notice, Complainant replied
with documents showing such notice. . . . The record permits
inferences that appropriate effort was made to give notice to
Respondent at the addresses provided by Respondent. Respondent is
required to provide correct addresses to the Registrar and if
Respondent failed to do so, that does not place a higher burden on
those dealing with Respondent to find it where it really is rather than
where Respondent notified those dealing with it that it was located
Id. I defy anyone reading the above to make an informed judgment as to whether the
arbitrator was right or not. There is more exposition in the decision regarding what
complainant alleged on the merits, but even then the opinion mostly refers to it being
supported by "evidence on the record" without telling what the evidence might be. See
id.
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Bias can manifest itself in very subtle ways. Suppose an
arbitral body has 100 arbitrators in its stable. If the provider
believes that some of them have a good-faith leaning in a
particular direction, the provider can influence results by
giving them a disproportionate number of cases, be it more or
less than the average. Even if none of the arbitrators are
biased, a provider can still subtly manipulate outcomes.
Suppose there is a controversial issue of law where courts
themselves are divided. An example might be what rights
franchisees have to use trademarks belonging to franchisors in
the absence of any explicit agreement covering the Internet or
domain names.28' Suppose a case raising this issue comes
before a tribunal and an arbitrator rules for the franchisor,
considering this to be the better view of the law. UDRP
decisions are not precedent; a subsequent panel has no duty to
follow it. However, a competent arbitrator is very likely to take
a consistent view of contested legal questions from case to case.
If the provider continues to select this arbitrator for cases
involving franchisor/franchisee controversies, perhaps on the
grounds of "experience with such matters," the result is to lock
in one view of a contested legal issue in a way that favors one
side.
There is no question that a small number of arbitrators
have heard a disproportionate number of cases and that others
have heard very few.282 The UDRP should require that
arbitration service providers use neutral, documented, and
transparent criteria to select the arbitrator for any given case.
28 Cf. Gaylen L. Knack & Ann K. Bloodhart, Do Franchisors Need To Rechart
The Course To Internet Success?, 20 WTR FRANCHISE L.J. 101 (2001).
m See Geist, supra note 141. Speaking as an UDRP arbitrator, I have to say
that I find one part of NAF's response to the Geist article to be specious at best. NAF
argued that the reason a small number of arbitrators decided the overwhelming
majority of its uncontested cases (almost invariable for the complainant) and that
certain other arbitrators had never been selected (those who had some history that
suggested they might not be as deferential to complainants), is that uncontested cases
are duller, and those arbitrators were generously taking on the extra burden. See
Reuters, Domain Disputes Don't Get Fair Hearing, Study Says, Aug. 20, 2001,
http'//www.siliconvalley.com/docs/news/tech/073106.htm (quoting Edward Anderson,
managing director of the NAF, as saying, "A lot of people don't want to do default
cases. Not everybody wants to do uninteresting stuff."). This is largely nonsense:
uncontested cases are almost always much less work than contested ones, if only
because there's half as much to read, but they pay no less. Furthermore, I have it on
the authority of a NAF panelist who has never had an uncontested case that he was
never asked if he was willing to shoulder this "burden."
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Indeed, subject to the necessary limitations imposed by the
need to select arbitrators fluent in the language of the
proceedings and familiar with the relevant law, arbitrators in
the qualified pool should be selected randomly. WIPO, for
example, has never selected Dr. Milton Mueller, one of its
arbitrators who happens to be the author of a report suggesting
pro-complainant bias in the UDRP,2' as the panelist in a sole-
arbitrator case. 4 It is hard to imagine why this might be other
than a fear it would be bad for business. One sees no such
preference applied against arbitrators whose background or
track record suggests they are happy to find for
complainants.2
Finally, much greater thought needs to be given to how
arbitrators are selected in the first place-and what it takes to
get an arbitrator removed from a provider's list. No amount of
random selection will suffice if a provider's entire list is drawn
from a like-minded community of trademark lawyers with
large institutional clients.
CONCLUSION
The UDRP had a strange genesis. ICANN, supposedly a
technical coordination body for a key part of the Internet, and
undoubtedly a body without much legal expertise, based the
UDRP on recommendations by WIPO, but made a considerable
number of changes of its own. While the substantive parts of
the UDRP received considerable attention before WIPO and
ICANN, and may reflect as much consensus as could be
achieved given the very rapid time frame ICANN imposed, the
procedural parts received far less scrutiny at all stages of the
UDRP's evolution, and are not of high quality.
The UDRP can be seen as the latest part of a general
move to shift dispute resolution towards ADR and away from
traditional adjudication. 86 Online arbitration is relatively new,
See Mueller, supra note 141.
284 Personal communication from Dr. Milton Mueller, February 12, 2002.
28sThe decision records of arbitrators can be examined at UDRPinfo.corn,
http:J/www.udrpinfo.com (last visited Mar. 27, 2002).
286 See, e.g., European Commission, Commission Recommendation of Apr. 4,
2001 on the principles for out-of-court bodies involved in the consensual resolution of
consumer disputes, (2000/310/EC) L 109/56; Gillian K Hadfield, Privatizing
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and new processes inevitably experience teething pains; for
online ADR, it appears that these pains have been severe. As a
recent study by Consumers International of thirty online
arbitration providers put it, "consumers at present cannot and
should not trust that alternative dispute resolution systems
available online can offer adequate redress."2 7 Indeed, more
traditional ADR, without the online component, has attracted
much blame288 as well as praise.289
Even viewed in this most generous context, however,
the procedural design of ICANN's UDRP has a number of
special features that resulted in an especially unjust set of
outcomes. Key decisions were made by unrepresentative
groups or persops who were not subject to any democratic
control, and the rules went into effect because of ICANN's
monopoly over technical aspects of the Internet, not because
any legislature approved them.9 Perhaps because the drafters,
both in WIPO and in ICANN, attempted to model the
substantive parts of the UDRP on an emerging international
Commercial Law, REGULATION 40 (Spring 2001) ("By privatizing... we could gain the
benefits of decentralized innovation and cost-reduction in the design of legal rules ....
Privatization holds out the promise of reducing the cost and increasing the
effectiveness of commercial law."); Mark Seidenfeld, An Apology for Administrative
Law in "The Contracting State," 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV 215 (2000); see also ICC
Electronic Commerce Project, Task Force on Jurisdiction and Applicable law in
Electronic commerce, ICC draft discussion paper on jurisdiction and applicable law in
electronic commerce (Apr. 12, 2001) (advocating increased e-ADR for B2C disputes).
Consumers International, Disputes In Cyberspace 5), at http:J/www.con-
sumersinternational.org/campaignslelectronicadr web.pdf (2000) (on file with author).
28S See, e.g., Chris A. Carr & Michael R. Jencks, The Privatization of Business
and Commercial Dispute Resolution: A Misguided Policy Decision, 88 KY. L.J. 183
(1999-2000) (arguing that development of common law is threatened if too many
business disputes are removed from court system); Paul D. Carrington & Paul H.
Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SuP. CT. REV. 331; Ronald J. Krotoszynski,
Jr., The New Legal Process: Games People Play and the Quest for Legitimate Judicial
Decision Making, 77 WASH U. L.Q. 993 (1999); Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or
Corporate Tool? Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74
WASH. U. L.Q. 637 (1996); Johanna Harrinigton, Comment, To Litigate or Arbitrate?
No Matter-The Credit Card Industry is Deciding for You, 2001 J. DiSP. RESOL. 101
("consumers lose their legal protections in the credit industry when arbitration policies
are favored over consumer credit protection policies").
289 See, e.g., Steven J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing
Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703 (1999).
Alternately, one might view the UDRP experience as tending to support
Prof. Drahozal's observation that "[a]rbitration clauses are most problematic when
market constraints on opportunistic behavior are least effective." Christopher R.
Drahozal, 'Unfair"Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695, 771.
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-consensus against cybersquatting, and especially on an
emerging U.S. consensus exemplified by the Toeppen decision
and later by the ACPA, the greatest flaws emerged in the
newest parts of the UDRP-the procedural provisions. That
these parts also received the least attention and open debate
only exacerbated the problem.
The UDRP's procedural component needs reform. These
reforms, at a minimum should include the following:
A. Basic Fairness Issues
The UDRP must be changed to remove any incentive for
arbitration providers to be "plaintiff-friendly," and to equalize
both sides' influence on the selection of the arbitrators,
specifically:
* Plausible claims of arbitration-provider bias need an
appropriate forum.
* Parties need an enhanced means to get information about
arbitrators' possible conflicts of interest and to act on that
information.
* Complainants should be required to post a small bond
that would be forfeited in the event of a finding that the
complaint was brought in bad faith and constitutes an
abuse of the administrative proceeding.
* Consumers should have access to an authoritative copy of
the UDRP in their national language.
* Providers' methods of recruiting and assigning
arbitrators should be open and auditable. Some thought
should be given to the issues of panelist training,
qualification, and selection, especially with an eye
towards ensuring a broad pool of arbitrators, and
removing opportunities for provider manipulation of
panelist selection.
Complaints and replies should be published online along
with decisions in order to increase confidence in the
justice of outcomes, subject to redaction of confidential
business information which should be segregated in
limited exhibits. Providers should be required to archive
all briefs and exhibits for several years, and to make
20021
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them available after a reasonable time to researchers and'
others who want to study them, with some provision for
redaction of the most sensitive personal and financial
data.
B. Practice and Procedure Under the UDRP
Arbitrators should be instructed even more explicitly as
to what constitutes meeting the complainant's burden of proof.
* The UDRP should specify that neither settlement
negotiations nor solicited offers of sale constitute
evidence of registrant bad faith.
* Either the UDRP should spell out in some detail what
sort of evidence will be considered proof of the existence
of a common law mark, or the UDRP should be limited to
registered marks.
UDRP decisions should be final within the system-any
complaint that elicits a reply should not be subject to a
"dismissal without prejudice" that invites complainants
to try and try again.
* The UDRP should not allow parties even to attempt to
undermine a final decision on the merits by a court of
competent jurisdiction.
* The rules should require actual notice or greater efforts
reasonably calculated to achieve actual notice, especially
in countries with inferior postal systems.
* Given that many respondents are consumers or small
businesses, the minimum time to respond to a complaint
should be increased to sixty days to reflect the amount of
time it takes to locate and brief counsel, collect facts, and
write a brief to which no amendments are permitted.
* Complainants should be penalized for filing lengthy
attachments and exhibits in an attempt to evade word
limits, and for submitting most non-digitized material.
Either behavior should entitle complainants to extra time
on a graduated scale depending on the severity of the
offense.
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* Providers need to be prevented from writing
supplemental rules that violate the UDRP or unfairly
favor either party. Parties need a means to challenge
supplemental rules, and ICANN or some other party
needs to be ready to decide these challenges quickly.
* Procedures need to be created to help unrepresented
parties represent themselves more effectively, and
especially to help them select an arbitrator for three-
member panels.
* More investigation is needed into the causes of the high
rate of default judgments and the extent to which these
cases are being decided fairly.
C. Ensuring Equal Access to Courts
One of the critical parts of the compromise that
produced the UDRP was an assurance that if, as has proved
too often to be the case, the arbitrators rendered an irrational
judgment then either party would have the option of taking the
matter to a court for de novo consideration. One of the major
advances of the UDRP over the WIPO draft was that it
attempted to create conditions in which a losing registrant had
a chance-however cramped and rushed that ten-day window
might be-to take the matter to court. If, for reasons akin to
those set out in the Corinthians.com decision,"' U.S. courts (or
those of another major jurisdiction) were to close off access to
the courts for de novo "appeals" of UDRP decisions, then the
fundamental "parity of review" that underwrites whatever
legitimacy the current system has would be eliminated. Were
this to happen, the UDRP would have to be completely revised,
or even eliminated.
In addition to the more fundamental structural
problems, the time line of the current system is already biased
towards mark holders, who have as long as they want to
prepare their UDRP claim, and as long as they want to bring
their claim in court, subject only to the weak constraint of
possible laches. In contrast, in the current system registrants
29 See supra notes 202-05.
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have twenty days to respond to a UDRP claim, and only ten
days to challenge an adverse UDRP decision. Telling
registrants that they have twenty days to respond to a UDRP
claim, and if they lose that's it (but if they win the other side
can go to court) is so unfair that even the UDRP could not
countenance it.
Or, at least, so one might hope. The UDRP is as bad as
it is because primary drafting authority was in the hands of
groups dominated by trademark partisans who were very,
perhaps overly, concerned about cybersquatting. The initial
drafter, WIPO, exists to promote intellectual property rights.
The subsequent ICANN process was, and remains, captured by
a coalition of trademark interests and other businesses who
believed that they needed to appease the trademark interests
to achieve their goal of getting clearance to create additional
top-level domains. The conditions that caused the UDRP are
still present today in the ICANN domain name servicing
organization and the ICANN Board, so substantial reform from
within the ICANN process is far from obvious. It remains the
case that if you put a committee of foxes in charge of a chicken
coop, you tend to get a lot of happy foxes and dead chickens.
D. Lessons From the UDRP
The UDRP experience has a few things to teach us more
generally about the promise and perils of privatized law
making and about law's relation to the Internet. ICANN
requires all registrants in gTLDs such as .com to agree to a
mandatory online dispute resolution process. It is often said,
with some justice, that "code is law."292 In the case of ICANN's
UDRP, however, the code itself did not determine any
particular outcome. Rather than code being law here, the code
(or rather the Internet standards and practices that made
control of the root critical) simply provided an opportunity for
private lawmaking. Thus, the code or standard was more
properly characterized as constitutional, or more precisely, a
source of power akin to H.L.A. Hart's second order rules.29
See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999).
293 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).
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Indeed, because ICANN imposed its rules on domain
name registrants by contract, in the case of the UDRP "law is
law" rather than "code is law." The critical issue is who makes
that law-who drafts the UDRP and who administers it. The
key effect of the DNS code here is that it allows the law that
controls to be private law-contract terms imposed by ICANN,
ostensibly a private corporation, albeit with the advice of an
international body and a government. Were it not for the
chokepoint, the single point of failure, created by the hierarchy
underlying the DNS, then the law would have been public law,
imposed either by statute or by an international agreement,
which would have required a very different adoption process,
and likely would have had a different outcome. Due process, for
starters.
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NOTES, CREDITS, DISCLOSURES
The ICANN process is noteworthy for the ease with
which people toss around accusations of personal bias. Lengthy
disclosures are thus essential. Here are mine: I participated in
both the first WIPO Domain Name Process and in many of the
ICANN deliberations that created the UDRP, giving me
personal experience of the origins of the UDRP but also risking
a skewed and partisan perspective. I served as a member of the
purely advisory Panel of Experts empanelled by WIPO to assist
it with its report. I disagreed with substantial portions of that
final report and said so in A. Michael Froomkin, A
Commentary on WIPO's The Management of Internet Names
and Addresses: Intellectual Property Issues, at http://www.law.-
miami.edu/-amf'commentary.pdf from which portions of. this
paper are derived. I was also a member of the so-called "small
drafting committee" that advised ICANN on the UDRP, see
Second Staff Report on Implementation Documents for the
Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy, § 2.4, at http://www.icann-
.org/udrp/udrp-second-staff-report-4oct99.htm (Oct. 24, 1999),
although I have my differences with it as well. See A. Michael
Froomkin, Comments on ICANN Uniform Dispute Policy: A
Catalog of Critical Process Failures; Progress on Substance;
More Work Needed, at http://www.law.miami.edu/-amf/icann-
udp.htm (Oct. 13, 1999). I was also director of disputes.org,
which, in partnership with eResolution.ca, was until its demise
one of the dispute resolution providers accredited by ICANN.
Between the original submission of this Article and its going to
press, eResolution folded, cited shrinking market share due to
the complainants' bar's preference for providers they thought
would enhance their chances of winning. See David Post,
eResolution out of UDRP business, http://www.icannwatch.org/-
article.ph-p?sid=484 (Nov. 30, 2001).
Currently, I am a representative to ICANN's UDRP
Review Task Force. I am also a co-founder of ICANNWatch.org,
a group founded to increase awareness of ICANN's activities.
The views expressed in this Article are my own and should not
be attributed to the Task Force or to ICANNWatch.org, or
indeed anyone who does not affirmatively associate himself or
herself with them.
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